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[COMMITTEE PRINT] TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PREPARED BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Serial A ISO APRIL 25, 1960 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics [COMMITTEE PRINT] TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PREPARED BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Serial A m u~ JD m cr _D i o : □ I r=\ i a i m I ° I D APRIL 25, 1969 Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Astronautics U.S. GOVERNMEKT PRINTING OFFICE 99-044 WASHINGTON : 1969 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office "Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $2.25 COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS GEORGE P. MILLER, California, Chairman OLIN E. TEAGUE, Texas JAMES G. FULTON, Pennsylvania JOSEPH E. KARTH, Minnesota CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio KEN HECHLER, West Virginia RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH, Indiana EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut ALPHONZO BELL, California JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia THOMAS M. PELLY, Washington THOMAS N. DOWNING, Virginia DONALD RUMSFELD, Illinois JOE D. WAGGONNER, Jk., Louisiana JOHN W. WYDLER, New York DON FUQUA, Florida GUY VANDER JAGT, Michigan GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr., California LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas EARLE CABELL, Texas JERRY L. PETTIS, California BERTRAM L. PODELL, New York D. E. (BUZ) LUKENS, Ohio WAYNE N. ASPINALL, Colorado ROBERT PRICE, Texas ROY A. TAYLOR, North Carolina LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr., Connecticut HENRY HELSTOSKI, New Jersey LOUIS FREY, Jr., Florida MARIO BIAGGI, New York JAMES W. SYMINGTON, Missouri EDWARD I. KOCH, New York Charles F. Ducander, Executive Director and Chief Counsel John A. Carstarphen, Jr., Chief Clerk and Counsel Philip B. Yeager, Counsel Frank R. Hammill, Jr., Counsel James E. Wilson, Technical Consultant Richard P. Hines, Staff Consultant Peter A. Gerardi, Technical Consultant Harold A. Gould, Technical Consultant Philip P. Dickinson, Technical Consultant William G. Wells, Jr., Technical Consultant Joseph M. Felton, Counsel K. Guild Nichols, Jr., Staff Consultant Elizabeth S. Kernan, Scientific Research Assistant Frank J. Gmoux, Clerk Denis C. Quigley, Publications Clerk Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development EMILIO Q. DADDARIO, Connecticut, Chairman JOHN W. DAVIS, Georgia ALPHONZO BELL, California JOE D. WAGGONNER, Jr., Louisiana CHARLES A. MOSHER, Ohio GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr., California DONALD RUMSFELD, Illinois EARLE CABELL, Texas D. E. (BUZ) LUKENS, Ohio BERTRAM L. PODELL, New York (II) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL April 25, 1969. Hon. George P. Miller, Chairman, Committee on Science and Astronautics, House oj Representatives, Washington, D.C Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the identification in 1965 of the area of technology assessment as a major activity of the subcommittee, work has been proceeding steadily along two lines. One of these has been investigations and inquiry by the committee itself; second, has been the instigation of a number of special studies dealing with differ- ent phases of technology assessment by outside groups. This report by the Science Policy Research Division of the Library of Congress represents the completion of the first of the outside studies. It was inaugurated by the subcommittee late in 1967. Substantive work began several months later following the formulation of specific objectives and study parameters. In our view, the report represents a major eft'ort to delineate the kinds of scientific and technological problems which Congress is in- creasingly being called upon to face. It also illustrates in specific terms just how these problems have been approached and handled by the Congress during the peak technological era in American history — that is, the period from the close of World War II up to the present time. This study should be of use to every member of the Congress. For our committee, it should serve an indispensable purpose in helping us determine what precise mechanism for technology assessment now needs to be established. We believe the effect of the report wiU be a lasting one, both as a reference work of great intrinsic merit and as a guide to the science policies of tomorrow. Sincerely yours, Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development. (m) LETTER OF SUBMITTAL The Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Washington, B.C., April 18* 1969. Hon. Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, Com- mittee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Daddario: I am pleased to submit the study, "Technical Information for Congress," in response to your request. The study contains 17 chapters. The first two chapters contain introductory discussion about the problems of congressional manage- ment of information about technical issues, and indicate the approach to be taken in studying them. These are followed by 14 chapters, each presenting a case study of one particular technical issue that underwent congressional scrutiny and action. A closing chapter of summary observations and conclusions brings together the salient elements of the entire study. The project was under the direction of Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, of the Science Policy Research Division. He was assisted by Miss Genevieve Knezo, who prepared drafts of chapters 4, 6, 9, 12, and 13, and managed bibliographic referencing for the entire study. Many persons in and out of government contributed source data, and deserve our thanks. Staff members of the Legislative Reference Service, and particularly in the Science PoUcy Research Division, under the direction of Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II, reviewed the manu- script and contributed to its completeness. Particular acknowledge- ment is made of the helpful guidance of Mr. Philip B. Yeager, counsel to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, who monitored the project for your subcommittee. On behalf of the staff of the Legislative Reference Service, may I express my enthusiasm for this interesting, demanding, and, I believe, productive assignment. Sincerely, Lester S. Jayson, Director. (IV) •Anniversary date. PREFACE The findings of this study can be stated briefly. Few politicians are scientists, and few scientists are politicians. In the communication of technical information from one group to another, some members of the receiving group, as well as the members of the transmitting group, need to have special qualifications. To help the Congress to assure itself of the quality and thorough- ness, as well as to determine the direction and validity, of the tech- nical testimony it receives calls for a strengthening of the resources of personnel that serve it. The requirement is for support by special- ists with adequate and sound qualifications for understanding, analyz- ing, and interpreting technical testimony. Technical issues requiring congressional resolution are becoming broader in scope ; they are more serious, more complex, and more ur- gent. Information about them is voluminous and abstruse. The di- vision of labor among the continuing committees of Congress, by which some Members become quasi-specialists on each issue, is becoming in- creasingly hard to plan and execute. Congressional penetration into new technical issues is becoming more onerous and time consuming. Arrangements are needed to shorten the leadtime in the making of congressional decisions on technical matters. Leadtime can be shortened by improving the management of technical information. Sound management of teclmical information can improve the sources of in- formation to raise its quality. It can structure it to bring out its es- sentials, analyze it to test its completeness, and filter it to eradicate inaccuracies, contradictions, and irrelevancies. The leadtime can be further reduced. Anticipatory studies by a capable staff can identify teclmical issues likely to require future resolution by the Congress. The collection of reliable factual informa- tion about such potential issues can take place in advance, uncolored by political controversy, and unhurried by the pressures of urgent need. Then, when the issue needs to be decided, the groundwork will have been done and the Congress can more quickly and confidently come to grips with the political assessment of the problem. (V) I .') PART I TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS (VII) 1 T^A*I CONTENTS PART I Technical Information for Congress Page Chapter One — Introduction 1 Statement of the problem 1 Plan for the study 1 Chapter Two — Some general observations on science and government 5 The search for a common ground o The political framework 8 The scientific framework 11 Chapter Three — AD-X2: The difficulty of proving a negative 14 I. Background of the case 14 The story in brief 14 Relevant historical elements in the background 15 Issues growing out of the AD-X2 case 17 The illustrative features of the case 18 II. Beginnings of the AD-X2 story 19 The protagonist: Mr. Jesse M. Ritchie .. 19 Uncertain composition of the battery additive AD-X2 20 III. How the AD-X2 issue came before the Congress 22 Bureau of Standards involvement with AD-X2 23 The Federal Trade Commission and AD-X2 26 The Post Office Department and AD-X2 28 AD-X2 and the Office of the Secretary of Commerce 29 AD-X2 and the Senate Select Committee on Small Busi- ness 31 rV. Management of the issue 35 Structuring the issue 36 Assessment of the issue 39 Definition of alternatives 39 V. Sources of the committee's information 40 Testimony of Ritchie before the committee 40 Testimony of Dr. Astin on AD-X2 and NBS 42 Dr. Weber's description of the MIT tests 45 Other technical evidence presented to the committee 46 Recapitulation : A plethora of data _- 46 VI. The decisionmaking method 47 The decision method in the testing issue 48 The decision method in the regulatory issue 49 The decision method in the science policy issue 51 VII. The outcome of the AD-X2 controversy 52 Direct consequences of the controversy 54 Indirect consequences of the controversy 54 VIII. Lessons of the controversy — The role of scientific information.. 56 (IX) Chapter Four — The point IV program: Technological transfer as the basis Page of aid to developing countries 61 I. The point IV problem and its background 61 Summary of the legislative history of point IV 62 II. Central issues of point IV as seen by Congress and the adminis- tration 64 Political justification 64 Business and financing 65 The alternative of a study commission 68 III. The role of technology in economic development 68 IV. U.S. experience with technical assistance before 1950 78 V. Importance of long-range, comprehensive, and integrated de- velopment programs 81 VI. Evaluation of aspects of the point IV program 84 Research 84 Personnel 86 Agriculture 87 Business 89 Labor 90 Education 91 Population 92 VII. Conclusions 94 Chapter Five — Inclusion of the social sciences in the scope of the National Science Foundation, 1945-47: A groundwork for future partnership 97 I. Background of the issue 97 Origins of the National Science Foundation concept 97 The decision process on NSF legislation 102 Contemporary relevance of the social science issue 103 II. Issues confronting acceptance of the social sciences in 1945 104 III. Lessions of the Senate hearings on NSF bills 106 Testimony of the phj'^sical scientists 106 Testimony of the social scientists on NSF legislation 109 Social science views of Government witnesses 112 IV. Structuring the issue 112 V. The decision process — Senate and House 115 Congressional adoption of permissive formula in 1947 117 VI. Contemporary views of the social science community 119 VII. Federal sponsorship of social science research after 1950 121 Growth in social science sponsorship by NSF 122 Present status of the social sciences 125 Effect of deferred decision on the social sciences 125 Chapter Six — Congressional response to Project Camelot 126 I. Introduction 126 II. Establishment of the issue 128 Military uses of behavioral research in foreign areas 128 The rise and demise of Project Camelot 131 Administration activities 131 Congressional reaction 133 Congressional inquiry 134 DOD's need for foreign area social science data 134 The conduct of foreign area research by the Department of State 136 XI Chapter Six — Continued III. Determination of alternatives and enlargement of the scope of Tugo the issue 137 Foreign area research coordination 137 Subcommittee concern for the relationship of the social sciences and the Federal Government 137 Assessment of the social science/Federal Government re- lationship 138 Congress 138 Social science response 140 Constructive criticism 141 The Administration responds 143 DOD and NAS 143 State Department 144 Other responses in the "Advisory Community" 144 IV. Congressional response 14.5 Fascell bills — Toward a national social science policy 145 National Science Foundation 14.5 NSF information assessed 146 National Foundation for the Social Sciences 147 Objectives 147 Testimony received 148 Federal support of social sciences 150 Foreign area social science research 150 Administrative mechanisms 151 Responsibilities of social scientists in policymaking. _ 152 The proposal for a Social Science Foundation 1,52 Pro 152 Con 153 V. Consequences of Camelot for Government social science 153 Military-sponsored foreign area research 153 State Department response 153 DOD response 1.54 The social sciences and the Federal Government 156 The proposal to create a National Foundation for the Social Sciences, and amendment of the National Science Foundation 156 Congressional stimulation of administration and legislative assessment of the problem 158 Social science response 158 Administration response 158 Conclusion 159 Chapter Seven — Congressional concern with the decline and fall of Mohole. 161 I. Background of the Mohole issue 161 The situation facing the earth sciences in 1957 162 Evolution of Project Mohole 162 Mohole's administrative growing pains 164 Issues raised by the Mohole episode 167 Relevance of the Mohole experience for the future 169 II. The case in Congress 171 Possible congressional response to AMSOC first feasibility report 171 Congressional assessment following phase I success of Mohole 172 Congressional review following ^lohole contract placement. 176 The intermediate versus the ultimate drilling vessel 177 NSF interrogation by Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development 183 Congressional action to terminate the Mohole project 185 III. Conclusions 188 Chapter Eight — The test ban treaty — A study in military and political cost effectiveness . 193 I. Introduction 193 Issues and consequences of the treaty 193 Obstacles to acceptance of the treaty 194 Considerations favoring approval of the treaty 196 Assessment of the process of approving a weapons treaty 198 xn Chapter Eight — Continued Page ^-' II. Background of the issue 199 Status of nuclear tests in 1961 199 President Kennedy's search for a test ban agreenaent 199 Collapse of the test moratorium 200 Impetus to detente after Cuban missile crisis 201 Divisions of opinion on test ban scope 202 Indications of United States and Soviet Union detente 203 Guidelines for treaty negotiations 204 Completion of the negotiation process 205 III. The test ban treaty hearings 206 Complications of hearings in two committees 207 Testimony of the Secretary of State 208 Testimon j^ of the Secretary of Defense 210 Testimony of the Chairman of the AEC 212 Testimony of the Chairman of the JCS 213 Testimony by opponents of the treaty 215 Technical support for the treaty 216 Legal and political considerations, pro and con 218 Analysis of political impacts of the treaty 220 Hearings before Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. _ 222 Military opposition: The theory of maximum deterrence 223 IV. Reports of the committees 226 Findings of the Foreign Relations Committee 228 Committee citations of principal points in testimony 228 Importance ascribed to military safeguards 229 Findings as to proliferation, plowshare, radiation, military acceptance 230 Findings of Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee 230 Military advantages neglected by the subcommittee 232 V. Final Senate decision process on the treaty 232 Preservation of the treaty from "eroding" amendments 233 Protection of Senate prerogatives in treatymaking 234 Preservation of the national security under the treaty 234 VI. The aftermath and the significance of the Test Ban Treaty 238 Expectations of President Kennedy for the Treaty 238 Future guidance afforded by the treaty debates 239 Chapter Nine — Estabhshment of the Peace Corps 241 I. Introduction 241 II. Identification of the issue 242 Congressional proposals by Reuss and Neuberger 243 The Peace Corps bill introduced bj^ Senator Humphrey 244 The Kennedy proposal 245 Public reaction pro and con to the Peace Corps plan 245 III. Assessment of the issue 246 International versus National Peace Corps 247 Evolving scope of the plan through professional reviews 247 The Reuss conferences on Peace Corps proposals 248 Peace Corps evaluation contract for the Congress 248 The Peace Corps task force report to the President 250 rV. Information assessed by the Congress 251 Grassroots technology aspects in Peace Corps presentations. 252 V. Congressional hearings and enactment of legislation 253 Objections 254 Compatibility of the Peace Corps with U.S. foreign policy and goals 254 Language training 25.5 Enactment of the Peace Corps legislation 255 VI. Assessment of consequences 255 Neglect of research as a major program defect 257 Technology transfer in the Peace Corps 259 VII. Conclusion 261 XIII Page Chapter Ten — High-energy physics: An issue without a focus 263 I. Introduction 263 Priority of high-energy physics atnong basic research discipHnes 265 Direct rewards of national investment in high-energy physics. 266 National security aspects of high-energy physics 266 Indirect social benefits of high-energy physics 267 Considerations of continued Government support 268 Recapitulation 269 II. Advice to the Congress on high energy physics 270 The technical advisory panel as a mechanism to advise Congress 271 Presidential support for high-energy physics programs 277 Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 278 Testimony of the Director of the National Science Founda- tion.. . 280 Panel discussion by senior Government officials 281 Roundtable discussion in Joint Committee on Atomic Energy heaiing 282 III. Status of high-energy physics support after 1965 285 Chapter Eleven — The Office of Coal Research: The use of applied research to restore a "sick" industry 288 I. Statement of the problem 288 The changing product mix of energy sources 288 Problems and opportunities in coal research 290 National moves to strengthen the coal industry 291 Plan of investigation of the Special Subcommittee on Coal Research 294 11. The investigation by the Special Subcommittee on Coal Research. 295 Scope of testimony in coal research hearings 296 Position of Bureau of Mines on expanded research in coal.. 296 Scope of potentially useful research in coal 298 Proposed magnitude of expanded coal research effort 299 Organizational issues in expanded coal research program 300 Findings of the Special Subcommittee on Coal Research 301 III. Subsequent historj^ of the coal research program 301 Presidential veto of independent coal research agency 302 Provisions of the Coal Research Act 303 Implementation of the Coal Research Act 303 Uncertainties over the goals of the program 305 Status of coal research program in 1968 305 IV. Assessment of OCR in the light of congressional objectives 307 Consideration of the information-gathering procedures leading to the Coal Research Act 307 Chapter Twelve — Congressional response to the Salk vaccine for immuni- zation against poliomyelitis 309 I . Introduction 309 Increasing incidence of polio in early 1950's 3o9 Present immunization treatments for polio 310 Controversy over introduction of the Salk vaccine 310 Congressional concern over Salk vaccine distribution^ — __. 312 11. Congressional consideration of arrangements for distributing the new vaccine 312 Early difficulties with quantity production 313 The distribution issue in congressional hearings 313 Distribution — The administration plan 314 III. The safety and efficacy aspects of the vaccine 319 Initial congressional probes of the safety and efficacy issue. 320 Technical questions probed by House Commerce Committee. 324 Additional sources of technical information tapped by Commerce Committee 327 Acceptance of enabling legislation for distribution of vaccine. 331 IV. Assessment of the congressional information process 331 Smooth acceptance and distribution of Sabin vaccine 334 XIV Chapter Thirteen — The Water Pollution Control Act of 1948: the dilemma Pare of economic compulsion versus social restraint 337 I. Introduction 337 The issues of national water pollution and pollution control. 337 Evolving problems with water pollution in prewar years 340 II. Postwar consideration of antipollution legislation 341 Legislative proposals for water pollution abatement in 1947 _ 341 Testimony in support of the water pollution control bill 343 Industrial opposition to Federal pollution control 346 Ambivalence of State and municipal views on Federal legislation 348 Interagency contest over pollution control jurisdiction 349 Summary of positions of groups for and against the legis- lation 350 Final congressional action on 1948 water pollution control bill 351 III.T Gradual evolution of comprehensive pollution control 352 National assessments of water needs and resources 352 Resistance to amending legislation, 1954-55 353 Passage of the 1956 amendments; presidential reservations. 354 Renewed activity in Federal control legislation after 1960__ 355 Significance of the 1948 act for subsequent pollution control. 356 Chapter Fourteen — Thalidomide: The complex problem of drug control in a free market 357 I.I^Introduction 357 Medical and pharmaceutical ethics in a free enterprise economy 357 Background of the thalidomide episode 358 II. Criticism of ethical drug industry in antitrust investigation, 1959-61 362 Professional criticism of drug industry and drug control 363 The need for strengthening of arrangements for drug evaluation 367 Senate conclusions of drug investigation 368 III.' Proposals to strengthen control of new drugs, 1961-62 369 Improved drug information program of AMA 369 Recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences 371 Senate hearings on Drug Industry Antitrust Act 372 IV. The thalidomide story 375 Early evidences of thalidomide side effects 377 Medical determination that thalidomide was associated with phocomelia 378 Fortunate exclusion of thalidomide from U.S. markets 380 The thalidomide testing program in the United States 381 V. Congressional response to the thalidomide near-disaster 385 Presidential interest in drug efficacy and safety 386 The spate of drug testimony available to Congress 387 Provisions of the 1962 Drug Act for increased Federal con- trol 390 VI. Aftermath of the thalidomide episode 391 Implementation of the Drug Amendments of 1962 391 Evaluation of efficacy, safety, and comparative merits of drugs 393 The issue of generic versus brand name drugs; clinical equivalence 395 Problems in the exchange of drug information 396 Proposals for an authoritative drug compendium 398 Report on biochemical mechanism of phocomelia from thalidomide 400 VII. The continuing problem of securing and using scientific guidance on drug issues 400 XV Chapter Fifteen — The Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of Page 1947 404 I. Introduction 404 An overview of public attitudes on pesticide regulation 404 Trends in scientific agriculture after 1S60 40.') Essentiality of pesticides in single-crop farming 406 Alternatives to chemical control of pests 406 Federal regulation of agricultural pesticides 407 The dilemma of pesticide contamination and essentialitj' 40roblem of securing reliable information about scientific matters. No effort will be made in the study to resolve the issues that remained in dispute as the case faded from view. It is the virtue of science that truth is finally proved by communication and criticism. In the words of the Committee on Battery Additives of the National Academy of Sciences: "Unsound or illogical scientific work, once published, will not long survive the fierce light of criticism to which it is subjected." On the other hand, it is the virtue of politics to seek out (and find) accommodations by which people can live together in reasonable peace and freedom. Political decisions and policies are sometimes found necessary to mediate, postpone, or circumvent the effects of harsh and arbitrary findings of science that impose unaccept- able obligations or conditions on the electorate. The issue of AD-X2 arose at the interface of science and politics. It grew out of the underlying question as to whether science should find increasing employment in regulating the quality and reliability of commercial products. Out of the case came the decision that the primaiy role of science in commerce should not be to regulate the quality of products to protect the consumer but to discover the truths of natiu'e, and use them more particularly to create additional products for human satisfaction and entrepreneurial exploitation. The issue apparently resolved in the case of AD-X2 is germane in the present day. As American society becomes increasingly aware of the impair- ments to the human enviroiunent that result from the api^lication of technological innovation, the move toward regulation of products and product use to protect the environment is gathering impetus. It is easy to foresee the possibility of some future cause celebre, paralleling that of AD-X2, in which the rights of some small businessman to sell his product come into conflict with the regulatory mechanisms of government and science to protect the environment. 19 II. Beginnings of the AD-X2 Story The case would never have arisen had it not been for an individual- istic entrepreneur whose determined efforts to sell his product brought him in conflict \\ith competitive and institutional obstacles, and whose persistence and ingenuity were sustained in the face of accumulating adversity. The protagonist in this episode was Jesse M. Ritchie, president of Pioneers, Inc., of Oakland, Calif. He described himself in these words: 'T am not a chemist; I am an engineer. I am basically a bulldozer operator." ^ Elsewhere, he has been described as a man of versatile and somewhat informal interests: Ritchie, a self-educated engineer, was born in 1909 in Sharp County, Ark. He supplemented a sixth-grade education with correspondence courses, worked as a certified bulldozer operator and as a journeyman diesel engineer. During World War II he worked as a civilian in charge of various defense contracts and in 1946 joined the Drake-Utah-Grove construction combine on an $80 million Armv Engineer contract, serving as general superintendent of construction with headquarters in the Philippines. In 1945 he qualified as a class A general contractor in California. In 1953 he listed himself as a "Psychologist-Specialist in Alcoholism" in the phore directory in Oakland, Calif. By this time, too, he was able to claim a doctor of psychology degree from a Chicago institution called the College of Universal Truth.^ In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, Ritchie described the evolution of his formula for a battery additive. Upon his return to California from the Philippines, early in 1947, he bought a partnership in a firm that made and sold a storage battery additive called Protecto-Charge. He found this addi- tive to be harmful to batteries, and undertook to develop a satisfactory one. He enlisted the aid of Dr. Merle Randall, professor emeritus of physical chemistry at the University of California. After an earlier partial success, he assertedly settled on the "AD-X2" formida in October 1947.^ To protect his proprietary interest in the new additive he relied on secrecy. In the Senate hearings Ritchie introduced various documents signed or authored by Dr. Randall describing the effect of the new additive in qualitative terms. Experience with the new additive, according to Dr. Randall, showed that it held the active lead paste tightly to the plates in storage batteries with "an apparent, possibly real, decrease in the amount of battery mud." The bubbles of gas generated during the charging phase were small and distributed, resulting, he said, in a decreased evaporation of liquid from batteries.* Elsewhere, Dr. Randall had said that the additive AD-X2 contrib- uted a desirable softening action to hardened "sulfated" battery plate material, and that by electrophoretic action it caused particles of battery mud to be "attracted to the plates, where they lodge and gradually form additional active material." He also attributed to the compounds of sodium suKate and magnesium sulfate the property of diminishing the rate of growth of crystals of lead sulfate; size of these 1 Testimony of Jesse M. Ritchie, president, Pioneers, Inc., Oakland, Calif. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Seleat Committee on Small Business. Battery AD-X2. Hearings before tlie * * * on Investigation of Battery Additive AD-X2. Mar. 31, June 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26, 1953. 83d Cong., first session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 18. 2 Samuel A. Lawrence. "The Battery Additive Controversy." The Inter-University Case Program, No. 68. (University of Alabama, University of Alabama Press, 1962), p. 5. 3 This account is pieced together from Ritchie's testimony in Senate. Battery, AD-X2. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 17-18, 20, 196-197. * Letter of June 23, 1948, from Dr. Merle Randall to Dr. George W. Vinal, National Bureau of Standards. In Senate. Battery AD-X2. Hearings, op. cit., p. 44. 20 crystals was associated with the aging of storage batteries with con- sequent loss of efRciency.^ Other favorable effects included an increase in the porosity of the plate surfaces and a slightly lower temperature of batteries both while charging and discharging. Uncertain composition of the battery additive AD-X2 " From the various documents in the case it is evident that the compo- sition of AD-X2 was inconstant. According to Ritchie's testimony in 1953: It is a secret formula. It contains sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate, but — and this is important — they do not appear as epsom and glauber salts. There are also seven trace elements and a pH of 7.9, if that means anything to you, Senator.'' The composition, he said, had not been changed since October 1947.^ Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, in the Senate hearings, vainly sought more information about the material. Ritchie was carefully uncommunicative, except to admit that some trace elements were added, and that there was silver * * *_9 In an exchange with Senator George A. Smathers, Ritchie ad- mitted that Professor Randall had never made reference to any "secret trace substance or element" in the additive, but that he had said there was magnesium oxide in it.'° A memorandum "to all bureau managers," by Jack A. Harris, general manager of the Oakland Better Business Bureau, February 21, 1949, reported the results of a chemical analysis of AD-X2 made at his request by an "independent and disinterested chemical labora- tory" that described it as follows: Sodium sulfate 60.16, magnesium sulfate 28.64, magnesium oxide 6.95, combined water 3.82. Harris added: "Mr. Ritchie, of Pioneers, Inc., states that this chemical analysis is the most accurate he has seen."" In connection with the extensive NBS tests in June 1952 the "manufacturer supplied an ample quantity of his additive." It was analyzed by the NBS chemists and was found to contain 99.84 percent soluble materials (magnesium sulfate, anhydrous, 47.3, sodium sulfate, anhydrous, 41.2, water of hydration, 11.5) and 0.16 percent insoluble material (mainly barium sulfate).^^ The report of the Academy Committee on Battery Additives, October 30, 1953, cited as a "typical" composition for AD-X2 the laboratory analysis by Squier Signal Laboratory of material supplied early in 1948. It was reported to contain 48.5 percent of sodium sulfate, 42.5 percent of magnesium sulfate, and 8.6 percent of water of hydration. ("The remainder [0.4 percent] was presumably insoluble material.") ' Document titled "Aging of Lead Sulfate in the Lead-Acid Storage Battery," by Merle Randall. Sub- mitted by Mr. Ritchie to the Senate Small Business Committee and identified as a paper that Dr. Randall had delivered at the spring meeting of the American Chemical Society, San Francisco, 1941. In Hearings, op. cit., pp. 72-75. 6 Hearings, op. cit., p. 71, presents explanation by Mr. Ritchie: "AD is additive; X is the unknown portion of the thing; [and the 2 signifies] 1 ion of sodium and 1 ion of magnesium." For a time the new additive went under the same name, "Protecto-Charge," as had been used to designate the unsatisfactory and partially satisfactory precursor additives sold by Ritchie's company. ' Ibid., p. 18. 8 Ibid., p. 20. » Ibid., p. 22. i» Ibid., p. 64. " Ibid., p. 76. '2 Ibid., p. 565. 21 ' The NA8 report observed that "later analyses vary above and below these figures somewhat and we note the analyses change significantly from time to time." This was the earUest of "nearly a dozen" aiialyses encountered by the Academy committee. ^^ According to Dr. Allen V. Astin, Director of NBS, the additive AD-X2 was neither mj^sterious nor unchanging in composition. He said : The Bureau's tests have shown that the material is primarily a simple mixture of sodium and magnesium sulfates and that there is no evidence of a compoiuid or alum structure. The analj'sis also showed a number of trace elements but for the most part these are the same trace elements usually found in varying amovuits in commercial grades of sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate or in the normal battery electrolyte. It is also pertinent to note in connection with the claim of the uniqueness of the composition of AD-X2 that our analyses have shown variations between samples as high as 19 percent in the ratio of sodium sulfate in AD-X2 to the magnesium sulfate. The ratio of the ciuantities of trace elements also vary a})preciabh-.'* In response to questioning by Senator Smathers, the Director said : "We know everything that is in it in concentrations in excess of five parts per million." ^^ He testified that the cost of the sulfate salts in the preparation, in a $36 package wotdd cost about 5 cents at wholesale rates. 1^ An article favorable to the additive, that appeared in Newsweek magazine, December 11, 1950, said that Ritchie had revealed that "the trick is in the way the sulfates are treated during preparation, which takes 4 days and nights." ^^ An element of uncertainty as to the identity of the additive was contributed by the Randalf letter to Vinal of April 23, 194S, which ascribed the "invention" of AD-X2 to a Donald E. Keifer, and stated that: Reductions of 85, 90, and in one instance, 95 percent in annual battery expense during the past year has [sic] been reported by large firms, some of which have always had an intelligent battery service program.'** Since the material in question had been in existence only 6 months, according to Ritchie, and the material superseded had been described by Ritchie as unsatisfactory, and an earlier composition positively injurious, the claim of a tenfold to twentyfold im{)rovement in battery cost/effectiveness on an annual basis, in a communication to a fellow scientist is difficult to understand. The material Randall was discussing he described as "a powder mixture of anhydrous sodium sulfate and a slightly basic, nearly anhydrous, magnesium sidfate." ^^ The conclusion of the Academy committee was that the composition of the battery additive was of no consequence. It said: The matter of the composition of AD-X2 is somewhat irrelevant to our dis- cussion since we liave found no unusual effects which could not be explained by the assumption that it consists of a simple mixture of sodium and magnesium sulfates.^" 13 National Academy of Sciences— N'ational Research Council. Committee on Battery Additives. Report of tlie Committee on Battery Additives. (Washington, National Academy of Sciences, Oct. 20, 1953), p. 30. I* Hearings. Op. cit., pp. 219-220. "Ibid., p. 260. i«Ibid., p. 263-264. 1" "New Life for Batteries." Newsweek (Dec. 11, 1950), p. 62. IS Hearings. Op. cit., p. 45. 19 Idem. 20 Report of the Committee on Battery Additives. Op. cit., p. 30. 22 A somewhat obscure statement by Ritchie in the Senate hearing seems to foreshadow this comment by the Academy committee. He agreed : Most of the learned men with whom I have worked on [AD-X2] have expressed the opinion that it did not make a great deal of difference what it is made of. [And later on] It is my opinion that what is in it doesn't have a great deal to do with the subject matter at all. It is what it does.^i From the point of view of the scientists of the NBS and the Academy who investigated AD-X2, the composition of the additive was not of consequence. However, if the preparation consisted merely of two salts, untreated, without unusual additives, then some extent of mis- representation was present- — if only in the name of the product. Also, there would be an extraordinary price markup, if the "raw" material wholesaled at 2.5 cents per pound and retailed at $18. Moreover, it was to be Ritchie's claim that his additive was different in composi- tion from the scores of others tested by the NBS, and that therefore the NBS publications declaring battery additives without vu'tue did not apply to his. If the first part of his claim was without substance, then there was no substance to the second part. When Senator John Sparkman, toward the latter part of the hear- ing, sought advice from Dr. Harold C. Weber, professor of chemical engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, on whether trace elements might prove beneficial the answer was vmhelpful. Senator Sparkman. Here is a question that comes over from yesterday. If you were here, you may recall that Dr. Astin stated in answer to a question which I put to him — and I am refreshed by one of Senator Smathers' questions — that in the chemical analysis of this AD-X2, it was broken down to a fineness of five points in a million; in other words, that the seven trace elements were found to that extent. Is that a close enough analysis? Could there be other elements in there in that small amount, five points in 1 million, to be effective? Dr. Webkr. I cannot answer your question. I do not know.^^ Ill — How THE AD-X2 Issue Came Before Congress The AD-X2 issue emerged gradually as a question inviting congres- sional consideration. Most of the ways in which it impacted on the Federal Government resulted from the vigorous merchandising and promotional efforts of Ritchie himself. His attempts to establish re- spectable bona fides for his product brought him successively under scrutiny of the National Better Business Bureau, into controversy uith the National Bureau of Standards, and within the regulatory purview of the Federal Trade Commission and the Post Office Depart- ment. Progressively, concurrently with these encounters, appeals were made by Ritchie or on his behalf to individual legislators in the Con- gress. When at length he appealed to the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, that took a leading role in reviewing the issue, some 28 Senators had records in their files of communications with and concerning Pioneers, Inc. Ritchie's early appeals to individual Members of Congress were dealt with in the customary manner — by being referred to the Bureau of Standards, or to the Department of Commerce, with a request that information be provided as to the merits of the case. His appeals to NBS were dealt with, at first, in accordance with established policy — - 21 Hearings. Op. cit., pp. 183, 184. 22 Ibid., p. 392. 23 That NBS would not do any commercial testing at the request of an individual or business firm; That NBS would not identify tested products by name or company affiliation. However, Ritchie's dissatisfaction with the status of his product under this policy encouraged him to generate pressure on NBS to test his product before condemning it. Similar pressure was exerted on NBS by the National Better Business Bureau (NBBB) in an ef- fort to counteract Ritchie's promotional claims that his product was different from those found worthless by NBS laboratory tests, and that the various warnings on the subject issued by NBBB, based on NBS findings, did not apply to AD-X2. "When, in response to these pressures, NBS tested the product, assured the NBBB that the product had been tested, and then allowed the fact to be made public by NBBB, Ritchie's status as a political plaintiff became a special one. Summary action by the Post Office made his problem exphcit and urgent. By selecting the Senate Select Committee on Small Business as the forum in which to present his case, Ritchie was assured of a friendly hearing, if he could estabhsh (a) that his was a small business, (b) that his product had a reasonable claim to utility, and (c) that he had been obstructed in the marketplace by "big business" and bureaucratic regulation. Ritchie was able to document these points. Bureau oj Standards Involvement with AD-X2 The first Federal agency to encounter Ritchie and his company in connection with the controversy was the National Bureau of Standards. Professor Randall's letter of April 23, 1948, wTitten by Randall as consultant to Pioneers, Inc., called attention to the favorable response of batteries when treated with the additive. He said it improved the service and restored the condition of batteries to an extent quite different from that produced by adding equivalent amounts of sodium sulfate and epsom salts.^^ The Randall letter was apparently the opening gun in a campaign to secure an exception for the product of Pioneers, Inc., then known as Protecto-Charge and later called AD-X2. The NBS in 1931 had issued Circular 302 which had recommended against the use of any battery additive, and had named sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate (respectively known as glauber salts and epsom salts) as worthless additives.^* The National Better Business Bureau had long carnpaigned against battery additives as fraudulent, and had relied mainly on the NBS for technical data and support. During World War II, the NBBB had issued "Facts About Battery Dopes" to further its campaign, and "to help the war effort." ^" Ritchie sought to advance the contention that Circular 302, having antedated his product by 16 years, could not be considered to apply to it. His success in gaining the support of the local Better Business Bureau of Oakland, Calif., was shoun by a "confidential memoran- dum to all bureau managers," circulated by Jack A. Harris, general manager of the Oakland BBB, February 21, 1949. It recapitulated the state of affairs regarding Ritchie's campaign, as follows : 23 The Randall letter, cited earlier. Hearings. Op. cit., pp. 44-45. 2« Text of NBS Circular 302 was reproduced in Ibid., p. 515i 2S The text of "Facts About Battery Dopes" was reproduced in Ibid., p. 41. ^4 The U.S. Bureau of Standards, Circular No. 302, specificaly [sic] condemns battery additives composed of sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate on the inclu- sive condemnation that these products are epsom salts and glauber salts. It is Dr. Randall's contention that these two chemicals when used in certain combina- tions with other elements do not form epsom or glauber salts, but form a new compound which does not possess the harmful qualities of the above-named salts. Numerous attempts have been made by Pioneers, Inc., Dr. Merle Randall, S(!n- ator William Knowland, and I, [sic] to get the Bureau of Standards through the Chief of Electro-Chemistry Division, Dr. George W. Vinal, to give this product a fair test to either prove or disprove the statements made in this circular. In every case, the only courtesy received from the Bureau of Standards has been a statement that further test is unnecessary in that the product is admitted by its manufacturers to contain sodium sulfate and magnesium sulfate.^' Shortly after receiving the letter from Randall, Vinal wrote Mr. K. B. Willson, operating manager of the NBBB, June 25, 1948, observing that battery componnds "seem to be becoming increasingly numerous and troublesome" and soliciting his opinion "as to the desirability of issuing an up-to-date statement of the problem." He still regarded Circular 302 as valid, but noted that NBS had con- ducted a 2-year program of unsuccessful research to find satisfactory methods of storing war-surplus batteries, and that information acquired in the course of this work might usefully be incorporated in a revision." Willson replied, June 30, that a new statement would be "extremely helpful to American business and to governmental agencies" as there were several such products on the market. He con- tinued: "Perliaps the most aggressive is Protecto-Charge, which is being promoted out of Oakland, Calif." Willson said lie was includ- ing in his letter some corresi^ondence with Dr. Merle Randall, object- ing to the NBBB bulletin on battery dopes. "I do not know Dr. Randall, but he is presumed to have some standing and his vouching for the product lends further support for it in the minds of the inexperienced and tlie uninformed." '^^ Dr. Vinal wrote Willson again, Jidy 16, exi)laining that national de- fense work had kept him too busy to spend much time "* * * on these rather troublesome battery compounds." He added: "Tliere seems to be unusual activity at the present time, which is ])robably the result of shortages of lead and finished batteries." He saw no reason, on the basis of the information he had about Protecto-Charge, why any excei)tion could be made for this ]:)rodiu't in the application of Circular 302.-^ Vinal's next letter to Willson, dated December 9, 1948, contained a rough draft of the revised circular and invited comments "with reference to subject matter and any possible legal complica- tions." 2" On December 1, 1948, Harris, of the Oakland Bettei'^ Business Bureau, ^vTote Vinal on behalf of Pioneers, Inc., asking NBS either to test the company's additive or to make an excej)tion for it from Circu- lar 302. Vinal rephed, December 22, explaining that NBS had not tested AD-X2 (Protecto-Charge) because he had been informed by Randall that it was merely magnesium sulfate and sodium sulfate, the effects of which were well known by NBS to be useless in batteries. Moreover, tests of the material were being made at the Signal Corps laboratory at Fort Monmouth and at the New York and Mare Island 26 Ibid., p. 76. 2' Ibid., p. 769. 2' Ibid., p. 770. 2» Idem. SI- Ibid., p. 741. 25 Navy Yards. Finally, NBS did not make commercial tests of battery materials, did not endorse commercial products, and did not permit the results of its tests to be used for advertising purposes.^^ At about this same time (Aug. 25, 1949). a letter from the Oakland Chamber of Commerce, with a copy to NBS, went to the National Better Business Bureau, endorsing in principle the latter's pamphlet against the "battery-dope racket" but asking that AD-X2 be specifi- cally excepted from its application."- During 1949, the NBBB continued to press Vinal for a compre- hensive and up-to-date statement that woidd unmistakably apply to AD-X2. Finally, Vinal wrote, June 22, "It has been our policy not to make any tests on commercial products until requested to do so by some Government agency which is interested in the merits of the product. If this matter is turned over to FTC [the Federal Trade Commission] it is possible we may be requested to make tests." ^^ In the vSenate hearings. Senator Gillette told Director Astin of NBS that "if that is not a suggestion on how to proceed to ask your organi- zation to make tests, I do not know the English language, Doctor." ^* However, the NBBB had filed a protest with FTC regarding AD-X2 on June 17, and had apparently sent a copy of the action to NBS at the same time. It was probably to this action that Vinal was referring, rather than volunteering the suggestion that the action be taken. Earlier in the hearing, Secretary Weeks, of the Commerce Department, had also been a victim of this same misinterpretation. In his prepared statement, March 31, he had said: "* * * I find the National Bureau of Standards suggesting to the National Better Business Bureau that tests would be made if requested by the Federal Trade Commission." ^^ A reason for NBBB anxiety to have an explicit and authoritative statement as to NBS findings on the inefEcacy of AD-X2 was that potential "legal complications" were assuming importance. WiUson wrote Vinal, Alarch 29, 1950, to explain: The reason why we have considered sending a bulletin to Vjattery manufacturers on this subject is because Pioneers, Inc., apparently has been pursuing a deliberate course of making inquiry of various manufacturers and their dealers in regard to the product — AD-X2. When they receive in reply a copy of our bulletin on battery compounds and solutions, they believe they have evidence to show that through the distribution of our bulletin we and the manufacturers distributing it are damaging their business. I do not know what they intend to do with this "evidence," but in view of certain threats which they have made about possible action against the manufacturers, we felt dutybound to put them on notice * * *. Pioneers, Inc., has always been in the position to tell us that although they agree completely with everything that Ur. Condon stated in our bulletin, the National Bureau of Standards has not tested their product and, therefore, was not in a position to state with authority that it is not the exception that they claim it to be. If we now can tell Pioneers, Inc., that you have tested their prod- uct and found it wanting, they may continue to dispute your findings and con- clusions but they cannot claim that they are based upon theorv and not an intimate knowledge of the product.^'^ With the permission of NBS, NBBB in August issued a new pub- lication on battery additives specifically identifying AD-X2 (among others) as having been tested and found ineffective by NBS. The 31 Ibid., p. 772. 32 Ibid., p. 79. 33 Ibid., p. 777. 31 Ibid., p. 250. 3^ Ibid., p. 2. 36 Ibid., p. 780. 26 publication noted that the NBS finding was challenged by Pioneers, Inc., on the ground that the "only practical means of determining the product is through field test." The tests of NBS, the protest continued, "were not run in accordance with our specifications and, therefore, did not indicate the value to be derived from our product." " The Federal Trade Commission and AD-X2 A complaint agahist AD-X2 was filed by the National Better Busi- ness Bureau with the FTC, June 17, 1949. The Commission instructed its San Francisco field office to initiate a field investigation of the product. However, this first field investigation appears to have yielded no adverse information about AD-X2. "Instead of unearthing com- plaints, the [FTC] San Francisco office found wide acceptance for AD-X2 in and around the bay area. The proponents included technical personnel at military installations, the Oakland Chamber of Com- merce, the Oakland BBB, and many individual customers." ^^ A second complaint came to FTC, March 10, 1950, from the Asso- ciation of American Battery Manufacturers, transmitting a letter from Keystone Batteries, Inc. The Keystone letter, dated February 2, 1950, said in part: When the AD-X2 first came out, we thought they would kill themselves off m short order like most of the other battery additives in the past, but they seem to be getting stronger and reaching out further all the time, and they will probably reach Midwest and East unless something is being done. As we understand it, they are now appointing dealers in various cities on the west coast who not only try to sell this preparation but also will recondition a stock of old batteries which they will guarantee for 12 months. * * * This is a sweet business because we have been informed that all they do is charge these batteries or, at the most, reinsulate them, which shows a considerable profit * * *. This is a serious situation. We know that we have lost a considerable amount of business for last month alone and the loss of business to large manufacturers must have run into thousands.^^ In forwarding this letter to the FTC, the Association of American Battery ^Manufacturers explained its position as follows: At one time the association tried to combat the use of dopes or trick electrolytes because after a group of them had been carefully tested in the laboratory it was found that none of the materials tested had been helpful in battery performance and some of them were actually harmful. Many of these were reported to the Federal Trade Commission from"'time to time. Cease-and-desist orders were issvied by the FTC, but the companies would spring up in other localities under different names and it became a hopeless effort. Moreover, retailers of the dopes used as an argument for selling the materials that the battery industry is interested in obstructing the use of the materials because they would lengthen the life of a battery and reduce sales. This was not the case. The industry was simply trying to protect its product against introduc- tion of foreign materials and at the same time prevent the public from spending its money for something of no value.'"' Faced with these conflicting views, FTC sought technical advice from NBS as to the merits of the additive, by letter of March 22, 1950."^ On the basis of chemical analyses of the additive, and earlier experiments with two batteries. Dr. Vinal reported to FTC, May 11, that a series of tests had demonstrated no "significant reduction in harmful sulfation * * *." (Results of these tests were later reported in the NBS Circular 504, Battery Additives, issued in January 1951.) ^^ " Ibid., pp. 781-782. 38 Lawrence. Op. cit., p. 8. 89 Hearings. Op. cit., pp. 514-515. " Idem. " According to Lawrence, Op. cit., p. 8. <2 Ibid., pp. 8-9. Also, "Report of tlie Committee on Battery Additives." Op. cit., p.U. 27 Meanwhile, further information was accumuhiting in the FTC San Francisco office: Its San Francisco attorney-examiner did not consider the NBS test results conclusive. He felt that the iSTBS report would have had greater effect if actual service tests had been made. He felt that the overwhelmingly satisfactory experi- ence of many bay area users, reinforced by tests approving AD-X2 made at the Universitv of San Francisco, outweighed the NBS findings. He, therefore, recom- mended on December 8, 19.50, that the FTC drop its case without prejudice to the right of the Commission to reopen if and when warranted by facts. He was overruled by reviewing officials in both Washington and San Francisco who felt that the laboratory tests at NBS were more competent and conclusive than the experience of users. Attempts were then made to work out a stipulation under which Ritchie would modify some of his advertising claims. Ritchie refused to accept any restrictions on his advertising. The investigation continued.^^ It is not clear from the record whether or not the article in Newsweek magazine, issue of December 11, highly favorable to AD-X2, had appeared before the December 8 recommendation was made in San Francisco. Of the first test of AD-X2 run by NBS, Dr. Astin was later to e.xplain : The test was actually run on the Bureau's own initiative, but there had been prior requests from Senator Knowland and from the Oakland Better Business Bureau. About that time, the Federal Trade Commission had asked the National Bureau of Standards to run an evaluation on another battery additive, and it was felt that with very little added effort, AD-X2 could be put in and run along with the other additive, and that was the occasion for starting the test.^* The first NBS report was considered defective by FTC from the legal [)oint of view, because the samjjles used in the test had not been obtained by FTC in the course of its investigation. Accordingly, a request was made by FTC for further tests. Dr. Walter J. Hamer, who had replaced Vinal upon his retirement, after further tests, repeated the earlier NBS finding in a report dated July 21, 1952.*^ Dr. Astin summarized the rather confusing sequence of NBS tests as follows : There was a request from the Post Office Department in September of 19.51, but the Post Office Department was given, in response to that request, the data obtained from the test beginning January 1949, and the second test for the Post Office Department started about the first of 1952, and there was almost simul- taneously a second test about that time for the Federal Trade Commission. So the second and third tests which w^ere run by the Bureau on AD-X2 were in the winter of 1951-52. I do not recall the exact dates.^^ A further test was run publicly in June 1952, with Dr. Astin per- sonaUy in charge, in an eft'ort to satisfy Ritchie and his supporters by following precisely the test procedure he had specified. Like the other tests conducted by NBS, it found no merit in AD-X2 and was called faulty by Ritchie.*^ The quasi-judicial character of the FTC as a regulatory agency largely insidated it from external pressures by interested parties or from congressional intervention. Apjjarently the only congressional exchange was with Senator Henry C. Dworshak, who wrote FTC, October 24, 1951, to suggest that it might be advantageous if tests of " LawTence. Op. cit., pp. 9-10. " Hearings. Op. cit., p. 258. " Report of the Committee on Battery Additives. Op. cit., p. 10. <« Hearings. Op. cit., p. 259. " Idem. Also, see Hearings. Op. cit., pp. 222-225. 28 AD-X2 were run for FTC by some other laboratory than NBS. The Commission, through Chairman James M. Mead, replied in part: The Commission has reviewed this matter very carefully and has decided to have new and additional tests made with respect to the product by the National Bureau of Standards. It is being requested * * * that the tests conform, insofar as is possible, to the manufacturer's directions for use of the product * * * . The Bureau of Standards, of course, has no biased interest in the tests which it runs, and the Commission has always found the Bureau most fair in its position on other matters in the past.*^ Although the issue of AD-X2 remained on the FTC docket through- out the period of intense congressional concern it did not become active until 1954. Nevertheless, developments in other areas of the case were presimiably of interest to FTC, and the ultimate disposition of the FTC complaint was undoubtedly of considerable interest to Rit'"lne and his associates and supporters. In this sense, the suspended case was a source of pressure on Pioneers, Inc. The Post Office Department and AD-X2 Apparently, a complaint was lodged with the Post Office Depart- ment some time before September 6, 1951, when the Ciiief Post Office Inspector asked NBS to advise him if the additive x\D-X2, ''* * * when used as directed and applied to mechanically sound batteries, will prevent sulfation and exteiul the life expectancy of mechanically sound batteries; whether it will restore junked batteries to normal use; and whether it will extend the life of batteries 2^2 times tlieir normal Hfe." *^ According to Dr. Astin's prepared statement to the Small Business Committee — The Bureau submitted a report in December 1951 * * * based on results of tests obtained on the sample submitted by the Oakland Better Business Bureau. Following receipt of this report, the Post Office Department also requested addi- tional tests on samples submitted by them. Accordingly, the National Bureau of Standards initiated still another series of tests of AI)-X2.5° Apparently, this first NBS report to the Post Office Department- like the first report to FTC — was unsatisfactory because the material tested had come to the Government by an inappro])riate route (the Oakland Better Bushiess Bureau). Tlie record is not clear as to when and what further tests were performed. ConjecturaUy, the AD-X2 material supplied by the Post Office Department and the material supplied by FTC were both analyzed ui detail. (Dr. Astin mentioned the variation, from time to time, in the analysis of the additive. )^^ Apparently, also, the first NBS test for the Post Office was rim in the early days of 1952, almost simultaneously with the first test for FTC. For the Post Office, 14 three-cell batteries were used. At any rate, the Post Office Department notified Ritchie, March 2, 1952, that he was to appear at a hearing in Washuigton on April 26 to answer charges that he was "conducting an mdawful enterprise through the mails." After a series of postponements, the hearing was eventually held October 13-14.^2 ' «s Foregoing statoment based on text and internal evidence in FTC letter, appearing in Hearings, op. cit., p. 122. " Report of Committee on Battery Additives, o;). cit., p. U. 5'' Hearings, op. cit., p. 221. «i Ibid., pp. 221-222. 52 Account taken from Lawrence. Op.- cit., pp. 11-12, 14-16. Post Ofnce Solicitor's docket No. 2., ( p. cit., notes for the October hearing: "No one appeared for respondent at the hearing these dates." 29 Ritchie, upon receiving the Post Office notification, immediately went to Washington where he endeavored to recruit a legal and tech- nical staff, and sought support of the Committees on Small Business of the House of Re]n-esentatives and the Senate. The House committee responded to Ritchie's appeal by directuig a request, over the signa- ture of the executive director of the staff, that the NBS "* * * make a new test of [Ritchie's] product and submit a report on specific results of your testing." ^^ This test was supposed to be carried out in accordance with procedures specified by Ritchie. Subsequently, the House connnittee withdrew from further participation in the contro- versy, and left the followup action on tests and testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Small Busmess. The tests run by NBS of AD-X2 in June 1952, were with the co- operation and participation of Ritchie, and were under the personal supervision of Dr. Astin. As he told the Senate committee, the following year, "* * * i i^.^j hoped that by using a procedure described by [Ritchie], the matter could be settled decisively for all concerned." ^^ An elaborate series of tests was performed and was reported on Jidy 11, 1952. Again, the NBS found no merit in the additive, and again Ritchie assailed the tests as having been improperly performed.^^ When the rescheduled Post Office hearing took place, October 13-14, 1952, Ritchie did not appear. Testimony was provided by Dr. Astin and seven senior scientists from NBS. Decision was issued February 18, 1953, then suspended within a week by order of the Postmaster General, Arthur Summerfield, on Alarch 2, and eventuall}^ was can- celed, August 20, 1953.^« AD-X2 and the Office of the Secretary of Commerce During the closing months of the Administration of President Truman, after nearly 20 j^ears of Democratic succession, policies had become habit and a minimum of policy surNeillance was exercised by departmental secretaries over bureau chiefs. The AD-X2 contro- versy at NBS did not involve the Secretary of Commerce. However, the advent of the Administration of President Eisenhower brought important changes in policy and personnel. The new Secretary of Commerce, wSinclair Weeks, was particularly outspoken as to the need for restoring a "climate" favorable to private business. When his appointment was announced, in December 1952, he received considerable mail from — * * * People telling me that an outfit in Oakland, Calif., making a product called AD-X2 to prolong battery life tlirough reducing sulfation, was having tough sledding in Washington. Your committee, in fact, issued a report on the subject last December. One of the first things I did was to ask Mr. Sheaffer, Assistant Secretary for Domestic Affairs, to make a full and impartial investigation. He and his men have gone through file after file extending over the past 5 years.^^ « Hearings, op. cit., pp. 222-223. " Ibid., p. 222. 55 Ibid., pp. 223-224. The report of NBS on the test is presented at p. 551. 58 Lawrence. Op. cit., pp. 16, 19-20; 27. " Hearings, op. cit., p. 1. On Weelis' outspokenness, Lawrence, p. 18, notes: "Weelis' approach in his early months as Commerce Secretary was direct and forceful. 'We shall clean up the mess,' he promised in his first public statement. 'The administration has tlie backbone to do the job. * * * ShriU cries will be heard as the ax is swung on deadwood and poison ivy.' This pledge was followed by replacement of five higli-level officials * * *." 30 When the Post Office decision on AD-X2 was made public, Secre- tary Weeks actively intervened. By correspondence and interdepart- mental meeting he encouraged the suspension by the Postmaster General of the ruling against Pioneers, Inc/^ He also acquiesced in the action of Craig R. Sheaffer in requesting the resignation of NBS Director Astin/^ When this action was represented in the press as a political assault against "science" as symbolized by NBS, the Secre- tary appeared before the Senate Small Business Committee to advance his philosophy as to the interface between private business and Gov- ernment science. He made a brief but emphatic statement, expressing sympathy for Ritchie, criticizing the NBS as not "sufficiently objec- tive," and indicating dissatisfaction with Du'ector Astin. He said: We have felt rather strongly about this particular situation. It is one of many phases of that particular picture that caused us to decide that it would be well to have a change in the administration of the department.^" Weeks pledged to the committee that he would obtain the best scientific advice available to evaluate the role and mission of NBS, that he would have new tests of AD-X2 performed by "scientists in the Bureau who have never had an}^ connection with this matter," and that in the meantime he would suspend all NBS circidars dealing with battery additives. The forced resignation of the Director of NBS brought sharp critical response from the scientific community. "With the criticism mounting, the Secretary turned to the Visitin;^," Committee of the National Bureau of Standards." ^^ A meeting of the full Committee was held A})ril 14. That same day. Dr. Detlev Bronk, president of the National Academy of Sciences and a member of the Visiting Committee, wrote Weeks urging that Astin's dismissal not take effect until the AD-X2 issue had been studied. Weeks announced April 17 that Dr. Astin would remain temporaril}- as NBS Director, and that Dr. Mervin J. Kelly, president of Bell Telephone Laboratories and a member of the Visiting Committee, had been asked to form a group to evaluate the general situation of NBS. Weeks had already discussed A\-ith Dr. Bronk the possibility of a separate study to be conducted by the National Academy of Sciences to clear up some technical imcertainties as to the merits of AD-X2. A formal request was made by Weeks to the Academy on this matter, May 3, 1953.^^ The response of the Academy was a report by the Committee on Batter}^ Additives, of the NAS, October 30, providing two conclusions: NBS had done excellent work in battery testing, and 5' Lawrence, op. cit., p. 19, describes a departmental meeting on the Post Office action. Solicitor's docket No. 2, op. cit., at 3-2-53, notation reads: "Letter from Secretary of Commerce to Postmaster General, advising that it has come to liis attention that there is available certain credible and pertinent evidence not introduced in the hearings of POD concerning respondent corporation; and requesting that the POD suspend the fraud order of 2-24-53." M Ibid., p. 21. 60 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 1-5, especially 5. 61 Lawrence, op. cit., p. 23. According to the ofTicial history of NBS, the sequence of events was as follows: "Uln April 1953, in the midst of the impasse raised by the controversy over AD-X2, Secretary of Coimnerce Weeks asked the National Academy of Sciences to convene an ad lioc committee to evaluate the functions and operations of the National Bureau of Standards in relation to the current national needs * * *. H * * * In March 1953, anticipating Secretary Weeks' own request by almost a month, the Director of the Bureau had written liim to seek the counsel of the National Academy of Sciences on the current program and operations of tlie Bureau." (U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau of standards. "Measures for Progress: A History of the National Bureau of Standards." By Rexmond C. Cochrane, editorial consultant— James R. Newman (Washington, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1966, p. 495.) 62 Lawrence, op. cit., p. 27. (According to tliis source, the letter noted that "the matter has been discussed over the phone and othenvise on an informal basis," but that the letter was judged necessary by Weeks to fimi up the assignment.) 31 the additive in question was Anthoiit merit. ^^ Of greater significance for the underlying issue was the report of the Kelly committee, whose initial findings went to the Secretary in late July, and whose formal report was transmitted October 15. The Kelly committee found that the quality of personnel and scientific research of the Bureau were high, but that basic research had lost ground "at a tragic rate" to sponsored development of military hardware for the Department of Defense and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. With respect to the AD-X2 controversy, the committee recommended that the NBS be insulated from contact with private industry on the nontechnical aspects of commercial testing, and that the Secretary of Commerce be made responsible for the "policy and the establishment of the nontechnical procedures on commercial product tests." ^^ In carrying out this second recom- mendation, the Secretary transferred NBS from the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary for Domestic Affairs to the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The Kelly committee quite evidently sought to remove the NBS from the kind of contacts with private industr}^ that had led to the AD-X2 controversy, which was explicitly cited in the report: "The current 'Battery Additive' evaluation is typical of others that have sporadically occurred throughout the Bureau's history where its findings have been challenged and \\'ide public attention directed to them." The committee recommends that policy and procedures of a nontechnical nature, particularly with other agencies of Government, for handling commercial product tests be reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce and appropriate members of his staff with the Director of the Bureau of Standards. The committee recom- mends that the policy and establishment of the nontechnical procediu-es on com- mercial product tests be the responsibility of the Secretary of Commerce. The policy on the technical content of the problem should reside with the Director of the Bureau. We believe that the area of commercial product tests involves policies and actions of a nontechnical nature on which the Director of the Bureau should not be required to make the decisions.*^ Apparently his contacts with Director Astin, and his discussions with Dr. Kelly on the future of the Bureau, satisfied Secretary Weeks as to the merits of Dr. Astin. Members of the Visiting Committee had been asked to nominate possible candidates for the du'ectorship, and had unanimously agreed to recommend Astm's retention. Accordingly, on August 21, he announced that Dr. Astin was being retained as "a member of my team." ^^ AJD-X2 and the Senate Select Committee on Small Business At the opening of the hearings on "Investigation of Battery Ad- ditive AD-X2," the chau'man. Senator Edward J. Thye, described the function of his committee: "* * * to help create an atmosphere in our general economy that is conducive to the welfare of small-business enterprise and the creation of new business." ^^ Subsequent testimony brought out the fact that the particular product that was the subject 63 Report of the Committee on Battery Additives. Op. cit., p. 1. 6< Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation of the Present Functions and Operations of the National Bureau of Standards. A "Report to the Secretary of Commerce on tlie Present Functions and Operations of the National Bureau of Standards With Their Evaluation in Relation to Present National Needs and Recom- mendations for Improvement and Strengthening of the Bureau." ((Washington), processed Oct. 15, 1953), p. 16. '5 Idem. 6» Lawrence, op. cit., p. 27. Noted the New York Times: "Dr. Astin has since been reinstated, and Craig R. Sheafler, an Assistant Secretary of Commerce, who has been popularly credited with trying to get rid of Dr. Astin, has resigned" ("Scientists Praise Standards Agency," New York Times, (Oct. 16, 1953), p. 11, col. 3). 6' Hearings, op. cit., p. 1. 32 of the hearings had been repeatedly brought to the attention of in- dividual members, and of the committee staff. For example, referring to a "letterwriting campaign to the Congress that started in the sum- mer of 1951 * * *," Senator Sparkman observed: By the way, let me say this: I was chairman of the committee when this matter came up. I have no apology to offer for our committee's having vmdertaken it. I think we wonld have been neglectful of our duty if we had not. You point out that some 28 Senators had interested themselves in it. Those same Senators were calling upon a committee that had been set up in the Senate for the purpose of protecting the interests of the small businessman, to intercede in behalf of this small business. We handled it as a routine matter. We have literally hmadreds of these cases throughout the j^ear, and it was handled by the staff as a routine matter.^^ A second wave of letterwriting to the Congress on behalf of AD-X2 occurred in February 1952. Again, according to Senator Sparkman — Apparently these letters started coming to the Senators about February. The letter that I received originally was February 19, 1952. That letter was referred to the committee staff. Copies of that letter have been sent also to other members of the committee. Action in response to this letter, by the committee staff, was to request from the Director of NBS available information on the additive AD-X2.«9 Shortly after March 2, 1952, when the Post Office Department summoned Ritchie to appear in Washington to answer mail fraud charges, he went in ])erson to the Small Business Committees of the House and Senate to appeal for their help. The House committee wrote NBS, March 11, asking that further tests be made of AD-X2. In the Senate committee, a more comprehensive response resulted. The Senate committee staff also asked NBS to make further tests. However, Blake O'Connor, committee staff member, became active in pursuing the truth of the controversy as a test case of justice to small business confronted by big business and big government.™ When the extensive set of NBS tests of AD-X2^ iu June 1952 had been completed, the Senate Small Business Committee staff pressed for an inclication of results. Dr. Astin, in his testimony to the com- mittee, noted that "Mr. O'Connor of your committee had requested that we make every effort to exi)edite the report * * *." "^ When the report was transmitted to the committee, July 11, O'Connor apparently regarded it as unsatisfactor3^"^ Dr. Astin said that O'Connor had asked him, later in the summer, "* * * if ^ve would be willing to run still another test." "^ (Dr. Astin had replied that he would be willmg to do so, if the test were designed to establish some new pertinent factor, and if Ritchie would provide the batteries.) At any rate, the staff of the Senate Small Busmess Committee persisted in the matter. Technical support was provided by Dr. Keith Laidler, associate professor of chemistry at Catholic University, 68 Ibid., pp. 258, 234. 68 Ibid., pp. 286-287. '0 According to Lawrence, op. cit., p. 12, the opposition of battery manufacturers to tlie promotion and sale of AD-X2 served as confinnation that it liad merit, insofar as the committee stalT was concerned. O'Connor — says Lawrence— "saw in AD-X2 a test for the committee:" (apparently quoting O'Connor:) "Would [it] be content merely to make more or less innocuous studies of small business problems and file reports for the record or would the committee turn when needed into an aggressive champion of the riglit of the Nation's small businessman?" 'I Hearings, op. cit., p. 224. " Idem. Also, Lawrence, p. 14. " Hearings, op. cit., p. 224. 33 who had accepted employment in 1952 as consultant to Ritchie; ^* on July 29, Dr. Laidler, accompanied by O'Connor, met with Dr. Astin to discuss the results of the NBS tests the previous month. In a subsequent letter, August 5, to Ritchie, Dr. Laidler expressed dis- satisfaction with the NBS interpretation of the data. He also mdicated the existence of a hostile attitude that existed between himself and the Director."' Dr. Astin later described "proponents of AD-X2" at this time as "lookino- for minor flaws in the report and the testing- procedure ***."-« The proponents of AD-X2 continued to press for further action by NBS to validate the product. As a residt of the conversations between Dr. Astin and O'Connor, a meetmg was convened, September 29, in Dr. Astin's office at the Bureau. Its purpose, according to O'Connor, was to "clear the air." In attendance were Dr. Astin, O'Connor, Ritchie, Laidler, two representatives of the Post Office Department, a representative of the Department of Justice, and several NBS scientists. Also present was Dr. Harold C. Weber, the chemical engineering professor from ^IIT, who reported favorable results from some lareliminary tests of AD-X2 he had run on his own initiatives^ The mterest of the Justice Department related to an antitrust case in preparation against the Association of American Battery Manu- facturers for consph'acy to prevent resale of used battery lead. Dr. Weber's interest appears to have derived from his contact with Nor- man Goodwhi, president of Guaranteed Batteries, Inc., of Boston, and local sales representative for Ritchie's product. ''^ Laidler's role at this time seems to have been as consultant to the Small Business Committee.'^ According to a memorandum of that meeting, circulated hj the chairman of the Senate committee, and a[)parenth^ prepared by O'Connor, it was agreed that additional tests of AD-X2 would be desirable, that jjreferably such tests should be held elsewhere than in the NBS, and that NBS would agree to i)articipate. (Dr. Weber's recollection was that Dr. Astin did not agree to partici[)ate, but merely said "it could be arranged" or something of thesort.)^" Dr. Astin's own explanation was that no definite agreement had been made, and that in view of Ritchie's attitude toward tlie Bureau, "* * * we concluded that it would be better if MIT carried out its tests completely inde- pendently." He added that at the September 29 meeting Ritchie had said that "* * * he would believe no results which were not favorable to his product and that he did not believe Bureau personnel could be depended on to give a fair test." ^' O'Connor wrote NBS, September 30, suggesting that Bureau liter- ature critical of AD-X2 not be circulated by the Bureau until conflict- ing technical points of view were resolved. On October 8 he wrote '* According to Lawrence, p. 17, in late 1952 Laidler was "the Committee's unpaid consultant, who had until recently been Ritchie's scientific adviser and would be again in 1953." "5 Hearings, op. cit., p. 150 (where the letter is reproduced in full). '6 Hearings, op. cit., p. 224. " Lawrence, op. cit., p. 14. 78 Hearings, op. cit., p. 380. 79 In the hearings, Senator Humphrey asked Ritchie how Dr. Laidler had become acquainted with the committee. Ritchie replied, in part, that: "Dr. Laidler had been helping me with tliis situation, and due to some difficulties with the Duector of the Bureau of Standards, he reached the conclusion that he had better not work for me any more, and the committee was just entering into the tiling then, and * * * really taking an interest in the situation, and they had no technical help. I believe that tlie committee felt at that time that possibly Dr. Laidler's academic freedom was threatened, and they asked him. To the best of my knowledge, they knew at that time that he had been helping me (p. 207)." '0 Hearmgs, op. cit., p. 384. 81 Ibid., p. 225. 89-044—69 4 34 Dr. Julius Stratton, provost of MIT, asking "if it would be possible for the tests agreed ui)on to be conducted by MIT as a public service and at no ex])ense to the committee." The following day, Dr. Stratton replied agreeing to have MIT conduct the agreed-upon tests. ^- The MIT tests were completed November 7, and a report of results ])re])ared early in December. A transmittal letter to the Senate Small Business Committee was written by Provost Stratton, December 16, and a sealed coj^y of the report was delivered personally to the com- mittee by Goodwin, December 17. That same day the committee released a statement analyzing the report and criticizing the work of the NBS in battery additive testing. The release identified eight eft'ects of the additive upon batteries that had been found by the MIT tests, and said that the results of these tests completely supported the claims of the manufacturer. A 15-page commentary by Dr. Laidler accompanied the release; it asserted that the MIT tests were a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of the additive, and were "in sharp contrast to the residts of tests conducted * * * by the National Bureau of Standards." The Laidler statement called the NBS findings "reprehensible," and said the NBS researchers i-esponsible for testing AD-X2 were "simply psychologically incapable of giving battery AD-X2 a fair trial." ^^ Dr. Astin later commented on the procedure employed in the MIT tests, and on the resultant eight effects: A major couclusiou of the Bureau's investigations with respect to the effect reported by MIT is that the effect is observable in the batteries only with elec- trolyte of extremely dilute acid concentration, so dilute in fact that it appears to be of no significance whatever in normal storage battery operation. ^* Reorganization of the Senate imder the Republican majority after the elections of 1952 placed Senator Thye in the chairmanship of the Small Business Committee, but did not change the staff of the committee. At tlie close of the year, Ritchie was endeavoring, with the assistance of the committee staff, to have the Post Office Depart- ment reopen his case. However, his petition was denied, February 18, 1953, and the Post Office fraud order went into effect February 24. At this point, Ritchie obtained the help of the new committee chair- man. Senator Thye wrote a transmittal letter to accompany a final petition by Ritchie to Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield to set aside the fraud order. According to Lawrence: "Blake O'Connor delivered the docimients late Friday night, February 27, to Summer- field at his Connecticut Avenue apartment." ^^ Subsequently, the order was set aside, and by the end of March, Dr. Astin's resignation was on the President's desk. When a newspaper columnist "exposed" the resignation as having been forced by the AD-X2 issue and the personal hostility of Assistant Secretary Sheaffer, a hearing was convened by the Senate Small Business Committee on the afternoon of the same day, March 31. s- Ibid., p. 384. (This information is contained in an extract of a memorandum introduced in tlie record of tlie, hearing by Senator Guy M. Gillette.) 83 "Senate Unit Flays NBS Battery Test," Washington Post (Dec. 18, 1953), p. 37, col. 3. Also, see Lawrence, op. cit., p. i7. Lawrence supplies a later explanation by Laidler that his commentary had been "written hastily" and that it had been his impression that he was "preparing background material on the basis of which the committee would pursue its investigations." He said that he still stood "behind the opinions expressed in my report," but that he would have worded it differently had he known it was for pub- lication. He also indicated that a final paragraph had been added to his report by someone else. The addi- tional paragraph had hinted that the close association of the NBS scientists with the battery industry might have led them, despite their "considerable scientific distinction," to have made "such grave errors." 8< Hearings, op. cit., pp. 225-226. 86 Lawrence, op. cit., p. 19. 35 Weeks and Sheaffer were the only witnesses and the hearing lasted less than an hour. The Secretary traced succinctly the history of the controversy between Pioneers, Inc., and NBS, involving the FTC and the Post Oiffice. He noted that there were many testimonials from satisfied users of AD-X2 (including his own company). He noted that "The manufacturer had independent tests made by the tj.S. Testing Co., of Hoboken, N.J. — controlled field tests extending over a period of 362 days." The results of these tests, he said, "rendered credible the experience reported by consumers." ^^ He took note, also, of the tests at MIT under the sponsorship of the committee. Then he said: I am not a man of science, and I do not wish to enter into a technical discussion or be accused of overruling the findings of any laboratory. But as a practical man, I think that the National Bureau of Standards has not been sufBciently objective, because they discount entirely the play of the marketplace and have placed themselves in a vulnerable ijosition by discussing the nature and scope of their prospective reports with the verv people who might not want to see the additive remain on the market, and when their reports and results of tests were questioned, discussed the matter with other scientists, engaged by your committee to make separate, objective findings. I cannot help but wonder how many similar cases have never been heard about — how many entrepreneurs who were convinced they have a good thing for the people, were licked before they started, whether they knew it or not and by their very own Government to whcm they paid high taxes.^' By way of rectif\dng the situation, the Secretary promised the committee that he ^\■ould have the functions and objectives of the NBS examined and reevaluated "* * * in relation to the American busi- ness community * * *." He would "* * * put a group of scientists in the Bureau who have never had any connection ^nth this matter and tell them to test tliis thing in every conceivable way * * *." Meanv.'hile, aU circulars and technical reports dealing ^yith battery additives would be \\ithdrawn until the tests were completed. ^^ The agitation over the "firing of Astin" was not quieted by the Secre- tarj-'s appearance and testimony. Wtiile Secretary Weeks occupied himself ^^dth negotiations vith the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the National Academy of Sciences, and the Visiting Committee of the NBS, the Senate Small Business Com- mittee staft" was engaged in accumulating information bearing on the issue. They ^dsited Ritchie's operation in California, inter\dewed many users of AD-X2, and collected military test data on field and laboratory experiments with the additive. After seA^eral post- ponements, the committee hearings on the AD-X2 issue resumed June 22. «3 IV. Management of the Issue As presented to the Congress, the AD-X2 case does not appear to have been viewed as invohing profound or far-reaching issues. The case was described as one of many small grievances in wliich some small business found itself unable to establish a viable relationship with the Federal bureaucracy and other institutional hazards of the commercial environment. Emphasis in researching the issue centered on factfinding: An effort to establish the facts of the case, and a " Hearings, op. cit., p. 2. " Ibid., p. 3. S8 1bid., p. 4. 8« Ibid., p. 9. 36 search for an appropriate form of corrective action specifically relevant to it. The Small Business Committee had no jm'isdiction over the fundamental ]5rotection of the household or private consumer from fraud. The abundant testimonials of satisfied users of AD-X2 ai)i)ar- ently foreclosed any interest in the case from the aspect of the small business as a consumer to be protected. The fundamental legal issue of testimonials versus scientific evidence was repeatedly discussed in the hearings, but Mdthout being structiu-ed as a problem for s^^s- tematic analysis. Neither the Post Office Department nor the FTC could find in the hearings any substantial guidance on this aspect, other than that the NBS clearly regarded testimonials (or uncon- trolled tests) as vorthless, while many Members of Congress con- sidered them as of important practical value. The apparent tendency of the committee to eschew the fimdamental aspects of the case, in order to disj)ose of it as a case, was strengtliened by tlie urgency with which it was presented. One source of urgency was the Post Office decision which, if allowed to stand, would i)robably have put the ap})ellant out of business. ^° Another was the strong dis- approval by the scientific community of the treatment of Dr. Astin, as represented in the press. ^^ It is possible, too, that a further sense of urgency was contributed by a recognition on the part of the committee members that too much time and energy was being devoted, in the early days of a new political administration, to an issue of less than transcendant importance. For exami)le, Chairman Thye expressed some irritation that Ritchie, tlie principal witness for himself, had been unable to present his case in the first day of the hearings, and had run over to midday of the second. ^^ The Ritchie presentation was so voluminous, in fact, and touched on so raan}^ points of grievance, with so little organization of material, and with so much documentation of varied germaneness, and so much technical data of varying quality, that the impression it conveyed depended largely on the preconditioning and technical sophistication of the listener. Structuring the issue Secretary Weeks made clear to the committee, March 31, 1953, that he regarded the AD-X2 testing controversy as an internal matter within his Department, and described the actions he proposed to take to resolve it. He questioned the power given to the FTC and suggested that restraint of trade by regulatory agencies should be used sparingly. He noted that "business has suft'ered severely at the hands of certain bureaucrats," and saw no reason ''why a product should be denied an opportunity in the marketplace." The enlargement of the issue that M As Chairman Thye told Dr. Astin (Hearings, op. cit., p. 335): "* * * If this becomes a prolonged investigation, the manufacturer in question might well be out of business and long since liquidated by bankruptcy action." »i Drew Pearson, "Astin Ouster Laid to Influence," the Washington Post (Mar. 31, 1953), p. B-31. Ac- cording to Pearson, Dr. Astin was "fired" by Sheafler, and "lectured regarding the Bureau of Standards diagnosis of battery additives." LawTcnce describes the "sharp critical reaction" to the Astin dismissal on the part of "scientists. Congressmen, civil service groups, consumer organizations, newspapers, and private citizens" (p. 22). He notes (p. 24) that politicized organizations of scientists "issued angry press releases, called meetings, badgered the administration, and sought to call public attention to tlie Govern- ment's alleged assault on science." Another line of action was taken by members of the more staid National Academy of Sciences who "did not wish to add to the embarrassment of the administration, and they be- lieved that they could help the Bureau more effectively by working quietly within the administration and tlirough established channels." •2 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 91, 160. 37 resulted from the interpretation of the Astin resignation confused the situation rather than chirifying it, and the subsequent hearings re- vealed how variously the issue was defined. (a) The issue as presented by Ritchie. — Testimony and exhibits offered by Ritchie in the Senate hearings tilled some 200 pages of the proceedings — pages 9 to 209. Tlie witness based his case on five principal points: 1. His battery additive was different. It contained a mysterious ingredient or several of them. Or the preparation of the ingredients made it different, or it contained trace elements. An accredited scientist had aided in its development, and had observed differences in its effects from those of the other additives being merchandised.^^ 2. Tests of the additive showed that it had merit except for those tests that were improperly conducted. Properlj- conducted tests included his own and those at the University of San Francisco physics department, the U.S. Testing Co., and MIT. Those improperly conducted included tests at NBS, and by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Faults of such tests included: permitting specific gravitj- of electrolyte to go too high, use of uninspected or excessively aged batteries, dirty electrolyte, and a high initial charge sufficient to "ruin" the test batteries.^* 3. There were many testimonials from satisfied users of the additive, and no complaints. On the other hand, NBS had run no practical field tests. Although military tests were adverse, there were many indications of satisfied users in the military field installations. ^^ 4. The administrative procedures of NBS were unfair to the vendor of AD-X2. The personnel at NBS held patents on designs of batteries contributing an effect that would be competitive with that of the additive, which showed bias. The NBS Circular 302 was unfair because "the product was condemned about 16 or 17 years before it was developed." The NBS Circular 504 was unfair because it was issued before NBS tested AD-X2. The tests performed in preparation for Circular 504, by NBS, were declared faulty by Dr. Laidler. Although NBS claimed not to test individual products or report on them by name, they had done so in effect by permitting NBBB to announce the results of NBS tests, naming AD-X2. There was an implication of animus in the vigor with which NBS testified against AD-X2 in the Post Office Department hearing. (Said Ritchie: "The array of witnesses from the National Bureau of Standards was probably the greatest parade of scientists ever to appear before a Government agency in the history of the United States.") ^^ 5. The NBS contriVjuted technical information and assistance that benefited the stoiage battery manufacturers whose interests were adverse to Ritchie, and did so in a manner injurious to Ritchie. Through the intermediate agency of the NBBB, the battery manufacturers distributed bulletins, circulars, and pamphlets based on NBS data that were critical of AD-X2. The NBBB was in conflict with the Oakland BBB, with which Ritchie had maintained excellent relations, but the NBBB cooperated with the battery manufacttu'ers against him. Close relations were maintained between NBS staff "and NBBB. Also, NBS consulted with battery manufacturers respecting AD-X2 matters. ^^ Ritchie summed up his case against NBS in these words: * * * The Bureau of Standards condemned battery AD-X2, together with all other additives by implication since 1931 to April 19o0, whether they were tested or not * * *. The Bureau of Standards has condemned battery AD-X2 through the National Better Business Bureau jjublication, "Battery Compounds and Solutions," over protests, when, by their own admission, they had only tested the material in one or, at the most, two batteries which we and others have determined were not opened for inspection of the samples prior to testing; and the overcharge shown in the test report 504 indicates that the batteries were ruined prior to treatment with the product. That in June 1952, they ran tests on a group of batteries and allowed the acid to go well over 1.280, which action ruined the test. This was «3 Ibid., pp. 20-23, 27-28. 44. " Ibid., pp. 65, 81. 83, 143, 158, 161-2, 192-3. »5 Ibid., pp. 46, 81. 757-76'J. »8 Ibid., pp. 52, 63-65, 123, 136, 170, 177. »' Ibid., pp. 77, 86, 124-125, 143, 145. 38 allowed to happen over our repeated protests; and, yet, at the Post Office hearing on October 14, 1952, the Director of the Bureau of Standards testified to the fact that the test was run, for all practical purposes, in accordance with the manu- facturer's instructions.** (6) The issue as seen by committee members. — -Throughout the hearmgs, there was mcomplete agreement as to what theu" purpose was, what was to be decided, and what mformation was germane. Senator Humphrey hiterested hmiself in the chemistry of AD-X2, and in the processing competence of its vendor. Senator Nixon (by this time, the Vice President), had expressed concern over the apparent discrepancy between hiboratory tests and practical experience in operational use of the product. ^^ Most of the committee members were concerned over the small business versus big government issue. At various times the chairman of the committee shifted from one issue to another. For example: The issue * * * is whether or not agencies of the Government have been fair and just in the treatment of JNIr. Ritchie and his product, battery AD-X2.io° * * * We are trying to comb for the last morsel of evidence as to whether this man should be denied the right to package and sell the product or whether he should be privileged to sell it."" We are trying to determine whether this product has merit or not."'^ * * * I have absolutely no interest in the product, only as a Member of Congress who is trying to determine whether a businessman should have an opportunity or whether that opportunitv should be denied the businessman, becaiise of a finding of a Federal agency. i"^ The issue of monopoly, or the question of the protection of tlie small business in conflict with the interests of big business evidently inter- ested Senator Gillette: What I am interested in, and I am sure the other members are in agreement with me on this, is whether or not there was in this entire investigation any discrimi- natory action against a company or a manufacturer anywhere along the line.'"^ * * * I have no knowledge and little interest as to whether the one test or another shows the particular merchandise to be valuable or not, relatively; but I am tre- mendously interested if any agency of this Government, the Bureau of Standards, the Federal Trade Commission, the Post Office Department, or ai'v other agency, has been, wittingly or unwittingly, knowingly or unknowingly, used to impair the business and the business position of any citizen of the United States.'"^ For Senator Schoeppel the question concerned both the product and the objectivity of NBS: * * * Probably the central issue h(>re is whether AD-X2 helps batteries or not.108 One of the main questions * * * jg whether the Bureau [of Standards] was completely objective and fair in the handling of AD-X2.1"" Senator Smathers saw the issue in a broader perspective, in which the Congress had obligations to both producer and consumer: As the other Senators have said, we are interested in seeing tliat no businessman gets put out of business arbitrarily. I think we are also interested in seeing tliat no consumer gets sold something under representations that do not measure up. So we have sort of a dual resi^onsibility not only of protecting the businessman but also, possibly, the consumer."'* •8 Ibid., p. 161. . ,^ . .. ^ •» Ibid., p. 222. (Letter excerpt, introduced as part of prepared testimony of Dr. Astni.) i"" Hearings, op. cit., p. 9. i«i Ibid., p. 229. i«2 Ibid., p. 374. iM Idem. iM Ibid., p. 248. iw Ibid., p. 384. i<» Ibid., p. 208. <•' Ibid., p. 320. i«s Ibid., pp. 385-386. 39 (c) The issue as defined by staff documentation. — Some indication as to how the committee staff defined the issue may be drawn from the kinds of documentation and \ntnesses they assembled for the hearing. There was evidence of the interest of battery manufacturers m halting the promotion of AD-X2. There were NBS circulars and memoranda on battery additives. A great deal of military test data of the additive, as well as the MIT test data and report, were included. Some documentation of NBBB interest had been collected, although most of this was supplied by Ritchie as he testified. ^°^ The -witnesses included two scientists, Dr. Astin and Dr. Harold C Weber, professor of chemical engineering at MIT; 10 practical technologists, all but one of whom appeared to present testimonials supporting AD-X2; and Ritchie himself. The hearings concluded with testimony by an east coast sales representative of Pioneers, Inc. Evidently the staff interest was in the performance of the additive in the laboratory and in service, and in the role of NBS both in technical evaluation and in influencing the competitive position of the product. Assessment of the issue The apparent lack of definition of the issue is both understandable and tolerable in a case before a committee with investigative rather than legislative functions. However, it would seem that before the Congress could resolve the issue it needed to be analyzed, and al- ternatives considered. These alternatives would need to go beyond whether Ritchie had been fairly treated or not, whether AD-X2 was any good or not, and whether it did or did not contain any mysterious ingredients that differentiated it from numerous additives the Bureau of Standards had previously found worthless. It does not appear that any analysis was made of the AD-X2 case in terms of its public or political significance. Accordingly, the testi- mony was based on each witness' interpretation of the issue; the choice of witnesses and documentation introduced in the hearings re- sulted mainly from committee staff interpretation as to what the issue was; and the questions asked of witnesses were essentially ad hoc — responding to the need for clarification or testing of the testimony. Definition of alternatives The most fundamental statement of alternatives offered to the committee was that of Secretary Weeks. He saw the issue in the con- text of the dichotomy of business vereus Government. For him the alternatives were as to whether the test of the marketplace should be permitted to prevail or whether the Government regidation should serve in its place. It is interesting to note that the report of the National Academy Committee on Battery Additives was later on to take the position that the surest means for the testing of the validity of scientific find- ings was in the "marketplace of ideas." Only the worthy survived. Whether the commercial marketplace served equally well, however, was not as evident. There were lacking some of the main som-ces of validation available to the institutions of science, such as the prestige of individual critics, the critical selection of items for publication, the '«» Ibid. (An index of exhibits contained in the appendix appears on pp. 10-11.) 40 currency of validated quantitative data, the rapid circulation of established publications, and the means of repeating procedures under challenge. However, the use of science in support of the regulation of com- mercial quality was clearly a relative matter. The resources of science would be quickly exhausted by any comprehensive program of testing. The NBS personnel responsible for the tests of AD-X2 found the work distasteful. There was no obvious way to limit the scope of scientific tests in support of regulation. The rights of the consumer to quality, and the rights of the producer to freedom from arbitrary regulation, had not been probed. Selection of products to be tested seemed to be a chancy process, invohdng at least some admixture of inadvertence, and some of competitive interest. Less fundamental, but still pertinent, were the alternatives ])re- sented by the regulatory mechanism in operation that had raised the AD-X2 issue. For example, one issue was as to whether a scientific laboratory should be insulated from possible bias, or imputation of bias, by dealing with the interested parties to a technological con- troversy only at arm's length, and through the medium of a political screening process. Another issue was as to whether the role of the Department of Commerce shoidd be limited to — or should emphasize — the facilitating of product sales, or whether it was also interested — even equally interested — in the maintenance of quality of products accepted by the consumer. Still another issue was: Should Government applica- tion of science serve neutrally but actively as the guardian of the marketplace, or should it be relegated to the development of new products? V. Sources of the Committee's Information The committee hearing was intended, according to Chairman Thye, to provide "* * * a complete presentation of the facts * * *" that would enable the decision process to take jilace. As the chairman observed, this process was — for this particular case — a diffuse one. It was spread among "* * * the public, the agencies of the Govern- ment, and this committee." ^''° Information was formally i)resented to the committee by 15 wit- nesses (in addition to Weeks and Shaeffer, who appeared at the brief preliminary session on March 31). These included Ritchie himself and one of his regional representatives, two scientists (Dr. Astin, of NBS, and Dr. Weber of ^IIT), four industrial technologists offering testi- monials favoring AD-X2, a battery shop manager, and six technol- ogists connected with field installations of the military de])artments; three of these last reported on military tests of the additive (one favor- able, one unfavorable, and one terminated after favorable preliminary results), while the other three attested to favorable experience in field service. Testimony of Bifchie before the committee In the some 200 pages of his testimony, Ritchie dealt with many aspects of his difficulties in marketing his product. He described the background of his scientific associate and consultant, Dr. Randall, including a notarized description of his technical qualifications. He '>» Hearings, op. cit., p. 0. 41 offered exhibits of Dr. Randall's technical writings in support of the additive. He graphically described Dr. Randall's reaction to the discovery of AD-X2. He included documentary evidence of Dr. Randall's repeated at- tempts to win recognition from NBS of the unique virtue of his prod- uct. Ritchie also introduced trade literature favorably describing AD-X2, and evidence (including bills of sale for repeated military orders) demonstrating that his product had numerous satisfied cus- tomers. He also gave evidence in the form of correspondence to show that a controversy had occurred between the Oaklaiid Better Business Bureau and the NBBB concerning AD-X2. The scientific aspects of Ritchie's testimony were largely evidential, as he did not represent himself as technicall}^ qualified. In addition to the documents by Dr. Randall, he presented informatioji about the experiences and uncontrolled tests by the Physics Department of the University of San Francisco, reports by the United States Testing Co., various field tests of his own, and an evaluation by Dr. Laidler of NBS Circular 504. There were evident tactical advantages to Ritchie in leadhig oft' as witness. For one thing, he was able to enlighten tlie connnittee as to how an electric storage battery worked, couching his explanation in terms compatible with his own explanation of the usefid function of his additi\e. It was also convenient for Ritchie's case for him to be able to mterject his own mterpretation of the results of the tests he reported on to the committee. Another 29 pages (482 to 510 of the hearings) were occupied by the testimony of Norman Goodwin, president of Guaranteed Batteries, Inc., of Boston, Mass., and an east coast distributor of AD-X2. His testimony included a nine-page reprint of a trade magazine article, as told by Ritchie ("the exclusive behhid-the-scenes story of the fight for recognition of the battery powder which caused all the trouble"). Goodwin claimed to have lost $40,000 because of the use made bj^ his competitors of NBS Circular 504 to campaign against him. Goodwin identified his competitors as "battery manufacturers, the manufacturers and dealers or })eople who were selling batteries." ^" He described a talk he had given on the additive to a group of potential customers at a trade association meeting in Boston, and said that during the 30-minute question period at its close, "the New England rnanager of a large national battery manufacturer stood u]), and he and his assistant took up the whole question period reading the Bureau of Standards 504 Circular, and otherwise fouhng up tlie situation." Goodwin asked why? ^^^ Goodwin conceded that "battery additives have, in the i)ast, had an unsavory rei)utation, and with cause * * *." But, "in view of the actual field experience with battery AD-X2, which luis been ]>iled up in all ])arts of the country, it is absurd that the Bureau of Standards, wdth their inadequate laboratory tests, would even dare to ignore the excellent results obtained from tlie wealth of field experience over a period of years * * *." ^^ jj^ d(!scribed a number of favorable experi- ences by his customers and c( Qchided bj^ recounting the favorable ':i Ibid., p. 492. "2I)Mfl., p. 497. "3 Ibid., p. 404. 42 indications in preliminary tests of the additive to restore a failing submarine battery at the New London Submarine Base."* Dr. Laidler did not testify. He had assisted the committee late in 1952 in preparing a preliminary report on AD-X2, in which the results of the MIT tests were interpreted by him as being favorable to AD-X2. He had also served as a paid consultant to Ritchie both before and after his work for the committee. Laidler was not named by Dr. Astin in his testimony, which is discussed below, but he was referred to indirectly, in the comment: "* * * the proponents of AD-X2 began looking for minor flaws in the report and the testing procedure [of the June 1952 tests], ignoring the major conclusions of the report." "^ Testimony oj Dr. Astin on AD-X2 and NBS Dr. Astin took the stand the afternoon of June 23, and continued until late in the afternoon of June 24. In his prepared statement, Dr. Astin welcomed the scrutiny by the National Academy of Sciences of the battery work of NBS, described the scope and functions of the Bureau, cited its statutory authority for tests and information dis- semination about commercial products, and then extensively dis- cussed the testing function itself. In particular, he explained to the committee the differences between laboratory and field tests, and between controlled and uncontrolled tests. He acknowledged that field tests were needed to confirm that an effect or improvement still persisted under the "more rigorous conditions of actual use." How- ever, the field test, he said, "* * * is not resorted to until some improvement or effect is developed in the laboratory which would then make the field test worthwhile." "^ Then Dr. Astin described the extensive work of NBS in storage batteries, the correspondence ^nth Dr. Randall, analysis by NBS of the chemical composition of AD-X2, and initial laboratory tests of the material. In comment on the charge of unfairness on the part of NBS in the testing of battery additives, he said: First, every action which the Bureau has taken with respect to the testing of AD-X2 and the dissemination of information with respect thereto has been brought about as a direct consequence of the representations and pressures of the proponents of AD-X2. The Bureau became aware of the existence of the product first by approaches made by the manufacturer, and initially declined to make any tests on it because there was no reasonable evidence that the product was, in fact, different from any of the other numerous additives the Bureau had previously tested, and also because the Bureau does not evaluate jjroprietary products for individual manufacturers. The initial tests made by the Bureau came about largely as a result of inquiries and suggestions from the Oakland Better Business Bureau and from Senator Knowland, their inquiries in turn being instigated by Pioneers, Inc. The subsequent dissemination of information about batterv' additives came about largely as a result of pressures applied to the Na- tionaf Better Business Bureau to make unwarranted exceptions in the case of Battery AD-X2.1" The response to the "pressures" from Pioneers, Inc., said Dr. Astin, had led to the sequence of NBS tests made at the request of the FTC and the Post Office Department. Periodically, there had been a spate of correspondence ^^•ith Members of Congress in reference to these acti^^ties. "< Ibid., pp. 508-510. An indication tliat tliis reference excited the interest of the committee is provided by the letter the chairman subsequently ^vrote asking the Department of the Navy to advise him of the results of the tests described by Goodwin. The Navy lias no record of any response to this inquiry. 115 Ibid., p. 224. >i« Ibid., p. 217. Dr. Astin's testimony runs from p. 209 tlirough p. 335. 1" Ibid., p. 221. 43 Finally, he described the procedure used in the NBS tests during June 1952, the methods used in interpreting the test results, and his OA\Ti conclusions based on these results. He also offered his own con- clusions on the MIT tests, which differed from those dra\v-n by Dr. Laidler. He asserted that "* * * the [major] effect reported by MIT is * * * observable in the batteries only vdth. electrolyte of extremely dilute acid concentration, so dilute in fact that it appears to be of no significance whatever in normal storage-battery operation." "* In the interrogation that followed his prepared statement, the committee sought to learn why NBS had conducted no field tests of the battery additive. Dr. Astin explained variously that the field test was less amenable to control of the external variables than was the test in the laboratory, that field tests were employed to explore the practi- cal significance of laboratory findings, and that he knew "* * * of no instance in a field test where something has been demonstrated of this sort which could not be demonstrated in a laboratory test." "^ Moreover — * * * We have taken the point of view that if the material performance does anything useful in the operation of a battery, then we should be able to relate it to some performance characteristics that can be measured. That has proved completely fruitless. I mean any pertinent effect, I should say.'^" In response to repeated comments by the chairman that the layman found the detailed reports of user-experience persuasive. Dr. Astin agreed that he could understand this. But he suggested that the same results would have been obtained with or ^^'ithout the additive, if the batteries in question had received otherwise identical treatment. In answer to Senator Sparkman's question as to the importance that should be attached to testimony by engineers, on the use of the additive, Dr. Astin suggested — Well, I think you should ask them for the type of observations and measure- ments they have made on which to base their decision that the material helps them. You should ask them if they have any control so that they have a base with which to compare their measurements. '^i Asked whether Dr. Randall was an "eminent scientist," Dr. Astin said that in the field of battery technology, he was not in a class with Dr. Vinal, and, "I would not endorse him." ^^^ He later explained that Dr. Randall's written submission of his views in an article had been rejected by a scientific journal "as not having adequate technical content." ^^^ Dr. Astin acknowledged that the NBBB request was a factor in the NBS initiation of activity on Circular 504, but insisted that — * * * our legislation authorizes us to disseminate the information we accumulate when such data is of importance to scientific or manufactiu-ing interest. We had information which has apparent importance to the public. The National Better Business Bureau said it was important. Now, since our legislation specifically states that we should appraise the interest of science and manufacturing interest before we publish data, I see nothing wrong with that. * * * If, however, this committee does not think it [a legitimate pro- cedure], then we would like your guidance on that.'^* 119 Ibid., pp. 225-226. n» Ibid,, p. 224. iMJbid., p. 260. "1 Ibid., p. 228. '22 Ibid., p. 251. 123 Ibid., p. 321. 124 Ibid., p. 252. As to the relevance of testimonials to the work of a scientific labora- tory, he dismissed them entirely as unacceptable for scientific evidence: In general, the reports are made by noutrained observers, and the people who supply svich information usually have no records or data to support, in a scientific manner, the statements or claims they make. For that reason — first, that there are generally no adequate measures included in a testimonial, no rigorous specifi- cations of the operating conditions under which the measurements were taken, and usually no controls whatever are used — for those reasons we cannot accept testimonials as scientific evidence. *^^ Wlien the questioning turned to the role of NBS in the testing of commercial products and the publication of information about findings in such tests, Dr. Astin stressed the essential neutrality of a scientific laboratory in this work: We try to confine oiu- reports merely to the presentation of technical data, and we hope thereby that since it is straightforward data, nobody can complain that they are being discriminated against. That is, I gave in my general statement the example of tests on aluminum. It might show that tests on aluminum under a particular set of conditions favor superior performance characteristics to steel. Now would we withhold the dissemination of that data because the steel i)eople would not like it? It is a cold, hard scientific fact. You disseminate it. To withhold the dissemination of scientific information I think is the most prejudicial action. '^e He defended the practice of consulting with private industry as to the subjects to be investigated by NBS: * * * We frequently attempt to determine the interest of sci(>ntific and manu- facturing groups in publications before we distribute them. * * * And since our act specifies that publications should be related to scientific and manufacturing interests, we do make a serious eff"ort to determine the degree of interest in in- formation of a particular type before dissemination.^^^ The infltience of the marketplace miglit generate interest iu a subject to be investigated by NBS, but shoidd not be permitted to influence tlie findings of a scientific investigation: * * * We are a scientific laboratory. We attempt to determine technical merits; and use consideratioii, that is, whether a person is satisfied by the use of a product, bears no consideration in influencing our findings. If, however, marketplace factors create interest in a product, then that might determine whether or not we would investigate it. But certainly the customer satisfaction or the demand for a particular product in the market has no bearing whatsoever on the technical merits of a product. '^^ The idtimate issue seemed to be the definition of the regidatory role of a Government scientific laboratory. In response to qtiestions by Senator Homer Ferguson, Dr. Astin sotight to reconcile the concept of a neutral Government scientific institution insidated from the interests and stresses of the marketplace ^nth the concept of a Government in- stitution generating data in response to the needs of commerce. Senator Ferguson asked such questions as: Do you believe that the Congress intended to grant authcrity to the Bureau of Standards personnel to prepare material at the request of and for publication by private organizations for commercial use? Do you think that the National Bureau of Standards by following its i)olicv of disseminating technical data, when not specifically directed toward scientific or technological progress, at the professional and production level, is broadening gratuitousl' and, perhaps, inadvertentlv, into a regulatory activity? Dr. Astin responded that («) he was not sure that the Congress intended the Bureau to channel its reports to comnKircial use by private 125 Ibid. P- 2fi2. 126 Ibid. . P- 2.53. 12- Ibid. P- 275. '-'' Ibid. P- 272. 45 organizations; (6) the organic law of NBS authorized dissemination of information of interest to private groups, and did not determine or restrict the use to be made of the information; (c) the conduct of scientific research was inherently regulator}^ — * * * All progress in science and technology is regulator}-. The invention of the incandescent lamp bulb made obsolete gas lights and so on, so that if j-ou carry this too far, then you would never disseminate any scientific information because it might have some effect on curtailing the marketing of some products that it is related to. i^-a Dr. Weber's description of the MIT tests Since the MIT tests of AD-X2, performed at the committee's re- quest, had been interpreted and represented as substantiating the advertising claims of Pioneers, Inc., the appearance of Dr. Weber before the committee had special significance. Dr. Weber, a professor of chemical engineeruig at JNIIT, had conducted the tests and had had a casual interest in AD-X2 for some time. Dr. Laidler had been quoted in a release by the committee as concluding from the residts of the MIT tests that the NBS evaluation of the additive was "reprehen- sible." ^-^ However, vhen the full report and test data were released by MIT, they had created uncertainties rather than helping to resolve the issue as to the merit of the additive. Dr. Astin had dismissed these tests as uninformative because, he said, the electrolyte used in them was of much lower specific gravity than would be requhed for service use, and the effects noted did not correlate with any significant change in battery performance.''*^ It was notable that in his comments about the performance of AD-X2 to the committee. Dr. Weber was careful to restrict himself to the formal wording of the MIT report; he provided no interpretation of the test data. He disassociated himself from Dr. Laidler's conclu- sions and accepted, as a precise paraphrase of his own thinking, a statement by James A. Beattie, professor of physical chemistry, concerning the MIT report. Its concluding paragraph read: I would say that the addition of AD-X2 certainly does have an effect on the behavior of a lead-acid battery. From my brief contact with the work, I cannot say that this effect is correlated with a beneficial action from the standpoint of the normal use of such a battery. I feel that the latter can be determined only after the examination and statistical evaluation of extensive field tests. i^i The testimony of Dr. Weber differed from that of Dr. Astin in some respects. Thus, wliile recognizing the competence of the National Academy of Sciences Committee that was to make a definitive finding as to the virtue of AD-X2, said Weber ("* * * I certainly have confidence that they will render as good a decision as such an eminent group of scientists could render"), he nevertheless attached more importance than had Dr. Astin to the "field data" on the additive. For himself, he said that a scientist coidd not aftord to disregard user testiniony.'^^ He called attention to a passage in the MIT report that said, in part, "* * * laboratory findings must be supplemented by field-use data if a true evaluation is to be obtained." '^^ (By contrast, i2'a Ibid., pp. 315-316. 129 "Senate Unit Flays NBS Battery Test," op. cit. 131 Hearings, op. cit. pp. 225-226. "1 Ibid., p. 393. The complete MIT report, and related correspondence are presented in the appendix to the hearings, pp. 565-618. The comments by Professor Beattie are on pp. 589-590. »32 Ibid., pp. 383, 386. 133 Ibid., p. 375. 46 Dr. Astin had said: "If it affects the performance of the battery, it does something to it that can be measured." '^*) Other technical evidence presented to the committee The rest of the hearings were occupied Math three military tech- nologists reporting on military tests, a battery shop operator, and seven users reporting favorable experience with the additive. (These included three persons from military field establishments.) The aj^pen- dix to the hearings contained data of three sets of military tests (adding up to an inconclusive picture), the full text of the MIT report and test data, affidavits of satisfied users, and correspondence between NBS officials and other persons concerning AD-X2 and battery additives generally. Typical of the experience reported by the technologists was that of Kenneth W. Binding, experimental and developmental engineer, Market Forge Co., Everett, Mass. His report occupied five pages of the hearings (pp. 421-426). Binding had no special experience with batteries, but designed and developed industrial equipment using them. He testified that he had had one i)articular battery 5 years old, hea\^ duty, costing between $500 and $600, used continuously for 3 years, then left idle 1 year, because it had begun to operate un- satisfactorily. The battery was then (November 1951) inspected by a battery salesman who recommended its discard. It was ordered junked at scrap lead salvage value of $29. The battery was then treated with AD-X2, repeatedly charged and discharged in accordance with the instructions provided along with the battery additive, and at the end of the week was put back into service. The cost of the treatment was $36. The battery was still in service in June 1953. Binding was now using the additive in his other batteries and had not required a re- placement battery in the previous 6 months; according to his past experience he would have expected some necessary replacement during this period. Recapitulation: A plethora of data From the political point of view, the committee had been provided with more information about batteries, battery tests, and battery experience than was really needed. The testimony brought out the fact that Ritchie had gone to the trouble of working with NBS, engaging the services of U.S. Testing Co., and contesting the Gov- ernment's position regarding his additive. It established that the product was associated by many users with an improvement in battery performance. Voluminous test data had been collected from military field in- stallations (pp. 618-757), that yielded inconclusive residts. There were data and reports of NBS tests, with controls, that uniformly showed an absence of beneficial results. There were the data of the MIT tests, indicating differences in battery behavior with and without the additive, but which the testing institution declined to identify as benefits. The question was: What did all this evidence prove? How did it bear on the issue? What action should the committee take? Was there conflicting evidence or did it merely look that way? Despite the advice of Dr. Astin that field data should be looked askance unless they were substantiated by quantitative data in 134 Ibid., p. 335. 47 writing, with environment and circumstances properly characterized, and appropriate controls devised, the committee did not raise these questions in taking testimony from witnesses describing favorable ex- perience with AD-X2. Data were almost entirely qualitative. On the other hand, the voluminous quantitative data from the various tests that the committee collected were virtually unmanageable. The tests themselves added up to an inconclusive total, and the information they provided was not usable in resohing the issue. VI. The Decisionmaking Method An analysis of the AD-X2 case reveals that it hivolved three sets of issues. One had to do with the testing process, a second with the regulatory mechanisms of the Government, and a third with broader science policy. The bulk of the evidence was relevant to the first issue, and much less was relevant to the second; the third issue remained largely undefined and was resolved only indirectly. The three sets of issues were as follows: 1. The testing process: (a) Was AD-X2 a useful product? (b) Was NBS qualified to test it? (c) Had the NBS tests been adequate? 2. The regulatory process: (a) Was it desirable to invoke the postal regulations, and was Pioneers, Inc., engaged in a fraud? (6) Was it desirable to invoke the fan- trade authority of FTC to moderate the advertising claims of Pioneers, Inc? (c) Was the regulatory process as it involved NBS arbi- trary or discriminatory, such as to give unfair treatment to Pioneers, Inc? 3. The science policy issue: (a) Should NBS personnel become involved in contacts with private industry involving evaluation of the merits of commercial products — i.e., give an appearance of interest? (6) Should NBS functions in the regulation or testing of commercial products be more sharply defined and delimited? (c) Shoidd the emphasis of Government sponsorship of science be on the regulation of consumer products or on new discovery and the development of new technology? These tlu-ee sets of issues called for tliree different kinds of treatment. The first set, which had received the bulk of the committee's atten- tion, had given rise to so much information of a detailed and seemingly conflicting nature that the committee saw no way of resolving it, and was content to leave the issue to resolution by the leadership of the national scientific institution. The regidatory issue, on which Dr. Astin and Ritchie had testified at some length, was of primary concern to the committee because it involved the question of fairplay to small busmess. It was of particular salience at this time, moreover, because of the emphasis of the new Ad- ministration on the need to redress the balance between bm'eaucratic regulation of business and Government encouragement of free enter- prise. In part, the resolution of this second set of issues seemed to hinge on the findings in the first set. However, as will be seen, the regulatory decision was not resolved automatically by the decision as to the merit of the additive. 4S The science policy issue, least salient from the political point of view, had perhaps the most far-reacliing implications and the most pro- tracted consequences. Because it was not made explicit, its resolution was generalized and adaptive, and not easy to identify. The decision processes concerning all thi'ee sets of issues involved a complex of decision points. The role of the Congress w^as as monitor. No legislation was involved in the decisions. This was partly because the committee itself did not have legislative responsibilities, partly because the issue did not appear to be amenable to resolution by act of Congress, and partly because the Admhiistration — through Secretary Weeks as its spokesman — gave assurances that the organizational and procedural changes found necessary to correct the situation would be taken promptly and decisively by his office. The decision method in the testing issue Although the committee had received information on upward of a dozen different sets of laboratory tests of AD-X2, and many testi- monials from satisfied users and field experience reports, a definitive finding was elusive. For every test there was some criticism as to procedure, sufficient to shake the faith of the committee as to the findings. Originally, the committee had sought to resolve the issue by going to an outside laboratory that was neutral as well as prestigious. MIT's reputation as a practical engineering institution, coupled with its acknowledged scientific com])etence, made it a logical choice. The MIT tests followed on the heels of an extensive set of tests by NBS which had been criticized by Ritchie principally on the ground that the electrolyte was too high in specific gravity. The MIT tests, con- ducted in autumn of 1952, identified eight effects in batteries attribut- able to the addition of AI)-X2. The ^IIT report, as evaluated by Dr. Laidler, seemed to show that these eight effects made the additive meritorious. However, the MIT research people did not make any interpretation of their data, and Dr. Astin rejected the data as derived from an unrealistic condition (in his judgment, the electrolj'te had been much too low in specific gravdty). It was understandable that Senator Sparkman was moved to ask: 'Ts there not some way that a conclusive test for the satisfaction of everybody can be conducted and conducted in such a way that there will be no possibility of a mistake?" '^^ And again — "Is it not possible to devise a test that can be agreed upon by all, so that, if it is run, it \dll be foolproof?" ^^^ Four conflicting attitudes seemed to persist among the membership of the committee. One was a profound respect for the institution of science, and for NBS as a great national laboratory. This attitude was conditioned somewhat, as shown above, by irritation that science was unable to provide unequivocal answers to the simple question of the virtue of a battery additive — or at least sufficient to silence the critics. ^^^ A second attitude was the general acceptance of the idea that the Edisonian creativity of the backyard inventor can sometimes accomplish what institutional science has concluded was impos- sible. ^^^The third attitude was a respect for the practical judgment and 135 I hid., p. 239. ■36 Ibid., p. 383. 137 As evidenced by Senator Sparkman's questions above. An additional source of irritation, expressed by- Senator Sparkman, ibid., p. 238, was tliat complaints had been heard from small business people that NB S had not given them fair treatment, that it had adhered to its fixed standards without full regard to changes that may take place. 138 See ibid., pp. 242, 379, and 381. 49 experience behind the "hardheaded" test of the marketplace and the testimonials of real-life users, over the theoretical or laboratory find- ings. Fourth was a tendency to accord respect to a finding held by a unanimous faction (satisfied users) over a faction in conflict (the laboratory testers). The decision of the committee on this issue was to defer to the findings of the Committee on Battery Additives of the National Academy of Sciences, endorsed in advance by both Dr. Astin and Dr. Weber. Secretary Weeks had indicated his intention of asking for a review of NBS battery additive testing by the best qualified scientists available.'^'' Dr. Astin had told the committee that Secretary Weeks had sought the advice of tiie National Academy of Sciences on this matter.^*'' He had also described the Academy and its special qualifi- cations, and had assured the members of the committee that on the issue of the reliability of the NBS tests he "would prefer that this is a question you let the National Academy committee settle." ^^^ The decision, however, was a tacit one. The Academy committee was proceeding on the basis of a request from the executive branch. The Small Business Committee might have ignored this development and gone ahead with its own report. That it did not do so, and the open-ended manner in which the chairman terminated the hearing, ^*- suggest that the committee had reached no fu-m conclusion of its own onthe merits of AD-X2 nor as to the reliance to be placed on battery additive testing by NBS. The decision method in the regulatory issue With respect to the regulation of small business in battery addi- tives, three quite separate issues confronted the committee. There was the summary issue of the Post Office fraud charge, the more formal but less clear-cut case of the FTC complaint, and there was the role of NBS in the regulatory process in general. In the Post Office case, a copy of the hearings was sent to the Post- master General with a letter which said, in part — The committee has concluded that further hearhigs should not be held for the time being. It could not, in the present state of the testimony, make a finding of its own. * * * This committee sends you for whatever consideration you care to give it, the testimony presented at its hearings. The decision as to what action your Department should take with relation to the suspended fraud order, the committee emphasizes, is yours. ^^^ According to the Lawrence account of the controversy, when the Post Office Department did not find in the record of the hearings a sufficient justification for "expunging" the case from the record at once, the Senate committee staft' "urged the Post Office informally to remove the fraud order." It needed documentation to show cause, however, which the staff supplied in a memorandum which drew the following conclusions : 1. A scientific controversy does exist over the merits of AD-X2. 2. The military and commercial users of AD-X2 feel very strongly that this product does all that the manufacturer claims it should do and that they are satisfied that the product can effect large savings in terms of time and money. 139 Ibid., p. 4. •« Ibid., p. 226. i«i Ibid., pp. 326, 244. •" Ibid., p. .510. Concluded the chairman: "* * * and, therefore, we wiU have to discontinue the hearings for a few days. For the present this will conclude the hearings." 143 "The Battery Additive Controversy," op. cit., p. 26. 99-044—69 5 50 3. No one who has used this product feels in any way that he has been de- frauded, either by the manufacturer or by the product. 4. That Mr. Ritchie's advertising is conservative and that his product does exactly what his advertising claims.'*^ Shortly after receipt of this memorandum, the Post Office Depart- ment, on August 20, took action to cancel the fraud order against AD-X2. It is possible that this memorandiun was too imqualified in its endorsement of the product. However, in view of the evident efforts by Ritchie to expose his product to tests by NBS, MIT, the military departments, U.S. Testing Co., Chicago Development Co., and others, it is difficult to conclude that Ritchie himself considered AD-X2 as other than meritorious. It was accordingly reasonable for the Post Office Department, in dismissing the case, to conclude that a* * * there is insufficient proof of an actual intent by Ritchie to deceive which is requhed to warrant and maintain a fraud order." ^^^ Even assuming the absolute validity of the NBS test conclusions, the record strongly suggests that Ritchie believed otherwise. There is no evidence that the Senate committee or its staff took any specific interest in the AD-X2 case before the FTC. This case dragged on for a number of years, before Pioneers, Inc., won final vindication. While it presents an interesting question as to relative weights of different types of evidence before a regidatory commission, it is not particularly instructive for the purposes of this study. The extent of active participation by NBS in the regulatory process was the subject of much of the committee's interrogation of Dr. Astin. Tliis question was the main focus of Secretary Weeks' presentation to the committee, and was also a main theme in Ritchie's testimony. The potential for discrimmatory treatment of an individual company was certainly present in the complex of regulatory arrangements that had evolved for the protection of the consumer. Even wider oppor- tunity was offered by this complex for allegations of discriminatory treatment. Thus, NBS did not test all products, but only those that came to its attention. Its attention was attracted by two routes: either as a consequence of complamts to regulatory agencies, who then brought the ])roduct to the Bureau for test, or (very rarely) as a result of direct inquiry to NBS itself. In either case, the contact with the initiating Government agency might be made by a nonprofit institu- tion with a public service character, but the impetus might ultimately be traced to a profitraaking organization with a competitive interest in having such tests made. The hearings did not reveal whether or not NBS had been influenced by its having taken a technical stand against battery additives, or whether it was inflexible in persisting in such a finding in the face of contrary evidence. There was contrary evidence, but its rejection by the Bureau was on the scientific grounds that it was unsoundly based or trivial. On the other hand, the hearings did contain allegations that NBS was both influenced and inflexible. Moreover, the relationships that the Bureau had drifted into, with the battery industry and NBBB, lent credence to the allegation. Further oppor- tunity for criticism lay in the fact that two principal battery experts of the Bureau had accepted employment in the battery industry after leaving NBS. From the point of view of Dr. Astin, it was "very unfair" to read any impropriety into this circumstance; the stature of the 1" Idem. "5 Ibid., p. 27. 51 scientists in qnestion ruled out the possibility. Dr. Astin's admission that the Bureau's findings were not absolutely infallible might also be taken as indicative of a degree of flexibility."^ Having made the point that the opportunity for impropriety^ Avas at least latent in the NBwS procedures, the committee did not pursue the subject further. It was left to the Department of Commerce to work out its own resolution of the problem. The recommendations of the Kelly committee and the evolution of NBS policy to increase the distance between commercial interest and scientific investigation appear to have disposed of the issue in a gradual way. The decision method in the science folicy issue The influence of the testing function on the character and program of a Government laboratory was not explored by the committee. Dr. Astin made clear that he did not seek or want regulatory responsibility for ]iis agency."^ The testing function had indeed involved the Bureau in t!ie AD-X2 controversy ; its undesirable byproducts had been shown to include distraction, stress, animus, personnel instability, and a ■veakening of scientific objectivity and disinterestedness. Although the motivation for NBS invoh'ement in the AD-X2 controversy was described as the desire to be helpfid, and a legitimate concern for the interests of the consumer, the consequences were harmful to the A\'ork, the reputation, and the stability of the personnel relations within tire laboratory. ^"'^ It was apparent from the line of questioning of Dr. Astin that the committee found the function of a national scientific laboratory difficult to reconcile with that of a monitor of product quality. The members took particular exception to the phrasing of Dr. Vinal's letters to the NBBB inviting comment on the "'legal aspects" of an NBS circular."^ They were also ambivalent about the NBBB itself: on the one hand, it was a constructive, public service organization of merit; ou the other hand, it shoidd not be referred to — as it had been — as a "quasi-governmental" institution.^^" Senator Schoeppel suggested that it was "maybe a little irregidar approach" for NBS to deal with NBBB on such a basis. Although no explicit conclusions were drawn on this matter by the committee, the implication was clear — 1. That to provide Government support for a private institution engaged in the regulation of business — even in a form of business self-regulation — was regarded with disfa\'or when it adversely affected the interests of small bushiess and bene- fited larger business organizations; 2. That an arms-leiigth relationship with commercial institutions should be maintained by NBS in matters other than the purely scientific or technical; 3. That NBS retained a residual responsibility as to the use made of its reports of the results of tests of commercial products. The proper scope of participation by NBS in regulatory activities affecting private industry was seen by Senator Ferguson in particidar as quite narrow. By implication, he would lunit it to "matters of w8 Ibid., pp. 271-272. Senator Smathers apparently accepted this view. Speaking of Dr. Vinal, he asked Dr. Astin (p. 330) the leading question: "Do you tliink that, having retired and having this experience as an electrician and a battery expert, he should have gone to work for a dairy, for example, or a cement-mixing plant, or do you think it is logical that he went to work for a battery concern?" The disclaimer of NBS in fallibility appears on p. 226. »■ Ibid., p. 313. w" At various points, Lawrence (op. cit.) refers to the newspaper accounts of threatened resignations, "Lysenkoism," and politically directed scientific research. (See especially pp. 22-23.) "« HeirinTS, op. cit., pp. 287, 294. ISO Ibid., pp. 244-245. 52 interest to science and technology, broadly speaking, and to manu- facturing interests at the technical level * * *." ^^^ By following a policy of disseminating "* * * technical data, when not specifically directed toward scientific or technological progress, at the professional and production level [suggested Senator Ferguson, the Bureau was] broadening gratuitously and, perhaps inadvertently, into a regulatory activity?" ^^2 Having demonstrated their concern with this role of NBS, the committee dropped the matter. It was left to the Department of Commerce to find the way to correct the situation. Secretary Weeks in his opening statement to the committee, had promised action along this line, and the policy instrument he selected was the Kelly com- mittee. This group met during the summer and studied broadly the NBS roles and missions, organization, and procedures. Its findings were relayed to the Secretary periodically and were mostly imple- mented as received; the final report of the committee, October 15, Avas accordingly largely pro forma.^^^ The issue as to whether Government science should serve regulatory or developmental functions w^as not made explicit at any point in the controversy. The "freedom of science" — that is, the insulation of scientists from political pressiu-es, such as those illustrated by the Astin resignation^w^as indeed an element in the case. But none of the participants expressed the conclusion that the use of science as a part of the regulatory process necessarily exposed it to political pressures. Dr. Astin had told the committee that the testing of commodities by NBS amounted to about 1 percent of its total activity, and that more than half of its testing w^as of the commodity cement.^^^ The agitation generated by the AD-X2 controversy, in view of this small proportion of NBS effort devoted to testing, was altogether dispro- portionate to the effort involved. At the same time, the case illustrated the political consequences of the use of science in regulation. Even without deahng with the issue as such, the committee — ^by focusing attention on the controversy, and by the process of factfinding and cross-examination— made the regulatory function sufficiently onerous that NBS thereafter undertook it sparingly and with reluctance.^^^ Vn. The Outcome of the AD-X2 Controversy The direct consequences of the AD-X2 case evidence the political character of the episode. They were not unequivocal. The methods of politics were used to mediate a conflict that the methods of science would have resolved in a politically unacceptable way. The issue did not reach the stage of legislative action. Apart from the technicality that it was presented to a select committee rather ■51 Ibid., p. 314. 152 Ibid., p. 315. J J ^ >53 See Ad Hoc Committee for Evaluation and Operations of the National Bureau of Standards. Op. cit. Also, Measures for Progress, Op. cit., especially p. 497. iM Hearings, op. cit., p. 212. "55 In the words of the official history of NBS ("Measures for Progress," op. cit., p. 485n) : "The action [The Astin resignation and associated events] raised a basic question: whether Governrnent through its regulatory and scientific agencies was to judge the merits of new products offered to the pubhc, or whether this function was to be left to the test of the marlret place. The integrity of the Government s primary scientific research body had been impugned. The Bureau was being subjected to pressure, and to reorganization in accordance with an outside concept of scientific ol)jectivity. The attacli on the Bureau Implied a radical reversal in the role of Government as the regulator of commerce." 53 than to a standing committee, the issue was never presented in a form in which legislation would have been a suitable means of resolution. ]\lost of the decision-points lay outside of the Congress, and were only influenced by actions within the committee of Congress. The alternatives perceived by the Congress — that is, by the com- mittee — centered on whether or not the battery additive had merit, whether the vendor had been fairly treated, whether arbitrary action of Government was closing the door of opportunity for small business. An investigating committee assumed the primary decisionmaking role. By concentrating on the case at hand, it generated pressure on the executive branch to avoid repetition of the case, but afforded no guidance as to how the repetition was to be avoided, or how this avoidance was to be accomplished without sacrificing the protection of the consumer that had led to the controversy. The source of the issue was an uncommonly aggressive entrepreneur. The indication of the issue took the form of a complaint of unfair treatment of the individual, supplemented by many letters to Con- gress from many different jurisdictions. Reception of the entrepre- neur's complaint was favorably motivated by a concurrent change in pohtical admmistration, and by the functional commitment of the membership and staff of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, to whom the entrepreneur appealed. Validation of the issue to the committee derived mainly from a considerable number of testimonials asserting favorable experience with the product. The need for action was not well expressed because of the way the issue came to the Congress: There was a tendency to lose sight of the functional role of the National Bureau of Standards in a system designed to protect the consumer against fraud and misrepresentation, and instead to concentrate on the issue as to the merits of the product — and as to whether or not NBS was competent to test it. The urgency of the issue as perceived by the Congress was partly out of consideration for the plaintiff, whose business was in jeopardy, and partly an extension of his plight to an indeterminate number of other persons whose businesses might be similarly jeopardized. Urgency was also contributed by the status of the Director of NBS, whose resignation had been linked publicly with the controversy. The issue assessment took the form of a thorough investigation by the committee staff of the perceived issue — by resort to a technically qualified scientific laboratory — ^presumably objective and remote from the issue, by collection of earher scientific findings, by numerous consultations with users of the product, and by lengthy interrogation of the Director of NBS. Because of the evolutionary way the issue emerged, attitudes and commitments had crystalhzed around the question as to the merits of the product rather than on the procedures by which the protection of the pubhc against fraud and misrepre- sentation was reconciled witli the protection of the entrepreneur against arbitrary and bureaucratic procedures. Thus, various statements of the issue were made by members of the committee during the hearings that had little bearing on the question of what to do about it. The most substantive statement was contained in Secretary Weeks' presentation at the opening session of the hearmg. He noted that the NBS was the "keystone" on which 54 other Government agencies depended. Its findings were a source of great power. However: * * * If the Bureau's foot slips, a business starting in against all the normal competitive hazards, finds itself up against something with which it cannot cope, the vast power of the U.S. Government. '^^ He suggested that the committee " * * * might want to reexamine the legislation giving the Federal Trade Commission very broad powers in matters like this." He might have added that even if NBS had not erred, its relaxed and informal attitude in consulting with a party to a commercial dispute might give color to the charge by the other party that NBS was not objective and without bias. Other procedural issues suggested by Weeks involved the NBS with the political and economic aspects of the issue. Bureau personnel had become involved in a technical controversy. Finally, he raised the question as to the roles of scientific tests versus practical experi- ence in the evaluation of products. There were " * * * many testi- monials to the fact that the product is good * * * ." Then the Sec- retary stated succmctly the essential issue as he saw it: As a practical man, I do not see why a product should be denied an opportunity in the market place. I believe that the purpose of the Congress in establishing the Bureau of Standards and in giving powers to such agencies as the Federal Trade Commission and the Post Office Department to act to prevent unfair prac- tices and the pei-petration of frauds, was that * * * their powers should be exercised in the interest of the general public and that such interest should be substantial and specifically and positively shown to be adversely affecting before the power is used.'" Direct consequences of the controversy There were six direct and explicit consequences of the AD-X2 controversy. They were : 1. The Senate Select Committee on Small Business did not report either favorabl}' or unfavorably on the merits of the additive. 2. The Director of the National Bureau of Standards was fully restored to his position by the Secretary of Commerce. 3. The National Bureau of Standards was extensively reorganized in response to the recommendations of the Kelly committee, and in particular was relieved of responsibility for political or other nontechnical decisions relative to com- mercial testing. 4. The Committee on Battery Additives of the National Academy of Sciences issued a formal report that found: (o) AD-X2 to have no merit; (6) NBS tests of the additive to be of excellent quality; (c) Competence of NBS personnel in battery tests to be high; (cO No want of objectivity of NBC personnel in the conduct or interpreta- tion of tests of battery additives. 5. The Post Office Department canceled its fraud order against Pioneers, Inc. 6. The Federal Trade Commission unanimously dismissed the complaint against Pioneers, Inc. Indirect consequences oj the controversy In addition to these direct consequences, there were a number of indii-ect results or effects, of which the most significant — as seen in retrospect — were the following: 1. Pioneers, Inc., and its proprietor, emerged without legal blemish, although at considerable cost for which he later vainly sought re- imbursement at the U.S. Court of Claims. The demonstration by this "Village Hampden" that the regulatory mechanisms of the Govern- ment on commerce could be effectively resisted by a determined indi- •5« Hearings, op. cit., p. 3. 157 Idem. 55 vidual can be variously evaluated: It might be judged a kind of vindication of individual rights, an erosion of a partial and incomplete mechanism of consumer protection, or a warning to civil servants to interpret any regulatory mandate narrowly and precisely. One effect was an encouragement to Ritchie himself to enter politics. ^^^ 2. The effect of the case on the value of user testimonials is con- jectm'al. The Academy committee and Dr. Astin made abundantly clear that in the scientific community such testimonials were valueless. On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission explicitly permitted them to overweigh the evidence judged pertinent by the formal scientific community. On this showing, any business confronted with the prospect of defending itself before the FTC would have reason to collect testimonials and use them with confidence as evidence in its support. Nevertheless, the au-ing of this issue before the committee was probably educational for the general public — both in principle and with respect to the merits of AD-X2. 3. The message was communicated unmistakably that the new Administration intended to minimize, or at least to moderate, the role of the Federal Government in the regulation of private business. 4. The role of science was confirmed as a respected institution immmie from political pressures as long as the institution contributed to technological opportunity, and did not insist on exercising a regulatory function. Tliis effect gTew out of an interaction in wliich the scientific community showed that it had strong views on the insi^dation of its findings from political pressures, and could speak with a single voice on issues even when the scientific e^adence seemed contradictory. On the other hand the political communit}'^ was unwilling to give political effect to a scientific finding that contravened political values such as business freedom from Government regulation, the well-being of small business, and the acceptability of testimonj^ based on practical ex]Derience. 5. The issue demonstrated both the utility and the limitations of a useful methodology^ for arbitrating issues of a highly technical nature. It highlighted the importance of insiu-ing that those who make, interpret, or arbitrate on scientific evidence are truly disinterested and objective. A committee named by the National Academy of Sciences and consisting of eminent, disinterested, and scientifically qualified individuals had gathered, assessed, and reported on the pertinent evidence, and had been able to arrive at a unanimous conclusion that was technically unassailable. However, it seems to have had an indecisive effect on the political aspect of the case, and was rejected as "hearsay" in the proceedings of the Federal Trade Commission. 6. As to regulatory proceedings, the case established that testi- monials of satisfied users were weighty, even to the extent of over- matcliing the findings of the NBS and the National Academy of Sciences; it defined more precisely the limits of postal regulation when science could not rule completely, mieqmvocallj", and simply on a complex technological process with many variables and unknown factors. In both cases, the result was a lessened interest in the role of the Government as protector of the consumer. 7. The rektionship between the Congress and the executive branch on the AD-Z'i2 issue illustrated anew the axioms that careful scrutiny '58 See Lawrence, op. cit., p. 33. 56 of any area of Government operations reveals o])i)ortumties for tight- ening of administration and procedures, and that close congressional scrutiny compels agenc}' self-examination and sharpening of policies responsive to statutes and congressional intent. 8. Perhaps the most significant effect of the AD-X2 controversy in the long run was that it turned the attention of Government science away from the monitoring or policing function, and in the direction of positive contributions to knowledge. In the hearings, Dr. Astin was quizzed sharph^ on the role of NBS in the regulatory process and in- sisted strongly that NBS was a scientific laboratory that conducted research and made objective findings. It was not, he said, concerned in any way with the application of its findings in the regulatory process. Thus, the point was made by inference that science should not be concerned with regulatory functions. But no testimony was oft'ered or sought to shed light on the uses of science for this purpose. By rejecting the findings of NBS, even though supported by the National Academy of Sciences, the FTC may have contributed to a trend away from scien- tifically supported regulation. ^^^ VIII. Lessons of the Controversy — The Kole of Scientific Information The effectiveness of the information acquisition process in con- gressional management of the AD-X2 controversy cannot be assessed without a first determination of the objectives sought. If the objective was simply to win for Ritchie an easement of the regulatory arrange- ments that impaired his market opportunities, the effort succeeded. The main sources of information yielding this result were the evi- dences of satisfied users and the apparent technical disagreement in findings between MIT and NBS tests. If the purpose was to communicate to the business community the intention to reduce the scale of government regulation of commerce, that, too, was successful. Here, the information was primarily in the form of declarations of polic}^ by Secretary Weeks and the tenor of the questioning of Director Astin. But there seem to have been other objectives. The oft-repeated assertion that the committee sought to determine whether or not AD-X2 Avas anj good remained unsatisfied. The Small Business Committee received more scientific and technological information about AD-X2 tests than it could assimilate or evaluate. Even so, when the Academy Committee on Battery AdditiA^es entered the scene, it found this information inadequate. ^*^° It needed more information about NBS personnel, more information about NBS test procedures, data from additional tests, and more expert consultation from "neutral" sources. ^^^ The problem of the Senate committee was not in the acquisition of data, but in the specialized skills required to use the data it received. Members of the committee were frank to ad- !69 Nevertheless, FTC did not itself emerge from the controversy unscathed. Lawrence reports: "The editor of Consumer's Research Bulletin wrote in September 1956: "There is no doubt that the handling of the AD-X2 case has severely damaged the [FTC's] prestige and ability to provide the American consumer with effective protection against misleading advertising' " (p. 32.) Lawrence also notes that a study of FTC procedures, made at the instigation of the Small Business Committee, led to a number of procedural changes at the Commission. 160 Report of the Committee on Battery Additives, op. cit., p. 19, Moreover, the Committee rejected the MIT data as UTelevant, and providing "* * * no basis for an evaluation." (p. 22) 161 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 04 mit their bafflement at the complexities of the technology on which they were expected to rule.'*^- Another objective, the protection of small business from a combina- tion of big business (i.e., the battery industry) and Government, was met in the sense that Government ])articipation in an arrangement that constrained a particular small business was undoubtedl}'- curtailed. The protection of the scientific community in the discharge of its research function while constraining its participation in regulatory activities was achieved, and was almost certainly an objective of the committee. The description by Dr. Astin of the functions of NBS may have helped to define this objective, but it was probably more attributable to the high esteem earned by the scientific community for its achievements in World War II — in which NBS had played an important role in connection with both the atomic bomb and the prox- imity fuse. However, the ramifications of this policy were not explored at the time, and are only beginning to emerge today. It is possible that if the AD-X2 issue had been studied not as an ad hoc problem of an individual businessman versus bureaucracy, but as a matter of principle — if the questions it raised had been enumerated and the issue analyzed as to its broader implications — an altogether different set of witnesses might have been called. The assistance of the National Academy of Sciences in midsummer of 1952, instead of a separate set of tests at MIT, might have helped to dispose of the controversy more quickly and simply. The collection of the great mass of test data by the committee would have been obviated, the parade of testimonials would have served no purpose, and the questioning of Dr. Astin could have been concentrated on the issue of the role of science in regulation rather than on whether or not NBS had per- formed imperfectly in a given instance. However, if the question was not as to the virtue of AD-X2, but as to the use of science in Govern- ment regulation, the Academy's advice might usefully have been sought on this broader issue. The related question as to whether the National Bureau of Standards was an appropriate agent for regula- tory tests or test standards, and how such an agent might be insulated from political intervention on individual cases, might also have been the subject of an Academy inquiry. ^^' As it was, the committee was concerned less in protecting a regulatory mechanism from political onslaughts than in interceding on behalf of an affected small business. The gulf in understanding that prevailed in 1953 between the Con- gress and the world of science is perhaps best illustrated by the issue of testimonials versus laboratory data. There was a mutual "credibility gap" between Congressmen and scientists. On the one hand, the committee was unable to reject the force of practical experience on the part of practicing technologists, especially when the money of hard- headed businessmen backed their judgment. On the other hand, to the scientists, testimonials were worthless as evidence because the data they provided were uncontrolled, not quantitative, and usually not even well documented. The National Bureau of Standards found itself in the awkward position of trying to prove a negative, in the face of abundant testi- monials supporting the affirmative. In view of the limitless variables "2 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 174, 183-184, 304, 377-378, for examples. 'MTo be sure, the Kelly committee did make a recommendation as to the inappropriateness of NBS to act in the nontechnical aspects of commercial tests. But its finding was made in the narrower context of the question of NBS reorganization to strengthen its scientific capability. On the broader question of scientific regulation by Government per se, the Kelly committee did not rule. 58 present in some minute extent in the situation, no complete, absolute, unqualified, impregnable proof was possible. A negative finding could be arrived at to the satisfaction of the scientific community, by reduc- ing to a negligible level the residual possibility of error. But it could not be reduced to zero. Most communications to the Congress appealing for help are from individuals without scientific training, and are based on a layman's judgment and values. Most Members of Congress have legal training in which representation of a client imposes the obligation to accept his story along with the case, and to attempt to substantiate his position. When the scientific evidence is confiictmg, obscure, or indecisive, the congressional conclusion may favor the layman's judgment, especially when backed by abundant practical evidence in the form of testi- monials. From the scientific point of view, NBS may have been alto- gether justified in ignoring testimonials. But from the practical or political point of view, the more testimonials in favor of a product, the stronger and more conclusive must be the scientific evidence to nullify it. Among the difficulties encountered by the Senate Small Business Committee in acquiring technical information, there was the problem of scientific language itself. ^^* There was the difference in approach as between the political personality, accustomed to dealing with quali- tative information, and the scientific personality, used to quantitative information.^*^^ There was the problem of obeying the scientific rules in the collection of data.^®^ All of these stood in the way of effective communication between the disciplines of physical science and the practice of politics. On the positive side, the AD-X2 episode contributed usefully to public and political education on matters of science. It afforded instruc- tion in the difficidty of conducting unassailable scientific tests of product performance and properties, the vulnerability of tests to criticism, and particularly the vulnerability of scientific tests to practical criticism. It illustrated the importance of controlled scientific tests, the importance of quantitative data, and the importance of requiring technica,l witnesses to arm themselves with careful docu- mentation on procedures and results. It explained the dift'erence between laboratory and field tests. In a broader context, it demon- strated the difficulty of resolving a technical issue in a congressional committee. It showed why political factfinding processes needed to separate the consideration of scientific aspects of issues from the political aspects, and to separate administratively the functions of scientific investigation and political or economic policy formulation — in order to preserve the appearance as well as the fact of scientific objectivity. The battery additive controversy also presented the Congress v\'itli a number of difficult policy questions. Some of these were specific to the controversy, as for example — Was it important for the examination of the issue that the Post Office Depart- ment, the FTC, and the NBBB were all impacting on Pioneers, Inc., using the data i3ro\ided by NBS? And that the motivation for all three lines of attack is 164 For example, see Hearines, op. cit., p. 397. Also, see references cited in footnote 163. 165 Hearings, op. cit., pp. 228-229. 166 For example, the Academy committee rejected 1 set of data received by the Senate committee on the ground that it was not made with AD-X2. (See report of the Committee on Battery Additives, p. 20.) The Academy committee rejected another set of test data partly on the gi'ound that "* * * the manner of reporting the data does not give confidence in the care with which the experiments were perfor;ned. (Ibid., p. 22.) 69 at least conceivably attributable to the battery industry? Did the battery industry use this regulatory complex for its own purposes? How could the committee ascertain the technical competence of persons offering testimonials? The competence of NBS scientists? The relevance of MIT test procedures? What conclusions could the committee draw from the detailed descriptions of fimction and service of a battery additive provided by accomplished salesmen of this product? Was the committee, after being exposed to much scientific evidence of seemingly conflicting nature, and descriptions by salesmen and users, able to accept the judgment and assessment of test data by a committee of scientists chosen by the National Academy of Sciences? Other questions raised by the controversy have broader impHca- tions, and are hkely to recur in a new context. For example — If it is decided that the Government should maintain a regulatory mechanism to protect the citizen or business from fraud, misrepresentation, and unsatis- factory products, how can the mechanism be designed to be immune from political reprisals following complaints from aggrieved parties, and at the same time maintain its objectivity, and also provide continuous assurance to the Congress that it is maintaining this objectivity? Can an impartial testing laboratory be exposed to political pressures without losing its objectivity and disinterestedness? On the other hand, should science and scientific institutions have immune status, apart from political pressures? Can any group be safely insulated from political stress? Yet — can science be objective and creative if it is subjected to political stress? In the building of a science institution with esprit and reputation, is this charac- ter accompanied sometimes by a sense of superiority and bias against "outside" experts? How does this development influence the objectivity of the "in-group" and the "out-group"? Is there a danger that there may develop a scientific "estab- lishment" infected vvith this kind of bias — the sort of attitude that scientists themselves have labeled the "NIH (Not Invented Here) Syndrome"? What policy should govern the relationships among professional people in the same discipline but representing conflicting or competitive commercial interests? In particular, what should be the relationship between civil service scientists and persons in private employment sharing the same scientific discipline? Many patterns of questioning were observable in the AD-X2 heai-ings, reflecting both the interests of committee members and their responses to the testimony. This combination of prepared statements and subsequent interrogations is a tried and proved method of eliciting information. However, its effectiveness is maximized by advance planning, and systematic preparation to insure that the questions asked bring out most thoroughly the most important aspects of an an issue. In the AD-X2 hearings there was no overall systematic use of the technique to develop factual information relative to major themes or issues. There was no preliminary staff report (except for the brief issuance in December 1952, based mainly on Ritchie's allegations and the MIT report as interpreted by Dr. Laidler), to establish what the issues really were. In more recent years there has been evident a more systematic approach to congressional investi- gations involving scientific and technological issues. This approach may be gradually evolving into an institutionalized procedure, along approximately the following sequence: 1. Statement of the issue. 2. Structuring of the issue. 3. Identification of the implications and ramifications of the issue. 4. Establishment of the priorities or ordering of the aspects of the issue, ranked in terms of relative significance and import. 5. Definition of the information needs of the Congress relevant to each aspect of the issue to be investigated. 60 6. Identification of the best sources of the requu-ecl information. 7. Procurement of the information : as pubUshed or unpublished documents, testimony, and witnesses avaihxble for questioning. S. Processing (ordering, analysis, and interpretation) of the information. 9, Statement of findings. 10. Establishment of policy decision or decisions. Whether for investigations and oversight, or for the testing and evaluation of legislative proposals, the merit of an orderly and struc- tured system of 1:his sort seems compelling. When, at the earliest point of contact, an issue can be identified as of major concern or widespread impact, and congressional investigation of it planned according to an orderly sequence, the outcome is likely to be of superior value. Diffi- culty is still to be anticipated, even today, with issues like AD-X2 in which a seemingly minor grievance evolves by stages into a front page controversy. It would have been unreasonable to have expected the Senate committee or its staff to have foreseen the scale of agitation that would ultimately result from a complaint over a test of a battery powder. It is much easier to relate the implications of the entire controversy, as they appear in retrospect, than it would have been at the time. While recognizing this, it is still valid to suggest that a searching analysis of these implications, taken at the earliest moment after the issue became momentous, might have served a useful purpose. CHAPTER FOUR— THE POINT JV PROGRAM: TECHNOLOG- ICAL TRANSFER AS THE BASIS OF AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES I. The Point IV Problem and Its Background This chapter is a case study of the decisionmaking process leading to congressional enactment in 1950 of the first long-range U.S. technical assistance program for the less developed countries of the world, the so-called point IV program. The purpose of the study is to examine the use by the Congress of scientific and technical information bearing on this issue. A principal goal of U.S. pohcy following World War II was to shield against Communist encroachment the territories of members of the "Atlantic Alliance." Marshall plan assistance to the war-ravaged nations of Western Europe was a principal means for implementing this policy. Progressively, the scope of this effort was enlarged as other nations, many of them former colonies of NATO countries, sought U.S. aid. Foreign economic and military assistance to a long list of bene- ficiaries thus became a fixture of U.S. policy. At the same time, a rapid growth in Communist power was taking place — as exemplified by Soviet achievement of nuclear weaponry and IMao Tse-tung's conquest of the Chinese mainland. Communist technological and territorial gains intensified the stresses between the Communist and non-Communist power systems. One area of competi- tion was in the territories that had been colonies of the European nations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Requirements of all the developing regions for economic assistance quickly threatened to overtax U.S. resources. Unlike the ravaged nations of Western Europe, whose skilled manpower and viable political systems enabled them to make a quick restoration under the stimulus of postwar aid, the developing countries lacked both technological culture and political organization suited to the encour- agement and organization of industrial skills. Assistance under United Nations auspices was slow in materializing. It became evident that the United States faced a choice between curtailing the scope or altering the content of the foreign aid program. Accordingly, a search was undertaken for ways to enlarge the effects of foreign assistance without imposing a corresponding drain on U.S. resources of capital goods. Principal reliance was for a time placed on the concept of exporting U.S. technology. In his inaugural address of 1949, the President voiced this aspiration: Fourth. We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progi-ess available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. ^ 1 U.S. President (Harry S. Truman). Inaugural address, Jan. 20, 1949. In U.S. Congress. Senate. Com- mittee on Foreign Relations. Development of technical assistance progi'ams: Background information and documents, Subcommittee on Technical Assistance Programs pursuant to S. Res. 214, 83d Cong. Nov. 22, 1954. 83d Cong. 2d sess., Commdttee print. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 53-64. (61) 62 While the cooperation of other nations should be sought in the investment of capital to aid the poorer nations (said the President), the United States was "preeminent in the development of industrial and scientific techniques" which could be used effectively in areas needing them. Eighteen months later, on June 5, 1950, the Act for International Development, embodying the congressional response to the President's request, received his approval. Its first funding was further delayed until the end of August 1950. Summary of the legislative history of Point IV The first step in implementing the point IV proposal was the formu- lation of a set of specifics. This task was undertaken by the Inter- departmental Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance, com- posed of agency and departmental administrators of assistance pro- grams, acting in concert with the National Advisory Council, com- posed of departmental chiefs concerned \\ath financial matters and also nongovernmental spokesmen for the American business com- munity. The enterprise was under the general direction of Assistant Secretary of State Wiliard Thorp. The major product of these deliber- ations was a program, issued in the form of a series of State Depart- ment publications under the title: "Point Four: Cooperative Program for the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas." On the basis of the recommendations in this series of publications, the administration drafted two bills which were introduced as legis- lative proposals in June 1949. One treated the provision of technical assistance ^ and the other the establishment of safeguards for private capital to finance a large part of the program.^ Segments of the business connnunity challenged the position taken by the Administration in oft'ering a flexible aid program, urged a larger role for private capital with stronger safeguards, and opposed the con- templated role of the United Nations as partner in the program. Tln-ee sets of hearings were held on the initial bills and on subsequent com- promise measmes, before the Congress adjourned without taking action. Deliberations between the executive branch and interested members of the business community continued. Compromise legislation was drawn up and introduced in an attempt to satisfy some of the criticisms of industry. New hearings were held, during the first part of 1950, by the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affahs Committees. The two Houses acted on separate measiu"es, the House version calling for a $25 million appropriations authorization, with a substantial role for guaranteed private investment, and the Senate version limited to the provision of technical "know-how," supported by a $45 million appro- priations authorization with few guarantees to protect overseas private investment. House and Senate conferees acquiesced essentially on the House version. After much debate in the Senate, the Congress accepted the conference report and the President signed the bill into law June 5.* After further debate, the Congress appropriated $25 million to get the program underway. The Act for International Development was a compromise between the administration bills and counterproposals for a program of limited 2 H.R. 5615, introduced in the House by Representative John Kee, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 3 H.R. 5594, introduced in the House by Representative Brent Spence and S. 2197, introduced in the Senate by Senator Burnet R. Maybank, July 12, 1949. The proposed State Department program is shown as follows: TABLE 1.— PROPOSED 1ST YEAR TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM BY FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY, ESTI- MATED COSTS TO RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND TO UNITED STATES OR INTERNATIONAL AGENCY Category Costs borne by United States or international agency Costs borne by recipient coun- tries Total $2,365,545 12,659,553 909.300 4.515,710 1.868,950 $1,182,772 6,329,777 454,650 2,257,855 934, 475 2.531,847 1,621,025 1,905,975 5,443,874 3,076,640 894,225 300,435 493.850 134,450 387,675 170,575 320, 150 99, 750 $3,548,317 18,989,330 1.363,950 6,773,565 2. 803, 425 5.063,694 7.595,541 3. 242. 050 4,863,075 3.811.950 10,887,748 5,717,925 16,331,622 6,153,280 1.788.450 9,229,920 2,682,675 600, 870 901,305 987. 700 268.900 775.350 341.150 640. 300 1.481,550 403,350 1,163,025 511,725 960, 450 199, 500 299, 250 57, 080, 000 28, 540, 000 85,620,000 1. General economic development 2. Agriculture and forestry 3. Fisheries 4. Reclamation, hydroelectric power, and flood controL 5. Mineral resources -.. 6. Industry.- 7. Labor 8. Transportation. 9. Health 10. Education 11. Social security and social services... 12. General statistics 13. Public administration 14. Finance. 15. Housing 16. Communications.. 17. Hydrographic and geodetic surveys. 18. Weather Total Source: Point Four: Cooperative Program For Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas (revised January 1950), op. cit., p. 81. 73 CO a ■z. r) o < —I C3 O CO < o DO < 00 o ■z. CTJ C CO cc O OJ < UJ X CD ^ M."ti GO 1. 1 §5 00 o <^ a) Qj Vi CO •^ -o c C/1 ro {/> < ro O CNJ Q.Q. r^ P 3 3 O O o> E coS. = 00 p ;r DO OJ O .u o.S= 3 c: Q ea £ c £ o ro oC3 '^ UJ ->; 03 c/5 TO ^o ^ ■o a> o £ Eti ._ o.^ :§ °:5 — ^ 03 to fli > '^ n- ^ O) 00 Se^s •O CO ,- o _- OJ O QJ 0.0. , trt C/) C3 3 =3 = O O o> 3:xco ^X3- <1> 03 LU 75 It is not evident that at the time of the hearings there were very many persons with the necessary quahfications to present scientific or technical criticism or ahernatives. Whether or not a search was vigorously pursued for such witnesses, they were not forthcoming. Vu"tually no testimony was offered to shed doubt on the Nation's ability to pursue an effective program of technical assistance to the less developed countries. No testimony was taken from executive officials actually designing the program: Haldore Hanson, Director of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cidtural Cooperation, and Jon Abbink and Isadore Lubin, who had participated in the Joint Brazil-United Statts Technical Mission and who were aiding Assistant Secretary Thor]) in program planning. Several reasons may be gi\'en to explain wiry Congress passed over the science policy aspects of this program. To begin with, the program was not recognized as involving scientific problems at all. Much of the deliberation centered on political, economic, and military considera- tions such as the need to contain conmiunism, the need to exjjand U.S. markets, and the development of secm^e som'ces of strategic materials. Then, to silence those opposed to Government spending, the President yielded to the persuasions of those advocating that main reliance be placed on private investment and private arrangements for the export of technology. The executive branch had apparently not undertaken thorough prelimmary analyses of the special needs of the underde- veloped countries. Its optimistic and somewhat superficial belief in the ability of American technicians to aid the underdeveloped countries was not challenged by the Congress, nor were the views of critics outside of the executive branch solicited. And in 1949-50 the executive branch did not have the benefit of the science advisory apparatus it now utilizes to help formidate science policy: the Office of International Scientific and Technical Affairs in the Department of State,^^ the Office of Research and Analysis within the Office of Technical Cooperation and Research in the Agency for International Development,^^ the science attache program in the Department of State, the Office of Science and Tech- nology, and the President's Science Advisory Committee. The task of Congress was complicated because it also lacked such science advisory arrangements as the several House and Senate committees relating to science, technology, research, and development; the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance of the Committee on ^* A Science Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. Oliver E. Buckley, chairman of the board of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, was established on Apr. 20, 1951, witliin the Office of Defense Mobilization, to advise the President and the Director of Defense Mobilization in matters relating to scientific research and development for defense. (U.S. Federal Register Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration. U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1951-52. Revised as of July 1, 1951. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 69.) Later in the Truman administration, it fell into disuse. (Bm-ton M. Sapin, "The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy" (Washington, D.C., the Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 225.) The Office of International Scientific and Technical Affaii's was created as the Office of the Science Adviser to the Secretary of State in 1951 upon recommendations of the Berkner report . From 1052 to 1902 it was ineffectual and nonfunctional. It was resuiTected in 19.58 after the launch of Sputnik I and reorganized into the Office of International Scientific Affairs (later the Office of International Scien- tific and Technological Affairs), in 1962 upon recommendations from the Development Assistance Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee. (U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee. Report of the Development Assistance Panel: "Research and development in tlie new development assistance program," prepared for the Department of State, 1961. In U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The International Development and Security Act. Hearings on * * * 87th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 3. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 971-82.) 35 Created in 1961 after enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and upon recommendations from the 1961 report of the President's Science Advisory Committee. (For information relating to the Science Offices within State and AID, see: Warner R. Schilling, "Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics." Revised version of an article pubhshed in The American Political Science Review (vol. LVI, No. 2, June 1962), in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, (eds.) "Scientists and National Policy Making." (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964), po. 144-173. 76 Foreign Relations; ^"^ and the Science Policy Research Division of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.^^ Congress did not call upon members of the scientific community who might have helped to shape this initial technical assistance program. Discussions of the subject appeared in some of the trade journals of the various relevant scientific groups. However, with the exception of social scientists, few other scientists and experts addressed themselves to the need to confront the problem as a whole, to forge a link between instruments of foreign assistance and the problems of economic development, to evaluate the relevant political and policy aspects of the issue, or to attempt to transmit theu' recommendations to the Congress. Two interdisciplinarjT^ social science organizations were engaged in direct analysis of the problem at this time. The Public Affairs In- stitute of Washington, an independent research organization under the direction of Dr. Dewey Anderson published a series of eight de- tailed studies in 1950, prior to enactment, on the requisites of an adequate i)oint IV program and how such a program could benefit the economy of the L^nited States.^* Members of the institute published plans for a 50-year program, costing $600 million during the first 5 years, to be carried out largely under the auspices of the LTnited Nations. Many of the reconuuendations contained in the series offered specific criticisms of the administration program. The American Academy of Political and Social Science for 2 years carried on an examination of the proposed program; it issued two volumes of findings before enactment of the legislation.^^ Moreover, several sessions of the 54t]i annual meeting of the academy held in April 1950 were devoted to the topic of point IV.*° The Social Science Research Council was not as active as the American Academy of Political and Social Science prior to the enact- ment of legislation. However, it held two meetings on the "Social Science Problems of Point 4", in December 1950 and February 1951. Much of the first meeting was addressed to the problems of how social 3' Established in 1054 in accordance with S. Res. 214, agreed to July 2, 1954, to "make a full and complete study of technical assistance and related programs." (In "Development of technical assistance programs," op. cit., p. V.) 5' Little use was made by the Congress of the Legislative Reference Service for scientific and technological information. The Congress did have the benefit of a report undertaken by the Legislative Reference Service for the House Committee on Foreign Afl'airs in July 1949, whicli sununarized congressional and administra- tion activities on the point 4 progvain to that date. However, it was based almost wholly on State Depart- ment justification materials, and did not include any critique of the program or recommendations regarding the proposal. (I^S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. "Point 4: Background and Program" (International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949) .July 1949. Prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Committee print. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949, 19 pages.) 38 The series published by the Public Affairs Institute of Washington D.C. throughout 1950 includes: "A Policy and Program for Success," by Dewey Anderson and Stephen Raushenbush, 75 pages; "Two- Thirds of the World: Problems of a New Approach to the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America," by Harold R. Issacs, 64 pages: "Groundwork for Action," by Morris Llewellyn Cooke with Calvin J. Nichols, Dorothy Detzer. and Peter G. Franck, 96 pages; "Engineers of World Plenty," by James Rorty. 70 pages; "People, Food, Machines," by Stephen Raushenbush, 79 pages; "Helping People Help Themselves," by Wallace J. Campbell and Richard Y. Giles, 71 pages; "Foreign Aid and Our Economy," by Se3rmour E. Harris, professor of economics. Harvard University, 76 pages; and "Where is the Money Coming From?" by Morris S. Rosenthal, president, Stein-Hall Co. and National Council of American Importers; vice chair- man, Foreign Commerce Department Committee, of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 58 pages. 39 Halford L. Hoskins. Ph. D.. ed., senior specialist in international relations. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C, "Aiding Underdeveloped Areas Abroad," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (vol. 268, March 1950), 251 pages; and Ernest Minor Patterson, Ph. D., ed., professor of economics. University of Pennsylvania, president, the American Acad- emy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa.; " Formulating a Point Four Program," The Annals of the American Academv of Political and Social Science (vol. 270, July 1950), 204 pages. *o See: Point 4 and Southeast Asia— Extention of Remarks of Hon. Harley M. Kilgore, Congressional Record, appendix (May 19, 1950), pp. A3794-3796. 77 scientists coiild contribute effectively in the formulation of foreign aid policies, how social scientists could make their thinking and the- orizing more realistic and relevant to policy problems, and how social scientists could immediately transmit their recommendations to the Government. They proposed research in such areas as training, "cul- tural shock" resulting from the introduction of new technology, and research in socioeconomic and cultural information problems.*^ The second meeting went further into these problems, and gave particular attention to the cases of supplying technical assistance to Paraguay and Liberia.*^ Other scientific groups gave less consideration to the proposed program and pubhshed less material than did the social science community before enactment of the legislation. For example, no sessions of the 1949 and 1950 conventions of the American Farm Economic Association were devoted to the problem. The only relevant article during this period in the pages of the joiu'nal of this associa- tion summarized part of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources held in August 1949.^^ And the only article appearing in Science, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, (AAAS), treated the same topic.** Three papers were presented at the 1949 meeting of the AAAS which related to the provision of technical assistance by the United States, and these were contributed by pohtical scientists and economists rather than physical, agricultural, or other natural scientists.*^ It was not until after enactment of the legislation that a symposiimi devoted to the topic of "Science and International Understanding" was held, at the December 1950 meeting of the AAx'\.S. Three papers dealt with mineral, biological, and intellectual resources.*^ Much of the discussion which followed treated the topic of developing resources to keep up with a biu'geoning population. But while the discussion addressed the need to develop food resoiu-ces and devise acceptable substitutes, no mention was made of the need for birth control or population control measures.*'' " Social Science Researcli Council. Summary minutes: "First Conference on Social Science Problems of Point 4" (Washington, D.C., Dec. 2, 1!I50, mimeo), 6 pages. <2 Social Science Research Council. Summary minutes: "Second Conference on Social Science Problems of Point 4" Feb. 2-3, 1951 (Washington, D.C., mimeo), 11 pages. « G. H. Aull, L. P. Gabbard, and John F. Timmons. "The United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources". Journal of Farm Economics, (vol. XXXII, No. 1, Feb. 1951), pp. 95-112. « Carl N. Gibboney, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. The United Nations Scientific Conference for the Conservation and Utilization of Resources. Science. (Vol. 110, Dec. 23, 1949), pp. 675-678. thor's of life that were good enough for their ancestors are not good enough for them. A big job of selling and of education would have to pr\'ith the other areas of the world. However the pro- visions he and other leaders of the American labor movement sug- gested to meet the needs of the worker in the underdeveloped coun- tries were limited to enactment of the "* * * appropriate mmmium- wage laws and maximum-hour law s * * *" to improve labor relations and the legal climate for workers.^'* The Department of Labor presented testimony detailing technical cooperation programs which it planned to undertake. Assistant Secre- 96 Jaines^P ^Varhiire.' ecoiiomrst'aiul author on international affairs. Previously Deputy Director of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information. "A New Look at the Economic Challenge. Annals ' « Morris 's°'RosenthaL "Point 4-Enough or Not at All." Annals (July 1950). op. cit., p 38. M Pee text of Letter of Walter Reuther, president of the UAW-CIO to Mr. E. F. McDonald Jr.. president, Zenith Radio Corp., Chicago, Nov. 22, 1949. (Pp. 449-450), and foreign policy resolution adopted by tne tary of Labor, Philij) M. Kaiser, said tlie Departnieut considered it would be necessary to "increase labor's understanding of economic development [)roblems and the role which a free labor movement plays in the process." For this purpose, "trade-union officials and other interested i)ersons sliould be brought to the more advanced countries to learn how more industrially developed countries attempt to deal with the problem of developing constructive industrial rela- tions.^'* Little recognition was given to the training requirements needed for developing the skills of workers in the underdeveloped countries. Thus, a primary goal of the point IV program planners, and one which the Congress apparently did not question, was to export the American stanclards of the rights of labor to regions where they were of less pertinence — and possibly seriously premature. However, such a goal, as subsequently became evident, was only one of many technical cooperation considerations relevant for labor. The need for the training of workers in basic and special technical skills, the development of labor recruitment technicjues, and the establishment of environments to motivate workers, have commanded at least an equal priority. Education The importance of educational assistance in the point IV program was obscured by several factors: the lack of perception of significant cultural differences, the belief that rapid change would ensue, the notion that the United States possessed the appropriate technical "know-how," and the importance given to the role of private business operations in the program. It appears that Congress easily acquiesced in the State Department program, which allocated only 10.5 percent of the initial budget to educational programs.' °° Agricultural and health assistance received approximately 20 percent each, while funds authorized for industrial development, approximated those given to education. Even the National Education Association did not foresee or docu- ment the essential role of education in the process of technical assist- ance. The only information it circulated called for a larger share of technical assistance funds to be devoted to educational programs "embracing nonschool as well as school agencies." For example: The "rich ethnic resources" of America should be fully utilized, the report advised, recommending that talent present in our Negro citizens be sought out in working with technically undeveloped peoples, the majority of whom belong to the colored races. '"^ Subsequent experience with technical assistance programs has shown that one of the prime requisites of economic develoiunent is the provision of a liberal and a technical education to a significant number CIO in November of 1949. In House. Act for International Development. Hearings, pt. 2, op. cit.. pp. 443. See also William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor. Letter to Hon. John W. McCormack. President Truman's point 4 program. Congressional Record (appendix) (Mar. 31, 1950), pp. A2421-A2425. 99 Statement of Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Secretary of Labor. In House. International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949. Hearings. Pt. 1, op. cit., p. 280. wo Total program estimates equaled .'};57,080,000 with education's proposed budget totaling $6,153,280. (Table IV, proposed first year technical cooperation program by functional category— Estimated costs to recipient countries and to United States or international agency. In Point 4: Cooperative Program for Aid in the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Areas (revised January 1950), op. cit., p. 81.) '«' "Educational Steps in Point 4 Program," Science News Letter (July 22. 1950), p. 63. 92 of persons in the underdeveloped society.^"- Critics of American aid programs overwhelmingly agree that early programs suffered from a lack of emphasis on education — both formal and informal.^"^ For example, Rene Maheu, UNESCO's Director General, has suggested that development must overcome widespread social inertia in the less developed nation. This implies the need for a change in attitude, which will not occur "* * * until science and technology cease to be an imported magic * * * (but instead) * * * become a custom of (the) people." ^"^ It was not until 1955 that the defects of not allocating more resources to the development of an educational system were noted by the administration and the technical assistance program was shifted to give greater priority to basic education and also i)ublic administration. Upon submitting information reviewing program shifts in technical cooperation to the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. Harold E. Stassen, then Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, said : We are in the process of shifting the emphasis in the program. Here you see that in the agriculture and natural resources in percentage the effort is declining. In the health and sanitation it stayed relatively in about the same importance. In education, going beyond literacy, it is expanding. This generally increased emphasis on education, including, for examiale, the establishment of the voca- tional-educational schools for crafts and occupations, the engineering schools, and the various types of professional schools, brings that less developed society along as it goes beyond the state of enough clothing for its people, into a more developed society. At the same time we are stepping up the public administration program to endeavor to educate and train their young men to be more economic in the managing of the financial exchange of their country, the balance of payments, the budgetary processes, the kind of things that a society, as it moves away from an agricultural, less developed society, must have if it is to be stable and continue to develop. '"5 Population In approaching the problem of population per se, both the admin- istration and the Congress were constrained by the existing cultural values, which in 1950 had not 3^et fully appreciated the growing problem of population pressiu'es. Accordingly the views of the best qualified authorities were not brought to bear in 1950 on the question of population resource imbalance in the underdeveloped coimtries. This omission delayed official recognition of the need for a national policy in this field until 1963 when President Keimedy said that "we need to 'know more about the whole reproductive cycle' and that this knowledge should then be made more available to the 102 Theodore Schultz asserts that nivestment hi human capital is as important as investment in pliysical capital (Theodore Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital." American Economic Review (March 1951), p. 1): Albert O. Hirschman has called for a "binding agent" or the development of a liberal enlightened stratum, which can understand and communicate with both the developed and underdeveloped sectors of society (Albert O. Hirschman, "The Strategy of Economic Development" (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 6-7). W3 See John Kenneth Galbraith. "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid." Foreign Affairs (April 1961), p. 444. 'M Rene Maheu, as cited by Carlos Chagas, Ambassador, Brazilian permanent delegate to UNESCO. Science and Technology in Latin America. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astro- nautics. Government, Science and International Policy. A compilation of papers prepared for the eighth meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology, 1967. Committee Print. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 10-11. •C5 Statement of Hon. Harold E. Stassen, Director, Foreign Operations Administration. In U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Technical assistance programs. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Technical Assistance of the * * * on Technical Assistance Programs. Feb. 17, 18, 21, 23, 24, Mar. 2, 3. 4, 1955. 84th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 21. 93 world." Both tlie Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in 1966, and the Food for Peace Act of 1966 have special provisions for the use of U.S. -owned foreign currencies to conduct birth control research and to assist family planning programs in countries requesting such help.ioe Under the constraint of existing social values, the problem of popidation growth presented to Congress by the State Department understated the magnitude, gravity, urgency, and seriousness of the problem of rapid population growth. The rate of increase of population is one of the undoubtedly serious problems as far as the economic future of these areas is concerned.!''^ State Department information indeed revealed that popidation growth rates approached 3.5 percent in the underdeveloped coun- tries, ^°* but the impression was conveyed that the population growth rate of these nations would not be likely to exceed 2 percent per annum in the longer range future. ^°^ The programmatic solution developed by the State Department to alleviate the perceived population problem was based on the premise that the application of technical assistance, and concomitant increases in food production and industrialization, would eventuate in a Eiu'o- pean pattern of social relations and mores. It was suggested that a middle class ethos would be developed and that persons therefore woidd choose to have fewer children."" Hindsight, of course, reveals the deficiencies of this reasoning. The cultm'al, technical, and financial obstacles to agricidtm'al develop- ment are so great that food-producing capability did not expand enough to keep pace with the burgeoning population. In addition, policymakers learned that cultural patterns vary widely between the developed and underdeveloped world. One cannot assinne that de- velopment — whether agricultural or industrial — will produce the same cultural values and mores evidenced in Europe and other developed areas. No evidence was presented in Congress to reveal these fallacies. In fact the position taken by the State Department, of eschewing any form of bhth control, and opting for rapid economic develop- ment to alleviate the impending problem, reflected the domestic public opinion and some of the literature chculating at that point."^ w« U.S. Agency for International Development. Background paper: U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy and Programs in tlie Field of Population and Family Plamiing. (Wasliington, D.C., mimeo, Sept. 14, 1967, n.p.) and U.S. Agency for International Development. M.O. 1612.57 — Guidelines for assistance to population programs, manual transmittal letter. Sept. 15, 1967, p. 3. ">' Statement of Hon. Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In House. International Technical Cooperation Act of 1939. Hearmgs, pt. 1, op. cit., p. 21. "" Almost hidden in a chart m an appendix of its program planning material, the State Department in- cluded figures which would reveal that 25 of the 28 comitries which were to participate in the point 4 program manifested an annual birth rate over 3.5 percent — an alarming rate when compared with the 1.0 percent rate of the developed countries. According to the State Department, " The birth rates refer to average annual flgui'es for the period 1931-40. Official vital statistics were used where available, though for a number of countries these were corrected to take account of apparent miderreporting of births. Birth rates were esti- mated from other demographic information for countries lacking official vital statistics." (Point 4: Coopera- tive Program For Aid in the Development of Economically tjnderdeveloped Areas.) (Revised January 1950), op. cit., p. 114. •09 Statement of Hon. Willard L. Thorp. In House. International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949, hearings, pt. 1, op. cit., p. 21. 110 Thorp, op. cit., p. 21. 111 For instance, Galbraith,"In Commentary," op. cit; Stephen Raushenbush "People, Food, Machines," No. 5 in the bold new program series. (Washington, D.C., the Public Affairs Institute, 1950), p. 11, and Morris LleveUyn Cooke with Calvin J. Nichols, Dorothy Detzer and Peter G. Franck. " Groundwork for Action" No. 3 in the bold new program series. (Washington, D.C.the Public Affairs Institute, 1950), pp. 19-20. 94 However, studies circulating within the scientific community in 1950 revealed the need for population control measures in the develop- ing countries. In 1946 the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization calculated that it would be an economic impossibility for enough finan- cial resources to be available and a])plied to food j)roduction to keep u|) with the projected rate of population growth."- And in a special Annals study devoted to requisites of an eft'ective point IV program, John Kerr Rose, a geographer with the Legislative Reference Service of the Li- brary of Congress, challenged the economic determinism hypothesis: More often than not it is assumed that development will provide self-correction for the population problems faced in a majority of the underdeveloped areas. This * * * is open to grave question. There is no particular reason for believing that areas of other cultures, if and when they industrialize, will necessarily fall into the 20th century Western European-United States population pattern. "=* Scientific i)opulation control devices were available in the deveh^ped Avorld in 1950. The controversy surrounding their use in both donor and reci])ient countries attests to their merit. And in spite of the di- lemma over the use of U.S. resources to interfere in the lives of other peoi)le and other nations, anthropologists know today, and knew in 1950, that many of the cultures of the less-developed world sanctioned a variety of birth control measures including infanticide, enforced segregation of the sexes, chemical potions, and primitive prophylactic apparati. "^ In their presentation of material to the Congress, the State Department might have given greater attention to the proposition that while technical assistance most certainly woidd lower the death rate, the economic conditions of underdeveloped peoples would not improve unless there were a concurrent lowering of the birth rate, and that artificial means might be needed to achieve this end. The study of this problem and its implication would have been warranted then, in view of its increasingly serious importance subsequently. VII — Conclusions In advancing the point IV program, President Truman and his staff had identified an issue requiring legislative action: to provide technical assistance to the less-developed w^orld. Both the Administration and the Congress proceeded to assess this need. While the State Depart- ment and other departmental representatives concentrated upon devising a suitable and financially acceptable program, the Congress assessed the political implications and financial costs of carrying it out (pp. 62-71). However, there were many gaps in the scientific and technical information supplied to the Congress about the proposed program. Few questions were asked in the hearings to challenge the State De- partment's rationale and assumptions (pp. 71-75). The bulk of the 18 months of congressional decisionmaking was spent on mulling over two overriding, nontechnical issues: (1) A group of national and international political considerations directly or tangentially related to the question; (2) the financial approach to be taken, with particular "2 Cited by Dennis A. Fitzgerald "World Needs and Resources" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (vol. Vn, No. 4, April 1951), p. 102. "3 John Ken- Rose "Needs and Resomces of the Brave New World." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Aiding Underdeveloped Areas Abroad, edited by Halford L. Hoskins. (Vol. 268, March 1950), pp. 10-11. IK For instance see Peter Frver "The Birth Controllers." (London, Seeker & Warburg, 1965.) 95 Csi reference to the role of private business (pp. 65-67). Partisan resistance to the program in Congress was supplemented by a resurgence of isolationism, and various issues of particularity. When the ultimate yes-no decision appeared to be in doubt, the President revived the main issue of political and military policy that had been the initial inspiration for the legislation. The companion claim — that to stress the technical assistance aspect of foreign aid would be optimal from the cost/effectiveness standpoint — had appeal in the existing context. It proved to be a persuasive justification for the new i)rogram. In retrospect, however, the aid program as a means to contain communism b}' alleviating sources of unrest in developing countries has had only a qualified success. The particular emphasis of the point IV program on the export of technology has become recognized as sim- plistic, incomplete, and on occasion inappropriate. Congressional evaluation of the merits of technical assistance per se was not search- ing or resourceful (pp. 68-80). The assumption of U.S. competence in applied technology was insufficient. Attention was diverted to such perennial issues as funding, the bipartisan foreign policy, and preserva- tion or expansion of U.S. exports. Several other factors also diverted attention from the central issue: (!) The Administration was the major source of scientific and technical information for the Congress. While this was a new and admittedly experimental program, the Congress expected the Administration to have adequately evaluated all pertinent information in putting it to- gether. It was not seen by either the Congress or the Administration as an important feature of a national science policy, nor as a component of international science policy; (2) the Administration showed an exces- sive optimism regarding the Nation's ability to engage in an effective program of technical assistance to the less developed world. This belief went unchallenged (pp. 78-84) ; (3) members of the relevant scientific disciplines — including social scientists, civil engineers, and public health experts — who would have supplemented the superficial tech- nical understanding of the decisionmakers, were only mildly active in discussing the program (pp. 76-77). They held information Avhich, if i)roperly evaluated, might have eliminated early pitfalls to the pro- gram. HoAvever, they were not asked to contribute their comments, and did not attempt to gain a hearing. Several alternatives were presented in the Congress to the bills sent over by the President. One alternative was to establish a com- mission to study the need for technical assistance, and to determine the character such aid should take. While this alternative proposal use- fully raised some doubts about the scientific and technical aspects of the President's program, it was summarily condemned as a stalling maneuver, and received less serious study than it merited. Another alternative was to give responsibility for program formidation and implementation to the private business community in return for its financial participation. This approach was adopted, in part, along with a program of Government guarantees of private loans. The further alternative of tabling the legislation w^as rejected because the inter- national political costs would have been too great. Accordingly, a small and relatively low-cost, partly private, program of technical assistance was selected. 96 The program enacted by the Congress was a modification of the ad- ministration proposals. The Congress added provisions for better over- sight, more centralized direction, and a larger and more secure role for private business. However, the Congress made no substantive modification of the technical assistance program itself. It is apparent that many of the problems that surfaced in early U.S. technical assistance programs could not have been anticipated ^^^thout a trial run. However, it is also apparent that many other deficiencies which had to be corrected later on by additional legislation, redirection, and funding, could have been foreseen if the Administration and the Congress had made better use of information circulating within the relevant scientific communities at the time. It was in the scientific/technical area that caveats were issued regarding the fallability of the belief that the United States could easily and rapidly promote foreign economic dcA^elopment. Among the many cautions expressed by experts who were not called upon, were the observations (later to be confirmed) that the United States would not easily find a supply of quahfied technicians to implement its aid progTams; that economic development could not be fostered Anthout the appropriate admixture of technical assistance and capital transfer; and that it would not be easy to graft the best of a technologically developed society onto the complex and culturally different mechanisms of an underdeveloped nation. (Pp. 81-84.) In evaluating the program, the Congress made heaviest use of business and poHtical Antnesses, who discussed business and political issues. The State Department and other officials of the executive branch were expected to be a major source of congressional information in international science policy issues; not only did they need to have the pertinent information, but they were called upon to relate it broadly to domestic and international political objectives. What ap- pears to have been lackuig in the development of the point IV pro- gram, was the evaluation of the specific substantive aspects of the program, and its coherent integration as a practical and frugal opera- tion. It is here that nongovernmental witnesses, experts in particular scientific fields, and critics of foreign assistance policies, can make their most signal contribution. CHAPTER FIVE— INCLUSION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE SCOPE OF THE NATION AI SCIENCE FOUNDA- TION, 1945-47: A GROUNDWORK FOR FUTURE PART- NERSHIP I. Background of the Issue The piu-pose of this chapter is to examine the treatment of the issue, under consideration from 1945 to 1947, as to whether the social sciences should be included within the scope of the National Science Foundation (NSF). For reasons unrelated to the issue of this study, the evolution of NSF did not reach legislative enactment until 1950. But the question as to whether the scope of NSF should include the social sciences was resolved, for practical purposes, on July 3, 1946, when a key vote in the Senate decided in favor of a permissive formula: NSF was not to be told to accept or to exclude the social sciences, but it had the option of doing either, with the unmistakable further impli- cation that careful selectivity of projects to sponsor in this area was a must. What were the considerations in the Congress bearing on this decision? What advice had been received, and from what sources, that helped the Congress to select this alternative? What other in- formation was available at the time? What consequences derived from the decision? Origins of the National Science Foundation concept President Franklin Roosevelt had made sporadic attempts, during the depression years, to enlist the resources of the physical sciences to further national goals of economic recovery. Freedom from bm*eau- cratic direction and assm*ance of unconditional support were necessary conditions of such service, however, and these the President could not provide. Nevertheless, evidence accumidated in the 1930's as to the func- tional relationship between progress in basic scientific discovery and the capability to solve large national problems.^ There was a fiu^ther relationship, also becoming apparent, between the growth of tech- nological application and the economic well-being of society.^ How- ever, no means had been devised — except in the special case of agri- cultm'e — for systematically exploiting the resources of basic and applied science and technology for public purposes. The scope of applicability of the scientific method for public purposes had not emerged as a serious question. Historically, the United States had contributed few achievements in the basic sciences. Research centers mostly in Eiu'ope had led the 1 See, for example: U.S. National Resources Committee. Research— A National Resource. Pt. 1. Rela- tions of the Federal Government to Research. November 1938. Report of the Science Committee to the * * * (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938), 255 pages. 2 See, for example: U.S. National Resources Planning Board. Research— A National Resource. Pt. H. Industrial Research. December 1940. Report of the National Research Council to the * * * (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), especially p. 42. (97) 99-044—69 8 98 way: by such outstanding contributions as those of Bohr and Moseley in atomic structure, Einstein in rehitivity, Curie in radioactivity; the Russians led in theoretical matlieniatics, the Germans in theoretical mechanics, Austria in medicine, Italy in electromagnetics, and so on. The genius of the United States (except for such outstanding excep- tions as Henry and Gibbs), lay in the areas of applied science and technology.^ Science had not been a major preoccupation of the Congress. There was a longstanding tendency to regard scientists as a group remote from political affairs whose achievements were sometimes rewarded by the granting of patents, but whose work largel}^ was beyond tlie control and whose motivations were beyond the reach of the legislators. Agricultural sciences were accorded a special status in the Morrill Act of 1863, whicli recognized this mundane field of research as related to the raising of the levels of skills of farmers.* In the field of science proper, congressional interest and government activities were on a modest scale. A small research effort was authorized in the National Bureau of Standards. Small programs were supported in the U.S. Geological Survey, the laboratories at ordnance arsenals, the Naval Research Laboratory, the David Taylor Model Basin, and the Naval Observatory. The quasi-governmental Smithsonian Institution was maintained with the help of Federal funds. Such longstanding institu- tions as the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Connnerce, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, however, were not recognized as performing really scientific functions and their researches were not ordinarily identified with those of the physical science laboratory. During World War II the physical scientists, and to a lesser extent the social scientists, were mobilized to carry on applied research and engineering develo})ment to help solve military problems. The impact of this outpouring of technology was the more notable because the depression period preceding the war (1930-39) had been character- ized by small expenditures for research and a reluctance of private industry to develop and use new technology that involved capital expenditures or laborsaving economies. During the prewar period, many graduate students, unable to find employment in industry, had continued their advanced studies so that when the war broke out there 3 Dr. Harold Urey, of Columbia University, whose name is associated with the discovery of "heavy water," submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization, Oct. 25, 1945, a table of Nobel Prize winners in the United States and Europe as follows: United Europe States Chemistry - 4 37 (11 Germans). Physics -- 8 39 (17 Germans). Medicine and physiology 6 37(8 Germans). Commented Urey: "The relatively small number of Nobel Prizes awarded to U.S. citizens indicates the weakness of this country in pure science and also, by contrast, its great strength in industrial development." (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs. Hearings on Science Legislation (S. 1297 and related bills.) Hearings before a subcommittee of the * * *. Pursuant to S. Res. 107 (78th Cong.) and S. Res. 146 (79th Cong.). Authorizing a Study of the Possibilities of Better Mobilizing the National Resources of the United States. 79th Cong. 1st and 2d sess. Five parts: Pt. 1, Oct. 8, 9, 11, 12, 1945; pt. 2, Oct. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1945; pt. 3, Oct. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 1945; pt. 4, Oct. 29, 30, 31 and Nov. 1, 1945; pt. 5, including statements sub- mitted for the record, Nov. 1, 2, 1945; and pt. 6, Testimony of Science Talent Search Finalists, Mar. 6, 1946. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office (1945), p. 658.) * The unforeseen consequences of the encouragement of scientific agriculture were the steady rise in in- industrial productivity of the United States as manpower left the farm. During the century following this action, farm families declined in proportion to the total population from about two-thirds to about one- twentieth. Throughout most of the period 1920 to the present, this dwindling proportion of farmers produced unmanageable surpluses of farm produce. 99 Avas a considerable pool of a\'ailable scientific manpower of high qual- ity. This pool Avas further augmented by an influx of refugee European scientists. This army of scientists, provided with an abundance of supporting resources, challenged by real and urgent ])roblems, and assured of eager acceptance of worthwhile products useful in military or industrial supi)ort of the war, produced an array of novel technol- ogy that Avas quantitatively voluminous and strategically decisive. Perhaps most significant of all, the war showed that it was feasible to organize a large-scale mobilization and coordination of scientifically skilled U.S. manpower to achieve a national goal. This teamwork on a national scale was attributable to a combination of cu-cumstances: the acceptance of direction under the stress of a powerful patriotic motive, the moral issue of a war against a particularly ugly political system, the receptiWty of U.S. military forces toward technological innovation, the need for Aveapons growing out of a decade of neglect of U.S. military development, the outstanding leadership of Dr. Vannevar Bush and his associates, and the unlimited resources that the Avartime Congress and Administration Avere prepared to provide for any plausible scientific application that might contribute to the Avar effort. From his vantage point as chairman of the Subcommittee on War Mobilization of the Senate Committee on ^Military Affairs, Senator Harley M. Kilgore became acquainted AA'ith the unprecedented Avar role of applied science and technology. The subcommittee had iuA^esti- ga ted the mobilization of scientific personnel, had surA-eyed Avartime scientific programs, had taken testimonj^ on the integration of science and technology into the Avar program, and had Avitnessed the rise of Government outlays on science from $70 million in 1940 to $700 million in 1944. As an outgroAvth of this surveillance, five legislatiA'e goals were perceived as necessary by the subcommittee: 1 . Government funding for research in the public interest, and especially for defense, health and medical, and basic sciences; 2. Coordination of Government-supported research; 3. Stimulation of research by private institutions; 4. ImproA-ed management of scientific information; 5. ^Accelerated full exploitation of the fruits of research. A bill_ (S. 1297) proAnding for a National Research Foundation to accomplish these purposes Avas introduced by Senator Kilgore (for himself, Mr. Johnson of Colorado and Mr. Pei3per), Jidy 23, 1945. In this initial bill, the scope of research, as proA'ided in section 2-a, Avould have been: "in fields of recognized public interest, particularly national defense, health and the medical sciences, and the basic sciences, in- cluding the social sciences." A similar line of thought Avas concurrently pursued by President Roosevelt, Avho sought a Avay to consolidate the mobilization of science for public purposes to serve in the peace to folloAv. In a letter to Dr. Bush, November 17, 1944, he requested adA'ice on Avays in AA'-hich the lessons found in the unique experiment of teamAvork and coopera- tion in coordinating scientific research and in applying existing scien- tific knoAAledge to the solution of the technical problems paramount in Avar could be profitably employed in times of peace. He cited as goals for peacetime science, a fuller and more fruitful employment and a fuller and more fruitful life. There Avere four questions: con- cerning dissemination of scientific knoAvledge accumulated in connec- 100 tion with war research, the future of medical and rehxted science, Government sponsorship of private and pubHc research, and en- couragement of talented young people to pursue careers in science. In response to the President's request. Dr. Bush organized four study panels, each to report on one of the four issues raised by the President; a report specifying an action program was transmitted to President Truman, July 5, 1945. The Bush report, "Science, the End- less Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research," concluded that a vigorous level of scientific effort under Federal sponsorship could be beneficial to national health, productivity, and defense. The primary need was for a strong and undirected effort in basic scientific research. The United States could no longer rely on Euro- pean basic research for the underpinning of its ap])lied research pro- grams; moreover, the research capital of past basic discoveries had been used up during the war years and needed replenishment which only the United States could undertake to provide. The report called for a national policy on science, with heavy emphasis on the need for Government support of basic research, expanded interchange with other countries of scientific information, and a vigorous program to bring more and better qualified young people into scientific careers. To implement these recommendations the Busli report proposed a national research foundation, responsible to the President, able to disburse funds to sponsor research, and consisting of divisions of med- ical research, natural sciences, national defense, scientific personnel and education, and publications and scientific collaboration, supported by an administrative office.^ Dr. Bush later explained that in preparing his recommendations, he had understood the President's request to encompass only the physical, biological, and medical sciences. However, upon recei])t of the Bush report. President Truman enlarged the scope of its terms. In a lengthy message to Congress on reconversion, September 6, 1945, he included a section in which he lU^ged "the earl}^ adoption of legislation for the establishment of a single Federal research agency which would [discharge six functions, of which the second was:] promote and support research in the basic sciences and in the social sciences." [Emphasis supplied.] ® Dr. Bush did not altogether oppose this addition to his program. On October 15 he told the Kilgore subcommittee that he believed "that our strength is also dependent upon the extent of our knowledge of social phenomena and our ability to bring such understanding to bear wisely on the urgent problems confronting us." He urged that the question receive proper study and that the views of the social scientists be assembled.'^ Because of its longstanding interest in science policy, the Sub- committee on War Mobilization — jointly with two ad hoc subcom- mittees of the Senate Committee on Commerce, proceeded shortly after the President's reconversion message to begin consideration of * U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development. "Science, the Endless Frontier," n report to the President on a program for postwar scientific research, by Vinnevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. July 1945 (Washington, D.C., National Science Foundation, reprinted July 1960), especially pp. 34-40. ' tr.S. President Harry S. Truman. Special message to the Congress presenting a 21-point program for the reconversion period, Sept. 6, 1945. In Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1945. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 293. 7 Hearings on Science Legislation (S. 1297 and related bills). Pt. 2, Oct. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1945, op cit., p. 800. 101 science legislation the message had requested. In 21 days of hearings before the end of 1945, the subcommittee accumulated 1,200 pages of testimony, exhibits, and statements relating to National Science Foundation legislation. These were followed by a preliminary report, December 21, a supplementaiy appendix presenting an analytical summary of the testimony, and a final report on science legislation by the subcommittee, February 27, 1946. The full Committee on Military Afi'airs made its report, April 9, and the Senate debated the proposal July 1-3, giving the measure its approval by a vote of 48 to 18, with 30 not voting. A companion measure was introduced in the House of Representa- tives,^ and was the subject of 2 days of hearings in the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. However, no House action was taken on either this bill nor on the version passed by the Senate, and the bill died at the close of the session. Although the House bill provided explicitly for social science, the purpose of the language was explained by its author to the committee. The provision read: "Until such time as the [National Science] Board may create a Division of Social Sciences * * * the initiation and support by the Foundation of the social sciences shall be limited to studies related to the programs of the division * * * and studies of the impact of scientific discovery on the general welfare." According to Representative Mills: "Actually what is in the bill is an effort on mv part to limit the activities of the Foundation in the field of social science." Mere omission of the words "social science," he said, would not prevent the Foimdation from sponsoring research in the field at a future date. Thus, "The only way that such action can be prevented is for the committee in its discretion to place some limitation excluding social science as one of the activities of the Foundation." ^ In the House hearings, Drs. Bush ^° and Isaiah Bowman (president of Johns Hopkins Universit}^, and a geographer by discipline), ^^ gave cautious support for the permissive approach — allowing the proposed National Science Foundation to establish a division for the social sciences at some future time. Dr. Detlev Bronk,^^ soon to be President of the National Academy of Sciences, and physiologist. Dr. Homer W. Smith, an associate of Dr. Bush m Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD),^^ took a similar position. Spokesmen for the military departments did not deal at all with the issue. The Secretary of Commerce, Henry A. Wallace, was represented by Dr. E. U. Condon, Director of the National Bureau of Standards, and vigorously supported inclusion of the social sciences in the pro- posed foundation.^* Most of the other witnesses preferred that the social sciences be omitted entirely from the functions or organization of the National Science Foundation. ^^ 8 TI.R. G448, 79th Cong., 2d sess. Introduced by Representative Wilbur D. Mills. « U.S. Congress. House. Conunittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. National Science Foundation Act. Hearings before a Subcommittee on the * * * on H. R. 6448, a bill to promote the progress of science and the useful arts; to secure the national defense; to advance the national health, prosperity, and welfare; and for other purposes. May 28 and 29, 1946. 79th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Omce, 1946), pp. 3,24. w Ibid., pp. 11-12. However, in the exchange that followed. Representative Brown remarked that there was "a sort of antipathy agamst social science" in the Congress, and Dr. Bowman agreed that this was true also "of most of the scientists who testified before the Senate [Kilgore] subcommittee." 11 Ibid., p. 53. 12 Ibid., p. 72. 13 Ibid., p. 59. i< Ibid., pp. 78, 80-81. 13 Including John F. Victory, executive secretary, National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (Ibid., p. 62); GeorgeE. Folk, representing the National Association of Manufactuiers (p. 67); Rev. J. Hugh O'Don- nell, president of the University of Notre Dame (p. 91); and Dr. C. E. MacQuigg,of the Engineering College Research Association (p. 33). 102 The decision 2)rocess on NSF legidafion The NSF concept was strongly favored by the scientific community in the United States, by the p'ubhc at hirge, and by a considerable consensus in both Houses of Congress. The fact that it failed of enact- ment from 1946 to 1950 is explained by the variety of subordinate issues it raised. These issues included the patent provisions of the various bills, the issue of basic versus applied science, the possibility of alternatively resorting to tax concessions as a means of stimulating scientific research, and the question of mandatory distribution of NSF funds geographically. The most salient issue was whether the NSF should be a conventional agency of the Government, under a director responsible to the President, or an agency run by a part-time board of scientists, assisted by an agency director resj^onsible to them. In essence, this issue was viewed as that of scientific pursuit of new knowledge, free from "government dictation." The question as to the inclusion of the social sciences mthin the scope of NSF was a relatively minor one. Although it loomed large at first, it was resolved by the Senate in the debate in July 1946. While the question was again debated in 1947, the outcome was the same. The issue was whether the social sciences should be (a) explicitly included as an equal partner ^nth the ])hysical, the biological, and the medical sciences; (b) not included at all; (c) included, subject to narrow con- straints; or (d) left to later determination by the NSF itself. Dr. Bush had recommended the fourth alternative, and the Senate concurred in his recommendation mthout much difficulty. The extensive hearings in the Senate subcommittee, and the 1946 debate on the Senate floor ^^ill be discussed later on. Although the social science decision made in 1946 became a fixture of subsequent bills, the Senate bill expired with the close of the 1946 legislative session. In 1947, after different bills had been passed by the two Houses, agreement was reached in conference on a compromise (permissive with regard to the social sciences) that would establish a National Science Foundation imder the direction of a part-time board of scientists. President Truman rejected this proposal by pocket veto, August 6, on the basis of the lack of Executive control."This action he took with "deep regret" because he had "hoped earnestly" for suitable legislation; however the bill as passed would, he said." "be divorced from control by the peoi)le to an extent that implies a distinct lack of faith in democratic i:)rocesses." ^^ Also in 1947 the President created by Executi^'e Order a Presidential Scientific Eesearch Board, and appointed John R. Steelman, his principal adviser, as its chairman. This Board was to undertake a study of U.S. scientific research and re]:)ort its recommendations to the President on national science policy. Like the Bush studv it omitted consideration of the social sciences. The rejiort of the Steel- man committee explained this omission on the grounds of their unmanageability. A statement by Dr. Bronk was cited with approval that every field of research in the physical sciences led sooner or later to new social ])roblems, so that "competent social scientists should 's Congressional Eecord (Nov. 17, 1947), p. 10568. 103 work hand in hand with tlie natural scientists" to solve these problems as they arose. Continued the report: Under these circumstances, it would have been desirable to include the social as well as the physical and biological, sciences in our investigations. The magni- tude of the task and the pressure of time prevented this, although we did examine a number of instances in which physical and social scientists were working jointly on projects in the Federal Government. These relationships should be further nvestigated, and a survey of the program of the Government in social science .areas would be useful." Bills were again introduced in 1948 and 1949, but not until 1950 were the two Houses of Congress able to concur in a legislative proposal which the President would approve; like most of its predecessors after July 3, 1946, it provided that the NSF might create additional divisions, presumably including one for the social sciences. Contemjjorary relevance oj the social science issue The issue of Goverimient sponsorsliip — or more precisely, NSF sponsorship — of basic research in the social sciences, quickly resolved in 1946, continues to be relevant. The intervening two decades have seen a sharpening of national problems which the 1945 Senate hearings identified as important challenges that social science research could heli^ to solve. These problems included: Crime Arms control Racial stresses Environmental degTadation Urban stresses Social impact of new Poverty technology After its creation in 1950, the National Science Foundation made a gradual and cautious entry into the field of the social sciences. Mindful of congressional reservations about their controversial character, it restricted its sponsorship to ultrasafe lines of inquiry. ^^ No serious challenge of any social science undertakings of NSF has come to national attention. This caution has been rewarded by a steady growth in the scope and level of supported effort, and in December 1960, by action of the National Science Board as the statute had provided, a Division of Social Sciences was formed within NSF. In 1968, the Congress finally accepted the maturity of the social sciences, and instructed NSF to accord them equal status with the other categories of science witlun its purview. ^^ However, the funda- mental question remains as far from resolution in the late 1960's as in tlie mid-1940's: whether the scientific method can be functionally applied by a democratic society under republican institutions to assemble a body of reliable data about society itself that can be sys- '" U.S. President's Scientific Research Board. "Science and Public Policy." a report to the President by John R. Steelman, Chainuau. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), five volumes, see vol. I. p. viii. '" For example, the Fifth Annual Report of NSF (1955) , describes the "limited program of support of the social sciences" that was approved 1jy the Foundation in August 1954. Criteria for the projects included those areas characterized by the application of the methods and logic of science, "national interest." "con- vergence of the national sciences and the social sciences," and "basic research." It was administered within the existing divisions of the board, and included projects in antliropology, functional archaeology, human ecology, demography, psycholinguistics. experimental and quantitative social psychology, human geogra- phy, economic engineering, statistical design, and the history-philosophy-sociology of science (pp. 60-61). i» Public Law 90-407, approved July 18, 1968. specifies in sec. 3 that the Foundation is to "initiate and support basic research in the mathematical, physical, medical, biological, engineeriTig, social, and other sciences * * *;" and toawardscholarshipsandfellowships in these sciences. Sec. 4 provides that the National Science Board's executive committee shall be appointed of persons "eminent in the fields of the basic, medi- cal, or social sciences * * *." And sec. 8 adds the provision that a division of the social science is to be in- cluded in the NSF organization, thereby confirming the 1960 action of the Board. 104 tematically applied to the development of social inventions to meet human needs. A long list of important social inventions had contributed to social, political, and economic progress before 1945. A random sampling of this list might include such items as — parliamentary procedure work simplification surveys the Australian ballot retirement pensions Federal-State grants-in-aid insiu-ance budgeting and accounting methods mass public education the census institutional waste disposal Government corporations public hygiene job and personnel classification statistical sampling and quality national income and product sta- control tistics workmen's compensation and un- hospitals employment compensation clinics opinion polls institutional outpatient care The relationship between these inventions of applied social science and the data, theories, and principles produced by basic research in the social sciences, is analogous to that in any other field of science. Invention has often come into being empirically, without benefit of, and in anticipation of, the development of fundamental theory. In the electric storage battery, for instance, the invention was empirical and the theory came later. So, also, with the wheel and the Code of Hammurabi. In many other cases, theory pointed the way to solution of a technological or social problem, such as Albert Einstein's theory of the equivalence of matter and energy leading to the discovery of nuclear energy, or the Pavlov and Skinner theories of conditioned response and reinforcement leading to the teaching machine. In other cases, refinement of understanding led to the correction of a misconception — such as the notion that metals failed by "crystalliza- tion," that alcohol potations were a specific for snakebite, that insanity resulted from exposure to moonlight, or that criminal tend- encies could be eradicated by severe enough punishment. Whether the invention is in technology, biology, medicine, or the social science fields, it is more likely to be relevant to the real problem if the inventor knows what the facts are. It is the function of basic scientific research to provide the facts. The issue in 1945-47 was whether the social sciences were ready to accept full partnership in a national endeavor to this end. II. Issues Confronting Acceptance of the Social Sciences in 1945 When the hearings on science legislation opened before the Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization, October 8, 1945, the proposal of President Truman that the social sciences be included was already confronted with numerous obstacles. The social sciences tended to have unfavorable connotations for many people: as connected with socialism, authoritarianism, and improper manipulation of people; as an attempt to apply scientific methods to a field that lay beyond the reach of science; as connected with "isms" and "crackpot ideas." The addition of the social sciences to the NSF proposal was evidently an afterthought; it had not even been considered or studied by the four 105 committees that collaborated in the preparation of the Bush report. The social sciences in World War II had produced no spectacular product like the atomic bomb; there was no widespread recognition of the practical results of research in social science fields. The disci- plines of the social sciences were poorly structured, displaying many conflicts and contradictions in each field, between related fields, and between general scientific and lay opinion as to matters of policy and theory. Distinctions between basic and applied research in the social sciences were poorly drawn. Moreover, the disciplines were not clearly defined, either by Members of Congress, by scientists generally, or even by the social scientists themselves. In short, for the social sci- ences to win equal status with the physical, biological, and medical sciences in the new Foundation, as the President had suggested, would require that compelling evidence and reasoning be assembled in their support. As this matter was considered by the subcommittee chaired by Senator Kilgore, and later as it was reviewed by the Senate, the following questions emerged: 1 . Were the social sciences sufficiently mature to be vested with a public interest? 2. Were these sciences in fact really "sciences" with proper objectivity and employment of the scientific method? 3. Were the social sciences sufficiently structured as disciplines, or would their inclusion in a National Science Foundation open the door to limitless scope of meaningless projects, thus siphoning off funds from other, more significant, functions of the Foundation? 4. Had the methodologies of the social sciences been sufficiently perfected for them to be considered as capable of serious research? 5. Could researches in the social sciences be satisfactorily classified into basic and a])plied? 6. If in fact the social sciences lagged behind the physical sciences, was that not an added reason for encouraging an accelerated effort in the former? 7. By consulting senior men as witnesses in a mature set of physical science disciplines, and also by consulting senior men as witnesses in a less mature set of social science disciplines, was Congress able to obtain a clear picture of the potential of the latter? Would younger researchers closer to the contemporary state of the art have served better as witnesses respecting the potential social utility of the social sciences? 8. The subjects studied by social science were "controversial" while those of the physical and biomedical sciences were not; thus, would social science research be more difficult to program, elicit political opposition, and embroil NSF in controversy such as to jeopardize its existence as a vehicle for the supjiort of the physical sciences? 9. Was it not possible to support a considerable range of re- search in the social sciences by calling it something else — as for example, the study of methods of improving the management of scientific information, research in the history of science, improve- ment in educational methods for the teaching of science, and statistical data collection concerning scientific manpower, etc.? 10. Did the social sciences present the threat that their prac- 106 titioners might acquire jiolitical power by the manipulation and control of the public? II. Could the same scientific leaders coordinate and manage a program of social science research and physical-biological- medical research? III. Lessons of the Senate Hearings on NSF Bills The decision to allow the social sciences a gradual admission to the NSF appears to have been taken on tlie floor of the Senate. The sustained interest of the Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization in scientific and technological matters made it the logical place for the testing of NSF legislation. The hearings held in this forum, accord- ingly, provided most of the evidence relevant to the Senate's decision. The content, direction, and implications of this evidence seem to support several conclusions: That the social sciences were not accepted to ecpial partnership or status by scientists in the "natural science" disciplines; That there was general agreement that the social sciences lagged, needed support, and must ultimately play a commanding role in the adjustment of society to technological advances; That the social sciences had already made important contribu- tions to military potency and peacetime development, although these were neither well recognized nor commonly regarded as "scientific" inventions; That tlie mechanisms by which new basic scientific discoveries move forward to exploitation were not ^ndely understood, and least of all in the social sciences; That the very relevance of the social sciences for major social problems intensified resistance to their development. Testimony of the physical scientists For the most part, the physical scientists who provided the bulk of the testimony were less hostile than skeptical. Isaiah Bowman, him- self a geographer and earlier a member of the Social Science Research Council, recognized the obstacles: It is well-known that so much of human i^rejudice and tendency and social philosophy enter into the study of social phenomena, that there is the widest difference of opinion as to what constitutes research in many instances in the social sciences. His view was that the proposed NSF should at first content itself with provision for the study of the social impacts of scientific discovery, and for the development of social statistics. ^"^ Probabl}' the bulk of the scientific witnesses would have agreed with Dr. Bush; although he recognized that "our strength is also dependent upon the extent of our knowledge of social phenomena and our ability to bring such understanding to bear wisely on the urgent problems confronting us," this resource should be approached with caution: I am not a social scientist and cannot presume to speak for the disciplines embraced by the field of the social sciences. ^len who can speak for them will appear before you. The proposed foundation should allow an opportunity for effective integration and partnership between the natiu-al and social sciences, and I believe that this pattern should be the result of careful study by the fovmdation after its establishment.-' 2" Ilearinss on science legislation (S. 1297 and related bills), p. 23, op. cit. ■•'Ibid., p. 200. 107 Some witnesses flatly opposed i)ro vision for social sciences in the NSF. For example, C. E. MacQiiigg, dean of engineering of Oliio State University, speaking for the Engineering College Research Associa- tion and also as a member of the OSRD gronp that contributed to the Bush report, said that "no useful purpose will be served" by including social sciences in the proposed foundation. Its problems and its practitioners were of an altogether disparate character from "those dealing with the physical world." ^- In one straw vote reported to the hearing 12 scientists favored inclusion of the social sciences, 46 favored putting them in a se])arate agency, and 4 were o])i)osed to any Government program of social science sponsorship or aid.-^ Bernard M. Baruch dismissed the social sciences in a single sentence; they should not, he said, "be included in the same setup." ^* Dr. Morris Fishbein, editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, opposed their inclusion because of the "great danger of the use of so-called researcli in the social' sciences for political purposes and to influence legislation." ~° The suggestion tliat the social sciences could not be objective because of their relevance to national ])roblems was advanced by Dr. I. I. Rabi, nuclear ph^^sicist from Cohunbia University. He noted that they were different, required a different kind of admin- istration, and might jeopardize the held of science generalW, although they were "a place where we need attention even more than the natural sciences." On the other hand, he said: I am afraid of the power of this foundation, in the support of social sciences through fellowships and otherwise, to make such selections as to strengthen a preconceived point of view or a particular opinion. You see, social science comes very closely to fundamental political questions which are questions of the day, and I begin to see possibility of a Government's building up a certain body of opinion, a certain direction of thinking through that, whereas in the physical sciences I am not afraid of that simply because it is quite objective. You can prove things b}* experiment.-^ Among those witnesses who favored the inclusion of the social sciencies. Dr. F. R. Motdton, permanent secretary of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, offered tlie judgment that the physical sciences luid been overemphasized and that "if we neglected social sciences, all tlie humanities that are involved in the human race living together, tlien the expertness in the {physical sciences would not in the long run save us from A\ar." -" A i)oll rejiorted by Dr. Howard A. Meyerhoff, executive secretary of the AAAS, of 192 replies to a questionnaire reflecting tlie views of some 400 members, indicated that 67 ])ercent believed that the social sciences "needed support." He said: '' * * * all of the social scientists answering the questionnaire, and a substantial nmnber of physical scientists believe that the social s("iences should have an integral place in the program, and that they should be classified with the basic sciences." ^* Most military witnesses ignored the issue entirely, but Brig. Gen. John ^klagruder, director of the Strategic Service Unit (the residual organization that had been the Office of Strategic Services, and was later to become the Central Intelligence Agency), made a strong bid 22 Ibid. p. 710. 23 Ibid., pp. 1145-1146. 2'' Ibid., p. 910. 25 Ibid., p. 496. 2« Ibid., pp. 998-909. 2' Ibid., p. 79. 28 Ibid., p. 92. 108 for support of ''those systematic studies which treat of man in his relationships with his community — economics, poHtical science, soci- ology, history, and geography among others." He cited the importance of strategic assessment of foreign nations, psychological warfare and morale studies, psychological testing of personnel for special service, and other aspects of intelligence. Said Magruder: In the estimates made for the various planning agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Joint Intelligence Committee the social scientists made valuable contributions in gaging the enemy capabilities, probable intentions, and vulnera- bilities. They dealt primarily with the nonmilitary aspects of the enemy situation, and the economic, political, and geographic position with respect to his supply of strategic raw materials, manpower supply, and plants; on enemy production of aircraft, tanks, and other military supplies; on the probable durability of the enemy's political structure; and so forth. These calculations, made by a staff which in large part had come to Federal service from the social science faculties of our leading universities, contributed significantly to the overall capability studies available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was important that this capability be preserved, he went on. Were there to develop a dearth of social scientists, all national intelligence agencies servicing policymakers in peace or war would directly be handicapped.^^ The role of the human sciences in systems engineering was described by Gen. H. H. Arnold, commanding general of the Army Air Forces, who spoke of the "necessity for scientific research on human factors, in use of new equipment and the integration of research in designs, personnel selection, and training, so that by the time the equipment has become standard, standard procedures for selection and training are also available." ^° Three witnesses testified as to the importance of the social sciences in fields that have since become of foremost importance in connection with national problems. One was Dr. Abel Wolman, professor of sani- tary engineering of Johns Hopkins University and Chairman of the Committee on Sanitary Engineering of the National Research Council. An important part of the research in his field, he said, "* * * falls over very completely in the social science field." It involved such problems as water sui)ply, stream pollution, air pollution, the social aspect of waste, and the social aspects of the environment. He would include the social sciences in the NSF because: I see tremendous importance in converting the results of fundamental and applied research to the uses of man. The reason I hesitate in defining how that should best be done is the criteria, the method of measurement, the whole field of research in social sciences doesn't lend itself to the concreteness that it does in natural sciences. But I certainly would not underestimate its importance because what such a foundation of science does in this field has, after all, whether we like it or not, significance not only in abstract knowledge, but significance in raising the general level of humanity, and that part of the program is a social science enterprise.^' In the field of "technological transfer," Moms L. Cooke, a consult- ing engineer who represented the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, favored inclusion of the social sciences in the NSF, and appeared to associate it with the achievement of a "balanced system for the sciences based on total human needs." ^^ Judge Ewing Cockrell, of the U.S. Federation of Justice proposed that the Foundation be given a special branch of the social sciences as 29 Ibid., pp. 900-901. so Ibid., pp. 345-346. 31 Ibid., pp. 663-674; and especially 670. 32 Ibid., pp. 1003-1005. 109 a principal charge. This would be a Division of Social Relations and Conduct and woidd deal synoptically with such problems as crime and arms control by deriving from the social sciences the findings relevant to social relations and conduct. In essence, he jiroposed a special organization of applied social science.^^ Testimony of the social scientists on NSF legislation The Senate subcommittee devoted 1 day — October 29, 1945 — to the hearing of testimony from witnesses representing the social science disciplines. Dr. Wesley C. Mitchell, an economist and a director of research at the National Bureau of Economic Research, delivered to the subcommittee a memorandum from the Social Science Research Council that made a strong plea for mclusion of the social sciences in the NSF. It said there was a great need of new social inventions — There is grave danger that man will find that he does not have the wisdom to guide his tremendous control over the forces of nature for his own greatest benefit. Fears exist not only that the powers of science will be misused in wars of unspeak- able destructiveness, but also that impending fundamental technological innova- tions cannot be made without serious internal social disorders. Scientists themselves perhaps more than the public are uneasy about potential evil uses of their inventions. It is obvious that man's inventions are in themselves of neutral character and that their value to humanity depends on the purposes which they are made to serve. The hazards to national and world interest created by new inventions cannot be evaded by checking the powers of invention even were such a proposal not too fantastic to merit serious discussion. Dependence for security and order must rather be on the improvement of the foundations of human relations. The social sciences were ill equipped to meet the challenge of designing the accommodation to new technology: The present inadequacy of knowledge of human relations is a source of danger which can be greatly reduced by more adequate applications of scientific tech- niques in the study of human problems. Social science personnel, research pro- cedures, and facilities are underdeveloped in terms of the tasks which must be undertaken. The fact that it cannot be claimed that the social sciences have reached a stage comparable to that of some of the other scientific disciplines is considered the strongest possible reason for advancing their develojoment by every effective means. The statement concluded with an allusion to the essential indivisi- bility of science and a blunt prediction for the future. The traditional lines of demarcation between the natural and the social sciences have little meaning when confronted with the research problems involved in the safeguarding of the human aspects of every major problem of national interest. Collaboration and cooperation among the sciences rather than an intensification of past rivalries and competitions is essential if the contemplated program is not to worsen the existing situation instead of achieving the goals set for it. The proposed research agency will be concerned with social science problems whether it so wishes or not; the only relevant and essential question is whether it will from the outset be able to deal competently with these problems.^^ The position of the Social Science Research Council A\'as seconded by Dr. Herbert Emmerich, director of the Public Administration Clearing House, who urged that the "Government shoidd not further put out of balance the program of these discijjhnes by overemphasis on purely physical research." ^^ Speaking for the American Political Science Association, Dr. John M. Gaus, its president, called attention to the gro\\ing need for 33 Ibid., pp. 1074-1079. 34 Ibid., pp. 741, 743. 34 Ibid., p. 740. 110 studies of urban problems and noted that wliile the Government ^^'as ah-ead}^ engaged in a ^^ide range of social science studies, tlie question was as to how well these would be done ^\"ithout the assurance of a progressive improvement in tlie quality of trained personnel and basic information. There was a disposition to overh)ok the social sciences because their useful inventions and products did not ajipear in recognizable form. Leaders in the physical sciences were identified by their scientific products, but no comparable eminence was con- ferred by social inventions or jiroducts such as budget programs, jjersonnel classification, public administration, regional planning, and many others. Dr. Robert \l. Yerkes, emeritus professor of psychobiology, Yale University, called the subcommittee's attention to the social im- portance of psychology which tended to link the physical to the human science invohdng the engineering contributions of human factors, the economic aspects of labor-management relations, the broader contri- bution to education, the matching of i)ersonnel to job classification, and the many contributions of the discipline to military operations. The social sciences, he said, were capable of contributing to the effectiveness of Government itself — In Government it would seem that social science research should be of first-rate importance, for Government itself is a social science and most of the problems that cost jNIembers of the Congress laborious days and sleepless nights are either partially or wholly psychological. For clearly enough they involve such Inunan factors as desires, prejudices, beliefs, opinions, convictions, practical judgments. Major contributions of psychological research and of psychotechiiological develop- ments to Government appear in the methods of individual psychobiological ap- praisal and description which enable us to understand oiu'selves and others better, and in procedures for public opinion polling, which have vast potentialities of usefulness and abuse. ^° Dr. Edwin G. Nom-se, vice ])resident of the Brookings Institution (and later to become Chairman of the President's Coimcil of Economic Advisers), observed that "Every problem of utilizing the resources of nattu'e for man's safety or material satisfaction has two halves, one technological, the other economic." But the values that were ulti- mately determined in the marketplace were evolved outside of his discipline — While scientific analysis of comparative costs and returns and investigations into the nature of the economic process occupies a pivotal place in man's effort to make a good life for himself out of the rich but reticent resources of nature, the values which come to expression in the marketplace, the preferences for certain types of goods or services, the esteem in which leisure is held, and the capacity of men to combine their productive efforts in one pattern of organization or another and in response to various kinds of incentive or motivation are matters which lie outside the field of economics as such. These contributory factors must be explored by otlier sciences such as psychology, anthropology, political science, sociology, and their handmaiden, history. We must understand the subtle complexities of human nature as well as the precise mechanistic relations of physical nature if we are to develop the national strength that grows out of productive cooperation and avoid the disruptive struggles of group, class, racial, or nationalistic warfare."*' There was a tendencj^, he said later, to "exaggerate the amount of exactness that there is in the phj^sical and biological sciences" and to "underestimate the amount of evidential value that social science techniques can get out of raw data from the economic and social fields. }> 3«rbid., pp. 751-753. 3' Ibid., p. 758. Ill The suciologictil discipline was rei)resented by Dr. William F. Ogburn of the University of Chicago. In his prepared statement he identified tliree ways in \\hich the social sciences made significant public contributions. The first, and most generally recognized, was in discovering "reliable and trustworthy knowledge" about such phe- nomena as "social, economic, and political organizations of all kinds such as government, industry, transportation, agriculture, the press, church, famil}^, rural communities, cities, nations, and international bodies." Secondly, "for every important mechanical invention that physical scientists make there is created a new social problem on \\'hich social scientists should work." Thirdly was the fact that social sciences were of increasing importance to national defense because "every war now is a total war and must be fought not only with munitions but also with institutions." For examples of the social impact of inventions, he noted that the steam engine had resulted in an increase in divorce, the automobile an increase in crime, and the atomic b(uiib a threat to cities. "Hence, social scientists (as a consequence of these inventions) must do research on divorce, on crime, and on the protection of our cities." The "industrial revolution," caused by steam, creat(>d cities, changed agri- culture from subsistence to commercial farming, built a new economic system with many new economic organizations, destroyed social classes and created new ones, redistributed wealth, revolutionized warfare, realigned the great powers, abolished the household economy, and reduced greatly the social functions of the family. The "scientific revolution" following nuclear fission of the atom may change our society and its institutions even more. It would be as foolish, he said, to ask the physicist to forecast the social consequences of invention as for the social scientist to outline the next procedure in nuclear fission. It would be foolish, also, to expect "off the cuff" answers from the social scientists to ciuestions warranting extensive study and research. "If Government sponsors research in natural science, it ought also to support the study of the social changes and social problems which the natural science researches create." He admitted that research in the social sciences was "a more recent development than research in the natural sciences" and that it was more difficult "because of the larger number of variables than are found in problems of the physical sciences." The field of anthropology was represented by Msgr. John AI. Cooper, professor of anthropology, Catholic Uni^'ersity. His subject dealt with comparative human cultures, and could contribute to the purposes of the proposed legislation by helping to "bridge the gap between the findings of the natural sciences and our living habits," and by "helping to bring about and to maintain harmonious relationships between larger national, ethnic, and other groups of human beings." As examples of the first, he cited analysis of the factors in U.S. culture that led to acceptance or rejection of sound dietary practices, hj'giene, and medicine. As an example of the second, he suggested that mis- understandings and conflicts grew out of the ignorance of the "subtle but powerful forces that underlie the working of other social systems than our own, of basic philosophies, attitudes, incentives, motives, loyalties, prejudices, and dislikes." ^^ »« Ibid., p. 778. 112 Social science views of Government witnesses Only a few of the administration spokesmen gave attention to the social science aspect of the NSF proposal. Secretary of Commerce Wallace said his Department's research activities embraced social as well as physical sciences and that their less advanced development was a reason for supporting them.^^ Dr. R. E. Dyer, Director of the National Institutes of Health, said that the Public Health Service had found it "* * * impossible to study man apart from his environment." Many problems of public health [he went on], are dependent for their ultimate solution upon greater understanding of the social and economic conditions. Geography, demography, sociology, and economics are all essential considerations in the study of disease.^" A statement submitted by P. V. Cardon, Administrator of the Agricultural Research Administration of the JDepartment of Agricul- ture, gave favorable mention to the inclusion of the social sciences in NSF and noted that "for many years the Department of Agriculture and the State agricultural experiment stations have carried on social research, and investigations in this field have proved important in the solution of economic and social problems of agriculture." *^ The principal Government witness on behalf of the social sciences was Watson B. Miller, Federal Security Administrator (preciu"sor agency to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). He observed that social inventions were "just as real and valuable as material inventions" but were not usually recognized as inventions, and were rarely patented, or sold at a profit. Therefore these important incentives were not available to stimulate social science research. Aliller gave examples of many social science inventions, and filed with the subcommittee a summary of social science research activities being carried on by his agency. The increasing use being made of teamwork in research. Miller concluded, made it important that the various scientific resources "be integrated in such a way as to reinforce each other." For ex- ample — When a broad human problem is approached to attempt to divide it into aca- demic fields is often highly artificial. Suppose we are planning a coordinated attack on malaria. We would probably start with such natural science techniques as study of the mosquito, study of the germ, study of insecticides and drugs, but we would eventually get to such socio-economic problems as the ownership of mosquito-breeding waters, methods of keeping roadside and farm ditches free of weeds and obstructions, methods of house screening, methods of obtaining com- munity cooperation, and sources of funds for the campaign.^^ rV. Structuring the Issue The hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on War Mobilization provided a voluminous record of information and identified many issues and considerations that were germane to the Senate's decision on the proposed NSF. The social science issue seemed to be regarded by the subcommittee as a principal issue. Its preliminary report, December 21, 1945, included a compromise bill, S. 1720, and called attention to the fact that one of the "major recommendations em- 39 Ibid., pp. 140, 143. *" Ibid., p. 522. " Ibid., p. 727. «2 Ibid., pp. 796-800, especiaUy p. 798; 113 bodied in the biH" made specific provision for the social sciences. The report continued: In recommending that the program of the Foundation include the social sciences, your subcommittee is implementing the recommendations of the President and the majority of the witnesses who testified on this subject. Not a single witness opposed the Federal support of the social sciences. A minority urged that such support be deferred or provided in a separate agency.*^ In an accompanying appendix, the subcommittee provided a summary of the testimony on the various issues. Witnesses comment- ing on the social sciences were divided as follows: Those favoring unqualified inclusion of the social sciences in the NSF, 37; an addi- tional 8 favored it with reservations; those favoring a separate agency for the social sciences, none. The publication devoted 13 pages to the social science issue, and remarked that "in addition to the social scientists who lu-ged mclusion of their fields in the program of the proposed foundation, a most substantial majority of other witnesses also came out for the social sciences as essential to a national science program." ** The summary included reference to the following aspects, pro and con: A. POINTS IN FAVOR OF FEDERAL SPONSORSHIP OF RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1. The lag in social science research needs to be corrected. 2. The utility of social inventions has been demonstrated. 3. The accommodation of society to the impact of new technology requu'es social science research. 4. Mechanisms for the exploitation of new technology involve research in the social sciences for their development. 5. Social science research provides coherence m the national defense effort. 6. The unity of all science requires that all be included in one comprehensive program of sponsorship. 7. Social science helps social change to occur by evolution rather than by revolution. 8. Social sciences help to set goals for the physical sciences. 9. The major problems confronting society have a content that is mainly in the field of the social sciences. 10. Social sciences are a stimulus to the physical sciences, and vice versa. 1 1 . The study of the human environment cannot be separated from the study of man, B. POINTS IN OPPOSITION TO FEDERAL SPONSORSHIP OF RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1. Social science research encounters problems of objectivity (its findings may be exploited for political purposes, or used to influence legislation). " U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs. National Science Foundation, "Preliminary Report on Science Legislation, From tiie Subcommittee on War Mobilization to thie * * * Pursuant to S. Res. 107 (78th Cong.) and S. Res. 146 (79th Gong.), Authorizing a Study of the Possibilities of Better Mobilizing the National Resources of the United States," Dec. 21, 1945, print contauiing S. 1720, 79th Cong^,_lst sess., Subcommittee Rept. No. 7 (Washington, U.S. Govenmient Printing Office, 1945), p. 2. w U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs- "Science Legislation: Analytical Summary of Testimony," Appendix to report from Subcommittee on War Mobilization pursuant to S. Res. 107 (78th Cong.) and S. Res. 146 (79th Cong.) , authorizing a study of the possibilities of better mobilizing the national resources of the United States, December 1945. 79th Cong., 1st sess., Subcommittee Monograph No. 5 (Washington, U.S. Government Printmg Office, 1945), pp. 26-38. 99-044 — 69 9 114 2. Social science methods, approaches, and training of practitioners differ from those in the physical sciences. 3. Findings of social science cannot be subjected to experimental verification. 4. The scope of social sciences is limitless, and administratively infeasible to encompass in a single agency. 5. Social science is inherently controversial, and would discredit and jeopardize support for the physical sciences. 6. Social sciences are not sciences in the same sense that the physical sciences are. In general, the tone of the preliminary report and its accompanying appendix gave the impression of an enthusiastic endorsement of the social sciences as a worthy and coequal academic partner with the physical, biological, and medical sciences in the new agency. However, by the time the subcommittee made its final report on NSF legislation, February 27, 1946, a note of caution was evident in its attitude on the inclusion of the social sciences. While still "firmly convinced" that they should be included, and that they would be able to make "significant contributions to almost every department of government," it was also true that "these younger disciplines have not had time to perfect their specialized techniques * * *." Therefore — With a carefullj' planned and administered program of support, the social sciences promise to make even more important contributions to the solution of the problems of the future. Because the specific research needs of the social sciences have not been subjected to such careful study as those of the physical and biological sciences, your subcommittee has recommended that initial support of research in these fields be limited until adequate planning studies have been completed.*^ This note of caution was repeated in the report of the parent Committee on Military Affairs, in presenting S. 1850 to the Senate for its consideration. The report, April 9, 1946, gave verbatim the above quotation from the final subcommittee report.*® But, in intro- ducing the subject, the full committee finding included the statement: The committee has rejected the proposal that the social sciences be specifically excluded from support by the new agency, because of the demonstrated inter- dependence of the physical and social sciences. S. 1850, however, makes special provision to assure that all social studies supported by the Foundation are in fact scientific in character." The provision in question was as follows: The functions of each division [of NSF] shall be prescribed by the Administrator after receiving the advice of the [National Science] Board, except that until the Administrator and the Board have received general recommendations from the Division of Social Sciences regarding the support of research through that Divi- sion, support of social science research shall be Hmited to studies of the impact of scientific discovery on the general welfare and studies required in connection with other projects supported by the Foundation. ^^ " U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Afiairs. National Science Foundation. "Report on Science Legislation From the Subcommittee on War Mobilization to the * * * Pursuant to S. Res. 107 (78th Cong.) and S. Res. 146 (79th Cong.), Authorizing a Study of the National Resources of the United States," Feb. 27, 1946, print containing S. 1850, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Subcommittee Report No. 8 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 6. " U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs. National Science Foundation. "Report from the * * * Pursuant to S. 1850, a Bill To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, To Secure the National Defense, To Advance the National Health and Welfare, and for Other Purposes," Apr. 9, 1946, 79th Cong., 2d sess. S. Rept. No. 1136, Calendar No. 1153 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 8. <" Ibid., p. 2. " Ibid., p. 18. 115 The report explained : The initial limitation with respect to the support of research in the social sciences has been included in the bill because none of the studies which served as a back- ground for this legislation had considered the research needs of these fields.^' V. The Decision Process — Senate and House The Senate took up the Science Foundation bill, S. 1850, on July 1, 1946. Senator Kilgore as floor manager, explained the need for the legislation, described the abundant support it had received in the hear- ings from scientists, business, labor, and other public figures, and indu'ectly accounted for the change in tone as between the preliminary and final reports of his subcommittee when he said : * * * After all the hearings were concluded [early in November 1945], a commit" tee was formed, consisting of leading scientists, to study the bill. I think the com- mittee was headed by A'annevar Bush and Dr. Isaiah Bowman as cochairmen. We met with Dr. Bowman and Dr. Bush in a conference in which all points in dispute with reference to the bill itself were ironed out, and we departed from the confer- ence with both sides satisfied as to the details of the bill.^o However, Senator Johnson of Colorado (one of the sponsors of the bill and very much in sympathy with its purposes) took exception to the bill's provision for a division of the social sciences. Senator Kilgore explained that the sciences were inseparable, and that the bill provided merely for a study of the relevance of the social sciences for the total program. Senator Magnuson offered assurance that there was "no intention of embarking upon a vast program into the realm of the social sciences" but that some areas of research unavoidably overlapped. But Senator Johnson protested that to include social sciences made the scope of the program vague and unmanageable.^^ Senator Fulbright evidently sensed an antipathy toward the social sciences which he thought might be based on a misconception with the study of the social sciences ''being confused with what we com- monly think of as politics, socialism, or some form of social philosophy." In attempting to clarif}^ the issue. Senator Fulbright quoted an "able scientist" whom he had consulted the day before, who had defined social science as "one individual or a group of individuals telling another group how they should live." ^^ This explanation was not well received and in his further explanatory^ statement he revealed both his own ambivalent attitude toward the social sciences and its source : At the request of the physical scientists, we incorporated a special provision in the bill in an effort to try to prevent the Division of Social Sciences getting out of hand, so to speak. I have no fear of that, however. I only hope this provi- sion will give some prestige to social science, that it will sort of recognize that field of study as a legitimate thing in our society, and I hope it will encourage some of our more inteUigent 3'oung people to go into that field. I think it is sadly understaffed. I know there are many crackpots in that field, just as there were in the field of medicine in the days of witchcraft, but it is not something from which 4» Ibid., p. 31. 5" Senator Kilgoie's statement is taken from the Congressional Record (July 1, 1946), p. 8144. In intro- ducing the legislation. Senator Smith explained that framing it he had had the benefit of advice from "* * * Dr. Vannevar Bush, Head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which Office the Foundation would replace; President James B. Conant of Hai-vard University and H.D. Smyth of Princeton University, author of the Smyth report on atomic energy (Gerald G. Gross, "New Science Drive Beiun in Congress," Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1947). " Congressional Record, op. cit., pp. 8157-8158. 52 Ibid., p. 8164. J 116 we should back away. We have to solve the social problems one way or the other. I cannot see any harm in admitting that they are legitimate problems and giving the Board authority to devote some of its resources to that study.^^ As the debate proceeded, opponents brought out further points: The proposed foundation should initially be confined to the fields most urgently needing support, with doubtful areas de- ferred until the plan had been tested; There was a danger in loading too much scope into the program; It was uncertain as to what the social scientists would study — they could not be trusted (this attitude was in marked contrast with that toward the physical sciences, which aU members agreed to assure full freedom of scientific inquiry) ; The scope of the social sciences part of the program deserved further study which the Congress would not itself be qualified to conduct; There was a danger that the Congress might find itself re- sponsible for sponsoring "wild-eyed, so-called research" or the use of funds to further projects of "a man addicted to certain isms"; The social sciences were not subject to close definition, were not related to the physical sciences, could not be managed by those qualified to direct research in the physical sciences, and were not favored by the physical scientists. In an effort to expedite the decision process. Senator Smith of New Jersey offered as an amendment a substitute bill which differed from the Kilgore-AIagnuson proposal in five respects: (1) control by a science board rather than an appointed administrator; (2) changed provisions for regional distribution of project funding; (3) changed patent provisions; (4) exclusion of the social sciences from the scope of the bill; and (5) modification in the timing of the scholarship- fellowship part of the program. ^* In support of item 4, Senator Smith produced a letter to the Presi- dent from a "Committee Supporting the Bush Report," dated November 24, 1945, and signed by 5,000 scientists. The committee included many notable figures in the scientific community, such as its Chaii'man, Isaiah Bowman, and also Bronk, Con ant, and Du- Bridge. This group said it would be a "serious mistake to include the social sciences * * * at this time," and recommended that a separate institution be provided for their support.^^ When the Smith amendment was rejected,^^ the Senate then proceeded on the following day (July 3) to take up one at a time the issues raised by Smith. An amendment by Senator Hart, of Connecticut, proposed to delete from the NSF biU the provision for a social science division, as- sistance to students of social science, and inclusion of the social sciences in the scope of the Foundation. ^^ In support of his amend- ment. Senator Hart again referred to its omission from the Bush report, the lack of agreement as to the definition of the social sciences, the complexity and expense of administering a field of such large scope, and the lack of coherence between physical and social sciences. 53 Ibid., p. 8165. 5* Ibid., p. 8232. " Ibid., pp. 8237-8238. 5« Ibid., p. 8265. Thie vote was 24 to 39 with 33 not voting. "Ibid., p. 8349. 117 In defense of the bill as introduced, Senator Thomas of Utah again referred to the social impact of science, the relevance of social trends for the general welfare, the unity of all science, the military importance of the social sciences, and the need for freedom of scientific inquiry. Whereupon the Senate accepted the Hart amendment (46 to 26, with 24 not voting) ,^^ and then adopted the NSF bill (48 to 18, with 30 not voting)/^ The effect of the decision was to register the Senate's disapproval of any positive action toward the social sciences in the NSF bill; the proposed National Science Foundation might, at a subsequent time, expand its scope to include "other sciences" but — at least insofar as the social sciences were concerned — would do so at its own risk. Congressional adoption oj 'permissive formula in 1947 It was evidently generally believed that the Senate action in ex- cluding the social sciences altogether from the NSF bill had been too extreme, because in the legislation introduced the following year the terms were uniformly more permissive. In the Senate, a bill was in- troduced (S. 526) by Senator Smith of New Jersey, and discharged by unanimous action (without hearings) from the Senate Committee on Labor and Welfare. It was taken up May 14. With respect to the social sciences, the committee recommended : Your committee has rejected the proposal that the social sciences be included as a division of the Foundation at this time. It is cognizant of the impact of funda- mental science on modern society and of the need for social-science studies. It feels, however, that the disciplines of the social sciences are not at this time sufficiently well defined to include them in a foundation designed to treat with the basic sciences. Rather, it is the opinion of the committee that the broad, collective wisdom of the Board must be relied upon to determine the time and to what extent changes shall be made in the divisional status of the Foundation; section 7(2) provides "and such other divisions as the Foundation may from time to time, deem necessary." [And also:] Time may change the relative importance of the divisions. The foregoing clause permits the necessary flexibility and leaves to the wisdom of the Board the extent to which the social-sciences disciplines are to be explored. It may thus be said that S. .526, as amended, denies mandatory provision for the social sciences, but estab- lishes the right of the Foundation to explore the needs of the social sciences and to determine the extent, if any, that studies in this field are necessary to support work in the other divisions. Smith, himself, confessed that he did not favor having the NSF support research in the social sciences but was yielding to the con- sensus. '^'^ Toward the end of the debate on S. 526 Senator Fulbright once more attempted to persuade the Senate to have the bill give equal status to the social sciences with other fields of science ^^ but his amend- ment was rejected by a vote of 23 to 63, with 9 not voting. From this point on, in both the Senate and House bills on science foundation legislation, the compromise formula as reported from the Senate Labor and Welfare Committee was uniformly followed. In the House hearmgs, before the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, March 16-17, 1947, the attitude toward the social sciences 58 Ibid., p. 8350. 58 Ibid., p. 8300. M Congressional Record (Mav 14, 1947), p. 5258. " Ibid. (May 20, 1947), p. 5649. lis had been somewhat more friendly than m the i)revious year's hearings. Dr. Bush, for example, said : In the last session of Congress there was considerable controversy over a pro- vision in the Kilgore-Magnuson bill which would establish within the Founda- tion, a Division of Social Sciences. This provision was eliminated on the floor, and I beheve that was a wise move. But I do think that the controversy was unfortunate. If we, as a democratic nation of free individuals are to survive, we must seek to understand the forces which affect our social organizations in order that they may be anticipated and guided in safe directions. A large amount of research is already being devoted to various aspects of the social sciences, both by the Government and by private individuals and orga- nizations. Much more could be done to advantage. In view of the magnitude and complexity of this field, however, it seems to me that the Fovuidation should fully survey it with a view toward determining those areas which could be made the subject of fruitful research under its auspices. Under H.R. 1830 [which was identical with the subsequently Senate-passed S. 526], this could be done, and I hope it will be done. But it is well to make research in the social sciences permis- sive rather than mandatory.^^ Although some witnesses still adhered to the idea of separate support for the social sciences, Dr. Bronk continued to support the full inclusion of the social sciences; "^ in addition, a rather strong move in support of the permissive formula was made by a group headed by Dr. Edmund E. Day, president of Cornell University and chairman of the " Intejsociety Committee on Science Foundation Legislation," representing 68 (or 75) scientific and educational organizations, and supported by the American Association for the Advancement of Science. According to Dr. Day: "It is my impression that both the natural scientists and the social scientists are prepared to go along with the provisions that are in these four educational bills which leave [the question of the social sciences division] essentially to the Founda- tion later to determine." ^"^ Responses from the participating societies to a questionnaire showed that 49 percent of these professional people favored specific inclusion of the social sciences in the NSF, another 48 percent favored permissive inclusion, and only 2 percent favored their exclusion. Also, 99 percent were willing to accept permissive inclusion as the solution, 94 percent were willing to accept specific inclusion (i.e., a Division of the Social Sciences), and 37 percent the exclusion of the social sciences from the Foundation altogether^"* Four of the House bills were identical with that passed by the Sen- ate; there was also a different bill, H.R. 942, introduced by Repre- sentative Celler of New York, that woidd have provided for a di\^sion of the social sciences. The Celler bill did not receive favorable con- sideration, however, and all parties appeared to be satisfied with the decision to defer action, leaving the question of level of effort and organizational provisions in the social sciences to the Foundation itself, after it had been created. The effect of this decision, of course, was to place responsibility for decisions regarding the social sciences with the representatives of other scientific disciplines than the social sciences. 62 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. National Science Foundation. Hearings before the * * * on H.R. 942, H.R. 1815, H.R. 1830, H.R. 1834, and H.R. 2027, bills relating to the National Science Foundation. Mar. 6 and 7, 1947. 80th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 235-236. 63 Ibid., see pp. 70,43^4. 64 Ibid., p. 59. 63 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 119 VI. Contemporary Views of the Social Science Community During the first 2 years of consideration of the proposed National Science Foundation, 1946-1947, communication between the social science community and the Congress was not extensive. In the 1945 hearings before Senator Kilgore's subcommittee, 1 day had been de- voted to testimony by social scientists, and the 1947 hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce received testimony showing a wide consensus within the scientific societies (including both physical and social sciences) in favor of permissive or even explicit inclusion of the social sciences in the NSF. The general propositions were unquestioned that the social sciences lagged behind the physical sciences, and that new inventions in technological hardware generated problems that the social sciences were called on to solve. But the Congress was left with many uncertainties. For example, the social sciences had not been subjected to the same scrutiny by the Bush committee as had the physical-biological-medical sciences. They were not clearly defined in scope. As the NSF concept gradually became delimited to the encouragement of basic rather than applied research, the role of the social sciences became less distinct: there was some question, for example, that research in the social sciences could even be separated into basic and applied categories or that there was any such thing as basic social science research. The existence of an array of meaningful basic research objectives in the social sciences had not been demonstrated. There was no clear char- acterization of the process by which basic discoveries in the social sciences led to useful results in the applied field. (Nor, for that matter, in the physical sciences either, but the dramatic hardware develop- ments of World War II had certified as real the process in the physical sciences.) Some of the attempts to apply the hypotheses of social science, it was held, ran counter to practical experience. There was a general sense of uneasiness that the potential — or actual — results of social science research might challenge deeply entrenched value-centered beliefs. There was also some question as to whether in the field of social studies the term "science" was applicable. For example, John M. Potter, president of Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and an historian, suggested that "when we use the term 'the social sciences,' we are expressing a more or less realizable hope, rather than indicating blood kinship between political economy and physics:" The extension of the exact methods of science into the doubtful regions of human peiplexity is devoutly to be wished. But the scientific study of man's affairs is still so little advanced toward the level of our examination of physical nature that it might seem more dangerous than advantageous to set up a Division of Social Sciences within the same National Research Foundation. We probably face many more decades of tedious and disappointing study, of tentative experi- ment and frustrated enterprise, before the methods for the study of society can without risk be so firmly crystallized.^^ Another social scientist, Alfred E. Cohn, ^\Titing in the Political Science Quarterly, assailed as bureaucratic and undemocratic the basic idea of a Federal foundation to support science. He criticized as generally diffuse and largely irrelevant the testimony before the Kilgore subcommittee ("* * * probably not the best way of securing M Hearings on Science Legislation (S. 1267 and related bills), op. cit., p. 939. 120 light on so intricate and professional a problem.* * * I suggest that a better way * * * is through reports." However, he found it "almost shocking" that the social sciences were not to be admitted to full partnership in the institution of which he disapproved).^^ Probably the most comprehensive and systematic analysis of the issue of social science and the NSF was that of George A. Lundberg, of the department of sociology of the University of Washington. From an analysis of the testimony in the 1945 KUgore subcommittee hearings and the 1946 debate on the floor of the Senate, he concluded that the decision to exclude the social sciences from the NSF was not based on "considered hostility or opposition;" it was, he said: * * * Simply as a reflection of the common feeling that the social and the physical sciences have nothing in common and that at best the social sciences are a propagandist, reformist, evangelical sort of cult.*^ Lundberg identified as the "principal misapprehensions regarding the nature of social science, as revealed in the Senate hearings," the following: (1) Social science cannot be unbiased; (2) the social sciences are "applied," not "pure" or "basic"; (3) social science research should be controlled by a separate foundation; (4) education rather than research is needed in the social sciences; (5) the atomic bomb should frighten people into effective social organization.^^ He concluded that the hearings actually provided a useful rough measure of the present status of the social sciences as seen by the witnesses. These views were significant because "they are sincerely held by people of promi- nence and influence in science, education, and public affairs." He summarized them as follows: 1. Man and his behavior are not a part of nature that can be studied as basic, "pure," natural science; the social sciences are inherently "applied" and concerned with ameMorative and exploitive techniques in the service of whatever tribal lore happens to be current. Social science, therefore, is a nondescript category consisting mainly of reformist and propagandist ideologies and isms. 2. The methods of tlie social sciences are so widely at variance with those of other sciences as to make it inadvisable to attempt to administer research in the social sciences under the same organization — (a) For fear of discrediting the other sciences ; and (b) Because people qualified to direct research in the other sciences would not be able to judge what constitutes vahd or desirable social research. (3) Social research is especially in danger of falling a victim to pressure groups or of being corrupted by the Government itself. And finally: (4) There is always in the background of the testimony reviewed, the tradi- tional view that, after all, we know the solution of social problems through the historic pronouncements of seers and sages, past and contemporary, and all that is needed is more education to diffuse this lore and arouse moral fervor in its behalf. i* Lundberg strongly intimated that the social scientists themselves bore a share of the responsibility for the disadvantaged status of their disciplines. To secure equality (and to justify equaUty) with the physical sciences they should "subject themselves to standards of the kind recognized by other scientists and by the public." They should distinguish between the true social scientist and "that vast array of camp foHowers, reformers, propagandists, and social workers, which today dominate even most of the professional organizations of social scientists." The social scientists (and indeed scientists generally) w Alfred E. Cohn. "Federal Legislation in Support of Sciences." Speech before American Association for tlie Advancement of Science and Pi Gamma 5lu. Symposium on science legislation and problems ot Federal aid. Dec. 28, 1946. (Reproduced in Political Science Quarterly. (Vol. 62, June 1947), pp. 235, 239). 95 George A. Lundberg. "The Senate Ponders Social Science." The Scientific Monthly (May 1947), p. 399. «9 Ibid., pp. 40(M07. '0 Ibid., p. 409. 121 should "make up their minds regarding the proper function of scien- tists as contrasted with the functions of citizens." ("Many of them are firmly convinced that it is the peculiar function of social scientists especially, not only to describe reUably the costs and consequences of alternative courses of action, but also to dictate public policy.") The social scientists have been "careless of their scientific reputation in a number of ways": Through lack of clarity or lack of intellectual integrity they have failed to make clear to the public when they have spoken as scientists and when they have spoken as propagandists and as citizens. They have posed as social scientists, and frequently claimed academic immunity as such, while actually engaging in ordi- nary pressure group activity. Finally, they have been careless in distinguishing between scientific research and special pleading. Another defect was that the social scientists had failed to present examples of their research that would be accepted as "scientific" by other disciplines, although there were many of these available. By way of corrective action in the learned society proceedings, he suggested that scientific papers in the social sciences should be care- fully kept separate from papers dealing with normative questions ("It may be that the [AAAS] should have a section devoted to ethics, planning, and social policy and thus avoid the confusion which results from including these topics ^vith the social sciences.") Finally, he said, the natiu-e of the scientific method should be thoroughly taught in the schools. The natiu-e of research was not well understood. It was not considered an important function in society. It was not looked upon as an important method of soh^ing social problems."' A succinct and prescient lay comment on the issue, at the time, was that of Fortune magazine whose editors concluded that the proposed NSF would probably be forced into the social sciences, regardless of the apparent public antipathy toward them. "It [NSF] will have the problem of studying its own organism for the kind of policies, rotation of personnel, or other techniques it must develop to prevent the ossification that sooner or later afilicts aU academies. And it ^vill have to study the sharper and sharper impact of science and technology upon society, never before systematically investigated under a steady flow of relevant data." "^ VII. Federal Sponsorship of Social Science Research After 1950 A gradual improvement in the acceptance of the social sciences has taken place during the 19 years since the NSF received its statutory charter; the social sciences have enjoyed a healthy growth in numbers of students, a strengthening in their methodologies, and some increased appreciation of the functional relationship between basic research and what is sometimes called social engineering. At the same time, the opening up of the field has provided disturbing evidence of just how vast it is, and how much remains to be disclosed before the field reaches its real potential. There still remain public reservations about the field as a "science." For example, in 1967, the Honorable W. Willard Wirtz, Secretar}" of Labor, said: * * * The present development of research in the social sciences falls so far short of both its potential and of the imperative necessity for its infinitely larger de- velopment that I think our problem is actually one of whether there are forms for " Ibid., pp. 410-411. " "The Great Science Debate," Fortune (June 1946), p. 242. 122 expression of the present form of the problem or even a recognition of it. * * * I believe that [the] limiting factor is a very real doubt in democracy's mind as to whether it really wants any more expert advice as far as the social sciences are concerned, for this is peculiarly an area in which every single one of us thinks that he is an expert and that if he is not enough of an expert, he would rather play it by hunch than to try to find out what somebody else's expertness might imply.'* The durability of the criticism of the social sciences is illustrated by charges leveled at the field by Adm. Hyman G. Rickover, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 28, 1968. The social sciences, he said, were jargon-ridden, vague, unconvincing, a Avaste of the taxpayer's money, and not a science at all: * * * Precision and dependability is possible only in regard to phenomena lacking both free will and significant individual diversity ; they do not obtain in the social science field, which deals with human phenomena about which one can generalize only in a statistical sense.^* [Social scientists] always try to judge human behavior the way the natural scientist judges the behavior of atoms. Now all atoms of a similar type are alike. So you can observe regularities in their behavior and express them in the form of "laws." But no two human beings are exactly alike. Therefore, you cannot by any statistical formula predict what any given human being will do.''^ I don't think our Government should sponsor such research abroad. I would go so far as to say, we ought not to sponsor it at home, either.'^ The certainty with which some engineers, like Admiral Rickover, regard the laws of the physical universe as absolute, is not shared completely by the practitioners of the basic physical sciences. Physical phenomena are also probabilistic — differing from social phenomena in degree of probability rather than absolutely. As physicist R. Bruce Lindsay, of Brown University, somewhat optimistically \vrites in the lead article in a recent issue of American Scientist: "It is well known that statistical mechanics operates in terms of averages of quantities associated with the particles or molecules of an aggregate." It is not possible, for example, to fix the positions and velocities of a huge number of particles, but this is of no consequence to the physical scientist who can deduce causal laws in terms of statistical averages. But so, too, can the social scientist. The social scientist cannot, indeed, predict how the individual unit will behave, but neither can the physical scientist. And as Lindsay concludes: "What difference does it make after all? If [the fundamental theory] can predict statis- tical averages and these agree with experiment, what more should we ask?" " Growth in social science sponsorship by NSF The evolution of the social science program of NSF, after 1950, w^as described by Dr. John T. Wilson, Deputy Director, before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, in 1967. He noted that the social sciences had not been named in the act, but that the phrase, "other sciences," permitted some degree of support. "3 In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. National Foundation for Social Sciences. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Government Research of the * * * on S. 836, a bill to pro- vide for the establisliment of the National Foundation for the social sciences in order to promote research and scholarship in such science, Feb. 7, 8, and 16, 1967, 90th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 1 (Washington, U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office), p. 9. ~* In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research. Hearings before the * * *," May 28, 1968, pt. 2, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, U.S. Qoverimient Printing Office, 1968), p. 10. " Ibid., p. 39. '« Ibid., p. 29. " R. B. Lindsay, "Physics— To What Extent Is It Deterministic?" American Scientist (Summer 1968), pp. 93-111, especially pp. 96, 110. 123 Two or 3 years after the Foundation started its program [he went on], we began thinking about how to handle the problem of the social sciences. The initial attach- ment of psychology was in the biological-medical sciences domain, where it fits very closely to physiology, neurology, and the traditional physiological and med- ical areas of psychology. The initial moves * * * were to attach a part-time person to an area of actixity that was called program analysis. The purpose in bringing a sociologist on the staff at that time for that particular function was that in our studies of the sup- port of science by the Federal Government, we were turning up data that re- flected support of the social sciences through the Census Bureau and through other agencies, and we needed somebody on the staff who knew what this was about and could interpret the data, so we brought Dr. Alpert over from the Bureau of the Budget part time on the program analysis activities. The other jDart of his time we assigned liim to the Biological Sciences Division, and we began support- ing physical anthropology, cultural anthropology, archeology, and areas of social science' that impinged rather closely on the biological sciences. In the Physical Sciences Division, we began a small effort in * * * the history and philosophy of science. We had a staff member over in the Physical Sciences Division who was particularly interested, so we began that over there. This went on for 2 or 3 years. Then, we finally created an Office of Social Sciences, and supported social science research per se. This, of course, came about as a result of study by the Board and in further response to the action of the Board in adopting policy that allowed us to support a broader range of social science research activities. Coincidentally, the same kind of movement was taking place in the fellowship programs for the sup- port of graduate students. After creating what was called the Office of Social Sciences, we began supporting social psychology, anthropology, economics, soci- ology, and the history and philosophy, of science — generally the things that were * * * scientific in character. In other words, we a^Dplied scientific methods to study the social phenomena. This went on for a few years and we eventually created a full-fledged Social Sciences Division. It has not become as large a program, but it has full division status. In the last couple of years we have broadened the program to include political science * * *. For the total effort of the Foundation encompassing research and facilities as well as fellowships and traineeships and other educational kinds of things the figure would run about $30 million. In the recent past there has been * * * an increasing awareness of * * * prob- lems of social import rather than social problems * * *. There has been the feeling that perhaps a stronger press for work in the social sciences might lead to solutions of some of these problems of social import.^^ Only a few grants and fellowships (in psychobiology, psychology, and anthropology) were extended by NSF during its first years of existence. However, in March 1953, the Foundation undertook a study of the status of the "sciences of human social behavior" to determine what should be its own position respecting research in this field. Results of this study were reported in NSF's Fifth Annual Report. The conclusion was that NSF should support a "limited program of support of the social sciences" which was approved by the National Science Board in August 1954. Criteria for the program were four: (1) the criterion of science, that is, the identification within the social disciplines, of those areas characterized by the applica- tion of the methods, and logic of science; (2) the criterion of national interest, namely, the assignment of highest priority to social science activities directly related to the responsibilities of the Federal Government with respect to national welfare and national defense; '8 In U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Establish a Select Senate Committee on Technology and the Human Environment. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the * * * on S. Res. 68, to establish a Select Senate Committee^on Technology and the Human Environment. Mar. 15, 16, 20, Apr. 5, 6, and 11, 1967. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 133-134. 124 (3) the criterion of convergence of the natural sciences and social sciences; and (4) the criterion of basic research/^ Shortly before this report was completed, the Study Director for Social Science Research in NSF, Harry Alpert, noted that the extent of NSF support for tlie social sciences depended mainly on the social scientists themselves. He called attention to the need of social scientists to address themselves to such "strategic considera- tions" as those suggested by Charles Dollard, president of the Carnegie Corp., at a mid-century conference on the social sciences.^'' The overall goal of the social sciences according to Dollard was acceptance — Acceptance, at least by the literate public, including scholars in other fields, of the fact that the behavior of men, like the behavior of materials, is charac- terized by certain uniformities and patterns which can be studied systematically, and further that the discovery of these uniformities and patterns is a matter of importance to society at large. It is important because presumably a better understanding of the springs and patterns of human behavior would help us to construct a more rational world. ^^ The obstacles to the achievement of acceptance were three: (1) the urgency of the problems meant that the application of results was too often premature; (2) the social scientist was forced into social contact, with many claims on his time, instead of remaining secluded to reflect on his research; (3) the social scientist was viewed with suspicion as one who would change society rather than one who sought to study it. The natural allies of the social scientists were felloM'' scientists in the older fields who were aware of their own long struggle to overcome resistance of society to their efforts and their findings; there were also allies m business and Government among those aware of the need for more systematic ways of achieving order and management in large human organizations. To meet the needs of business and government, the social sciences needed to deliver theh products in neat packages of completed and proved work. These customers had money to spend. If the legitimate scientists failed them, the charlatans would move in. To meet the needs of the universities, the social sciences needed to allocate much of their time to teaching. This function was of "immense strategic importance" in winning acceptance for the social sciences. ^^ The demands of the physical sciences upon the social scientists were that they discipline themselves to adhere to the scientific method, the proof of hypotheses by hard data and meticulous analysis, to yield predictive findings. To satisfy these requirements, DoUard proposed that the social sci- ences accelerate the sorting-out process by which the social scientists went into basic research teaching, and applied service. He urged " Fifth annual report, National Science Foundation, op. cit., p. 60. 8" Harry Alpert. The National Science Foundation and Social Science Research. American Sociological Review (April 1954), p. 209. The Dollard paper was pubUshed in: The Social Sciences at Mid-Century, papers delivered at the dedication of Ford Hall, Apr. 19-21, 1951. (Published for the Social Science Research Center of the Graduate School, by the University of Minnesota Press., 1952), pp. 12-20. 81 Ibid., p. 12. 82 He noted, for instance, that "A Congress which contained even a few men with undergraduate training in the social sciences might well have given us a very different National Science Foundation bill from the one we got" (p. 17). 125 restraint in the making of claims of research results, higher standards of disciplined research, patience, and humility — The long-term contract of the social sciences with society [he concluded] is not to perform miracles but to bring to the study of man and his problems the same objectivity and the same passion for truth which have in the past given us some understanding and control of the physical world. ^* Present status of the social sciences It is evident that the NSF has moved cautiously into the social sciences. Leadership of the Foundation has been predominantly drawn from the physical sciences. The social sciences, in accordance with Dollard's formula, have been obliged to prove their validity and scientific merit to their opposite numbers in the physical, biological, and medical sciences. That this has been a salutary process, despite some complaints from the social scientists that they were subjected to undue discrimination, is evidenced by the growing vigor and public acceptance the social sciences have achieved. In 1968, a proposal to create a separate Na- tional Social Science Foundation attracted considerable support and generated a large volume of testimonial endorsement in the Senate.^* At the same time, the social sciences won final acceptance in the Congress — in the form of coequal status within the NSF along with the physical, biological, and medical sciences. This was accomplished in Public Law 90-^07, approved by the President July 18, 1968, amending the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 to make mandatory a division of social sciences in NSF, and to include the social sciences explicitly within the scope of its functions. In the same bill, the Congress in section 3(c), instructed NSF to "initiate and support scientific research, includiiig applied research * * *. [Emphasis added.] The earlier congressional reservations con- cerning the abUity of the social scientists to distinguish between basic and applied research, and then* capacity for restraint in the applica- tion of social theory, appear to have been removed as a residt of the record of NSF performance and judicious selection of research, as well as by the achievements of the social sciences since 1950. Effect of deferred decision on the Social Sciences The_ contribution of the Congress in bringing about this strength- ening in the disciplines of the social sciences appears to have been a helpful one. By making both explicit and consequential their reserva- tions about the qualifications of these sciences for equal partnership in a national science program, the Congress increased the pressure on the social sciences to reexamine their own professional standards; at the same time, the caution expressed by Congress to the NSF to proceed slowly and in noncontroversial areas of the social sciences, resulted in a solid foundation for eventual full partnership of the social sciences in the work of the NSF. » Ibid., p. 20. 94 National Foundation for Social Sciences. Hearings, pt. 1, op. cit. and pt. 2, June 2, 6, 7, 20, 21, 1967; and pt. 3, June 27, 28; July 12, 13, 1967. For testimonal endorsement in the Senate see a statement of the sponsor and a cosponsor of the bill: Senator Fred R. Harris. National Social Science Foundation: Proposed Congressional Mandate for the Social Sciences. Article from American Psychologist, November 1967. In statement of Hon. Gaylord Nelson on the floor of the Senate. Governmental grants for research. Congres- sional Record (daily edition) (Mar, 13, 1968), pp. S2739-2742. CHAPTER SIX— CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO PROJECT CA^IELOT I. Introduction Project Camelot was a project in applied research in the social sciences sponsored by the Department of Defense. It was designed to study the political, economic, and social preconditions of instability and potential Communist usurpation of power in several developing countries. Public disclosure of the existence of the project, in June 1965, made front page news. Reaction to the disclosure was prompt and vociferous, Latin Americans of all political shades saw the project as related to recent U.S. troop landings in Santo Domingo; appre- hensions were widely expressed that the United States intended to intervene elsewhere in the internal affairs of the sovereign States of Latin America. Members of the U.S. Congress were also outspoken in their reactions to the project, raising such questions as — What was the Department of Defense doing? What was the propriety of such a military invasion of the field of foreign policy research ? Why had the President permitted military operations to damage U.S. relations with a Latin American neighbor ? Why had the Department of State played no role to prevent or control activities within its jurisdiction by another Department? During its formal assessment of Project Camelot, the Congress ordered a halt to the study and withheld appropriations for the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), the contractor performing the work for the Department of Defense under a contract administered by the Department of the Army. However, the interest of the Congress went further: the Legislature, the Administration, and the social science community apparently recognized that "big social science" (or applied social science) had become an essential fixture in government; accordingly, a mechanism was needed for the assessment of the entire relationship between the Federal Government and the social sciences. Various uncoordinated and sporadic moves were made, before 1965, to fashion an effective relationship between Government and the social sciences — a relationship to solve problems of priority, propriety, util- ity, funding, and ethics.^ The repercussions of the Camelot episode 1 Many of these problems were scanned during congressional debates regarding the in- clusion of the social sciences in the National Science Foundation. (See Chapter Five of this compilation.) Other early reviews are: Milton D. Graham. Federal Utilization of Social Science Research : Exploration of the Problems — A Preliminary Paper. (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution. August 1954). 146 pages. (Mr. Graham was formerly with the Research and Development Board, Department of Defense and with the Human Resources Research Institute of the U.S. Air Force.) See also: The Technology of Human Behavior. Recommendations for Defense Support of Research in Psychology arid the Social Sciences. A report submitted to the Office of Science, Director of Defense Research and Engineering in accordance with the provisions of the Contract No. 1354/08. By the Research Group In Psychology and the Social Sciences. (Washington, D.C.. Smithsonian Institution, July 1966) 39 pages ; Ithlel de Sola Pool, et al.. Social Science Research and National Security. A Re- port Prepared by the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Under Office of Naval Research Contract No. 1354 (08), Task (126) 127 made salient the issue of military sponsorship of foreign area re- search, and indeed the entire issue of the use of applied social science by the Federal Government. The purpose of this case study is to ex- amine the role of the Congress in resolving this issue, with particular emphasis on the information used by the Congress, and the mecha- nisms employed to resolve the issue. Although many Members of Congress had reservations about mili- tary research in social science questions abroad, and about the absence of coordination of such research by the Department of State, they dis- covered that the military initiative in this field was a natural con- sequence of the ability, no less than the need, of the Department of Defense to conduct such research, coupled with the lesser resources and distaste for such research on the part of the Department of State. Congressional intervention took the form of committee recommenda- tions and appropriation cuts. As the examination of the problem proceeded in congressional com- mittees, it became evident that these two issues were part of a broader problem : the need to develop a coherent policy for Federal funding and utilization of social science research, and to relate it to the forma- tion of a national science policy. This concern, demonstrated through indirect pressure and recommendations by Congress, mobilized the Department of Defense and other agencies, as well as the social science community, to assess this relationship. Thus, without attempting to prescribe a final solution, the Congress exerted its influence and con- sidered legislation aimed at solving the sponsorship problem and for- mulating an administrative mechanism to deal with the broader issue. The legislative proposals took two forais: (1) to recognize the im- portance of Government support for basic social science research in the National Science Foundation; (2) to create a parallel National Foundation for the Social Sciences. Eventually the former expedient prevailed. Wliile the Congress accumulated voluminous evidence on these mat- ters, the answers required administrative determination. The primary result of congressional investigations was that of education — the rais- ing of many questions requiring answers ; the stimulation of the execu- tive branch to answer the questions ; the motivation of social scientists to relate their researches more instrumentally to the real world; the provision of a national forum for debate on the uses of social science for public puiiDOses; and the assurance of congressional receptivity for further contributions of these developing academic fields. In sum, while many of the problems that arose could be solved only by the executive branch, and by the social scientists, the Congress was able to motivate these groups in a constructive way toward the solving of their mutual problems. No. NR 170-369, March 5, 1963. (Washington. Smithsonian Institution, 1963). 261 pages; William W. Ellis, Study Director. The Federal Government in Behavioral Science. The American Behavioral Scientist (vol. VII, No. 9, May 1964) ; Dr. George A. Miller. An Overview of the Behavioral Sciences. A Position for the National Institutes of Health Conference Report. (Washington, NIH, 1966), 76 pages ; and other references in : U.S. Con- gress. House. Committee on Government Operations. The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs. A Staff Study for the Research and Technical Programs Sub- committee of the ♦ * * 90th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967) (committee print), four parts: I. Federally Financed Soclrl Research — ■ Expenditures, Status, and Objectives : II. The Adequacy and Usefulness of Federally Financed Research on Major National S5ocial Problems : III. The Relation of Private Social Scientists to Federal Programs on National Social Problems ; and IV. Current Issues on the Administration of Federal Social Research. 128 II. Establishment of the Issue Before the Administration of John F. Kennedy, most military appli- cations of social science research in foreign countries were on an ad hoc basis in wartime — the study of military government in occupied terri- tory, propaganda and psychological warfare, morale questions, and related subjects. A modest peacetime effort in applied research abroad was sponsored by the Office of Naval Research in 1946, involving a contract with Ruth Benedict and later Margaret Mead to "* * * study culture at a distance" to help in the administration by the Navy of Pacific island communities.- Other peacetime applications of social science research by the Nation's militai-y establishment were centered on manpower, training, organization, and problems of human factors engineering in connection with weapon system development. Military uses of hehavioral research in foreign areas Early in his Administration, President Kennedy was motivated by the first Cuban crisis and other manifestations of political instability in developing countries to increase the U.S. capability in dealing with "guerrilla forces, insurrections, and subversion." Such a capability would entail a general strengthening of military resources of anthropo- logical, cultural, and other social science data in relevant areas of the world. In his March 28, 1961, message on the defense budget, the Presi- dent said that the U.S. interests were threatened by limited guerrilla warfare such as had brought Castro to power in Cuba. To counter the threat of being "nibbled to death," as the President expressed it, the United States needed to strengthen the capability for conventional (i.e., nonnuclear) and lower levels of intensity of conflict. It was evident that the President's concept of warfare would generate a re- quirement for background material on social dynamics. Said the message : To meet our own extensive commitments and needed improvements in conven- tional forces, I recommend tlie follov^ing : A Strengthened capacity to meet limited and guerilla warfare * * *. We need a greater ability to deal vpith guerilla forces, insurrections, and subversion. Much of our effort to create guerilla and anti- guerilla capabilities has in the past been aimed at general v^'ar. We must be ready now to deal with any size of force, including small externally supported bands of men ; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective.^ The Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, was charged with reconstructing DOD to fill this mission. It involved such changes in the DOD as the bringing in of civilians trained in systems analysis and social and behavioral sciences research and enlargement of DOD's in- ternal and external social research program. The substantial increase in Defense spending for foreign area re- search in the social sciences contrasted markedly with the level of effort in tlie Department of State in sponsoring corresponding researches. The Defense social research program in 1961 amounted to $17.17 mil- lion for psychological research and $0,215 million for social science research. However, by 1964, Defense expenditures for psychological research had risen to $31.1 million and for social science research had 2 Luisi Petrullo. Government Sponsorship of Overseas Research. Paper presented in a symposium on "Psychology, Government, and Overseas Research" at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C., September 1967. American Psy- chologist (vol. 23, No. 2. February 1968), p. 108. * President John F. Kennedy. Special message to the Congress on the defense budget. In Public Papers of the Presidents — John P. Kennedy, 1961. (Washington, U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1962), p. 236. 129 risen to $5.7 million. In 1965, when the total Federal expenditure for foreign area research in the social sciences totaled $30 million, the De- partment of State accomited for less than 1 percent of this amount.^ And in 1967 while the Department of Defense spent $13.1 million on foreign area social science research, the Department of State spent only $1.35 million. ( See the following tables :) V.8. Government agency obligations for social and behavioral research on foreign areas and international affairs * Fiscal year 1967 ^Oency Internal Agency for International Development: breakdown Total Central research $4, 4.51, 922 Regional bureaus 917,000 $5, 368, 922 Departure of Agriculture 525, 062 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency : Social, economic, and be- havioral sciences 985, 286 Department of Defense: Army $4, 853, 005 Navy 331, 762 Air Force 1,946,289 Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) 3,937,000 International security affairs 1, 947, 632 Systems analysis (Office of Secretary of Defense) _ 90, 337 13, 106, 025 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare : Office of Education $1, 942, 789 Public Health Service 3, 418, 890 Social and Rehabilitational Service 4, 742, 691 10, 104, 370 Executive Office of the President : National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development 561, 477 National Endowment for the Humanities : Division of Fellowships and Stipends $.506, 250 Division of Research and Publications 386, 190 892 440 National Science Foundation : Social Science Division $5,579,850 Economic and Manpower Studies 107, 000 5, 686, 850 Peace Corps 292, 829 Smithsonian Institution 920, 231 Department of State : External research $125, 000 International educational and cultural exchange program : American research scholars 745, 790 Assistance to centers for research and study aboard 480, 889 1, 351, 679 U.S. Information Agency ,537, 887 Miscellaneous programs 280.' 895 Total 40, 613, 953 iFAR Horizons (March 1968), p. 2. * Behavioral Sciences and the National Security, Rept. No. 4, p. 6-R. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Behavioral Sciences and the National Security Kept No. 4, together with pt. IX of the hearings on Winning the Cold War : The U.S. Ideological Offensive, by the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the * * * Pursuant to H. Res. 84, A Resolution Authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Conduct Thorough Studies and Investigations of AH Matters Coming Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee, Dec. 6, 1965. 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